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Abstract
This thesis argues that party ideologies are made up of a series of issues that vary in the 
extent of their interconnections. This approach to party programmes builds on 
Converse’s (1964) description of belief systems and on Downs’ (1957) understanding 
of ideologies. The concept of policy interconnections, originally applied to voter 
preferences, can also be used to understand party ideologies. In fact, parties are likely to 
exhibit stronger interconnections than voters. The strength, nature and effect of policy 
interconnections are examined for 23 Western European and English-speaking 
democracies using two expert surveys and the dataset of the Comparative Manifesto 
Project.
Three distinctions need to be made in order to understand how party policies are 
interconnected. First, linkages between issues are based either on an inherent logic or 
on historical and sociological circumstance. Logic-based interconnections are more 
consistent across contexts than circumstance-based interconnections. Moreover, parties 
are more likely to alter policy stances on two areas simultaneously if the issues are 
linked through logic. Second, linkages exist for position and salience, but salience 
interconnections are weaker than their positional counterparts. This helps explain the 
strategic attraction of salience manipulation. Finally, positions can be more extreme or 
more moderate than the overall mean party preferences, a characteristic termed the 
‘degree of unusualness’. Parties are likely to stress such unusual positions, especially if 
they are small, niche competitors.
3
The findings of this thesis have important implications for the study of party 
competition. For example, strategies such as vote-maximization and salience 
manipulation are directly affected by the impact of policy interconnections. This 
approach therefore significantly extends existing spatial models of party competition 
and challenges some of their assumptions. As interconnections influence voter choice 
and coalition formation, there are also broader implications for political representation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In his 2005 novel Saturday, Ian McEwan describes a competitive and emotion-filled 
squash game between Henry Perowne, an English surgeon, and his American colleague 
Jay Strauss (McEwan, 2005, p. 100). Saturday is, among other things, a political novel 
that takes on the subject of the Iraq War, and the fraught squash game takes place on 15 
February 2003 -  the same day as the largest march in London in opposition to the 
planned US-led invasion. Henry Perowne, the main character of the novel, is nervous 
about the impending war and not sure about his views. His American opponent, Jay 
Strauss, does not suffer from such uncertainties and is clearly in favour of the invasion: 
‘Iraq is a rotten state, a natural ally of terrorists, bound to cause mischief at some point 
and may as well be taken out now while the US military is feeling perky after 
Afghanistan. And by taken out, [Jay] insists he means liberated and democratised.’
But Jay Strauss is no raving neo-con. He is a great supporter of the National 
Health Service and is known for his love of children, of which he has five. As Perowne 
notes, ‘The proposed war ... generally doesn’t divide people predictably; a known 
package of opinions is not a reliable guide.’ The Iraq War, McEwan suggests, was so 
troubling to Perowne in part because it did not fit into existing schemes of ideologies. 
Neither support for socialised medicine nor a general love of humanity was a useful 
heuristic. By implication, opinions on the war also cross-cut the left-right opinions that 
characterise political competition in most countries. Whether this is true or not is
15
debateable, but Ian McEwan’s account nevertheless illustrates two important aspects of 
political ideologies.
The first is that ideologies can be summarised as packages of opinions. They are 
a series of views on different and distinct issues. Of course, there is more to an ideology 
than just a collection of opinions. As Converse (1964) argues, these views have to be 
coherent in some way in order to be called an ideology. Ideologies are a ‘set of idea 
elements’, but that is not enough: they also have to be ‘bound together’ (Gerring, 1997, 
p. 970). This coherence means that ideologies can often be used to predict people’s 
views on individual topics. This predictive capacity is the second aspect of ideologies 
that McEwan alludes to. As Poole (2005, p. 12) notes, ideology is ‘the knowledge of 
what goes with what’. McEwan argues that the Iraq War was so unusual a political 
event in part because it was difficult to predict positions from other ideological views. 
The implication is that in general it is possible to fit political views on issues of the day 
into the rest of the ‘known package of opinions’.
Thinking of individual voters’ political ideologies in this way is well-established 
in political science. One of the key contributions is Converse’s 1964 study of the 
coherence of packages of opinion among citizens. He examines to what extent voters 
can be seen as ideological actors, that is, as actors who possess a minimal level of 
coherence and consistency in their views. Converse’s work has been highly influential, 
and debate about the political sophistication of electorates continues (e.g., Critical 
Review: A Journal of Politics and Society, 2006; Converse, 2007; Kulinski and Peyton, 
2007). Importantly, Converse describes an individual’s political views as a collection of 
positions on different issues, which are ideological if there is coherence to these views. 
In other words, the series of views we have on separate issues are connected in some 
way, perhaps through underlying values and beliefs that provide the foundation for our
16
individual opinions. Converse came to the conclusion, since challenged, that many 
people in fact hold incoherent and therefore unideological views on political matters.
The political ideologies of individual citizens have thus been described and 
analysed as packages of policy views. To be ideological, these views have to be 
characterised by their interconnections rather than mutual independence. This 
framework can also be applied to the programmes espoused by political parties. It is 
largely uncontroversial to argue that parties take decisions on their views on a series of 
issue areas, so that their overall programmes take the shape of a package of policy 
positions. However, there are two strands within political party research concerning the 
existence of interconnections within party ideologies. A first strand, which simplifies 
the argument originally made by Downs (1957), posits that political parties are 
motivated primarily by the prospect of electoral success. Downs (1957, p.28) thus 
famously argued that parties formulate policies in order to win elections instead of 
winning elections to implement policies. If parties care solely about their electoral 
success, then party ideologies are likely to be developed without regard to the linkages 
between issue areas. A second strand, following arguments made by Wittman (1973, 
1983), takes the opposing view. Here, parties are ‘solely interested in policy and ... 
winning elections is just a means to an end’ (Wittman, 1973, p. 495). If parties are 
policy-motivated and sincere, then their ideologies will exhibit the strong 
interconnections also found among politically sophisticated citizens. Within the 
literature on party ideologies there are thus two poles with opposing views on the 
existence of interconnections in party programmes.
In this thesis, I argue that the ideologies of political parties are packages of 
interconnected opinions and views. Indeed, parties may be more likely than voters to 
strive for coherence among their policy positions. There are three reasons for this. First,
17
parties gain electoral benefits from presenting themselves to voters as ideological 
actors. Without a coherent programme, parties will arguably find it difficult to credibly 
commit to implementing promised polices (Hinich and Munger, 1994). This means that 
parties may not be able to convince voters they will actually implement what they 
promise unless they can show that an ideological commitment underlies their 
programme. A coherent and consistent programme may also help to attract committed 
activists. Conversely, appearing inconsistent and incoherent is potentially dangerous: 
voters are likely to punish parties that present inconsistent and contradictory 
programmes to the public (Downs, 1957). Political parties thus often present themselves 
as expressly ideological actors who aim to realise specific goals in accordance with 
sincerely held beliefs. Even if this is just a facade, parties will act as if it were true 
because an ideology has such clear electoral rewards. A second reason why parties are 
more likely to be ideologically coherent than voters is that parties tend to discuss and 
debate their overall policy programme at length, which means that clearly illogical 
views are likely to be changed. Finally, the policy-makers in parties are well-educated, 
highly specialised elites -  precisely the kind of people who tend to think in 
ideologically coherent terms (Converse, 1964).
Of course, parties are not unitary actors, which make them very different from 
voters. For example, parties will not suffer from the ‘cognitive dissonance’ that 
ideological incoherence might create in voters. Nevertheless, there is sufficient reason 
to believe that party programmes can be characterised as packages of connected policy 
positions, and that these connections are in fact stronger than among voters.
With regard to policy interconnections the distinction in the literature between 
vote- and policy-seeking parties is therefore largely a false one. Parties that desire 
electoral success have a significant incentive to present coherent, simple programmes to
18
the public, so that their individual policy positions will be interconnected. In addition, 
Downs (1957) discusses at length why it makes strategic sense for vote-seeking parties 
to at least appear to be pursuing the realisation of sincere ideological preferences. On 
the other hand, parties that only want to implement their favoured policies will discuss 
their programme at length internally and exhibit the tight interconnections that are 
characteristic of elite actors. Parties will thus act ideologically whether their 
fundamental motivation is winning elections or implementing policy.
This thesis therefore argues that parties’ views on different issues will be 
interconnected, as expected of ideological actors. However, the precise nature of these 
linkages also needs to be examined. There are two aspects to this line of inquiry. First, 
it is worth knowing how particular issues in political competition are linked to each 
other -  say, for example, economic policy and the environment. Second, there may also 
be systematic patterns that underlie the ways in which issue positions are 
interconnected. The first part of the research question of this thesis is thus: ‘How are 
issues within party ideologies interconnected?’
The linkages between the policy views that make up a party’s package of 
opinions may also have an effect on how parties compete, and this is why policy 
interconnections matter. Mainly, they can act as a constraint on the freedom of political 
parties, further limiting Downsian vote-maximising strategies. Some combinations of 
policy positions may be unlikely or unattractive to a party because they entail tolerating 
a certain level of incoherence. In addition, if an issue is strongly interconnected with 
others, then a party may be less able to move on that issue than it wishes. The full 
research question of this thesis is then: ‘How are issues within party ideologies 
interconnected, and how does this affect party competition?’
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The characteristics and effects of policy interconnections
In this thesis, I build on Converse’s framework for thinking about ideologies in order to 
construct a theory of policy interconnections for political parties. I therefore suggest 
that party ideologies can be deconstructed into individual issue components and their 
links to each other. In other words, the overall ideological profile of a political party is 
an issue system made up of a series of elements that vary in the extent to which they are 
interconnected. The components of these issue systems have two aspects: a position and 
a given salience. If each element represents a distinct issue or policy area that a political 
party has a stance on, then each such component contains information regarding the 
precise view of the party (i.e. its position) and how important it thinks this topic is (i.e. 
its salience).1 This view of issue systems combines the spatial and the salience models 
of party competition (Downs, 1957; Budge and Farlie, 1983), in line with other recent 
work on party strategies (e.g. Meguid, 2008).
I highlight three characteristics of policy interconnections. The first two apply 
Converse’s distinction between static and dynamic linkages to party ideologies. To 
Converse, an ideological voter is characterised by two features: first, it is possible to 
predict her position on one issue by her position on other issues, and second, if she 
changes her views on one topic she will also change her stance on other, closely related 
matters. Converse calls these two aspects of ideological coherence ‘static’ and 
‘dynamic’ interconnections. It is also possible to apply these concepts to the issue 
systems of political parties. A static interconnection between two policy areas thus 
means that it is possible to predict a party’s position on one of those issues from its 
stance on the other. The existence of a dynamic interconnection will cause a party to
1 In this thesis, some words will be used interchangeably in order to avoid repetition. This applies to 
‘policy area’, ‘issue’ and ‘topic’, which I take to mean the same thing, and to ‘interconnections’,
‘linkages’ and ‘ties’.
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change its views on two issues at the same time and in a similar way. While static 
interconnections refer to one point in time, their dynamic counterparts are concern 
changes in party policy. The third characteristic introduced in this thesis is the 
unusualness of issue positions. A position is unusual to the extent to which it is more 
extreme or more centrist than the party’s general average stance. Due to its outlier 
character, it is difficult to predict an unusual position from the party’s overall policy 
profile, so unusualness is a concept linked to static interconnections.
Not all interconnections are the same. While they of course vary in strength, 
another important difference is the source of the linkage. Again following Converse’s 
(1964) work, I suggest that there are two types of interconnection sources: logic and 
circumstance. Logic-based interconnections are those where there is an inherent link 
between the two policy areas. Milyo (2000) gives the well-known example of a budget 
constraint: increased expenditure on guns may require spending less on butter. 
Circumstance is a more complicated basis for interconnections. The reasons behind this 
type of linkage lie in the connections forged by history and society. For example, the 
ties between two positions may simply be perceived as logically necessary (Converse, 
1964). Poole argues that in the United States the link between gun control and abortion 
rights in an example of such a perceived logical connection (Poole, 2005). Another 
possibility is that some views tend to co-occur within certain segments of society, 
leading them to be associated with one another. A possible example for this are views 
on New Politics issues: Green parties tend to be in favour of liberal immigration rules 
and tight environmental regulation, but the ties between these positions are probably 
more due to the origins o f this movement among well-to-do urban strata than any 
inherent logical connection. Differentiating between logic and circumstance as sources 
of interconnections is important because logic-based linkages are by their very nature
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stronger. They are thus more likely to re-appear across different contexts and are more 
likely to be dynamic as well as static.
Policy interconnections have four key consequences for party competition. First, 
issues differ in the extent they are statically interconnected. This means that the range 
of positions a party can take on one issue varies depending on its position on a second 
issue. Some issues are therefore more flexible than others, and parties are then freer to 
take up or change position on such policy areas. Issue pairs without connections are the 
most flexible, followed first by those connected through circumstance and finally those 
linked by logic. Second, issues vary in the extent they are dynamically interconnected, 
that is, how much movement or policy change on two topics is correlated. Again, 
dynamic interconnections limit a party’s freedom of policy choice. Dynamic 
interconnections are more likely if the static interconnection is based on logic. Third, 
salience interconnections are in general weaker than position interconnections. This 
means that parties are freer in terms of salience choices than they are when it comes to 
deciding on their position. Finally, parties emphasise those issues that are unusually 
extreme within their overall package of positions. This reflects a need to carve out an 
electoral niche and develop a unique profile. Consequently, it is mainly small parties 
who engage in this strategic behaviour. While the first two consequences thus refer 
mainly to limitations on vote-maximising behaviour, the second two relate salience 
change to issue interconnections.
Policy interconnections are of course not the same for all parties. They may 
depend on the particular historical context of the country or party family and can also 
change over time. This applies in particular to circumstance-based interconnections, 
which grow out of the specific historical and social context of a party. Logic-based 
linkages should, on the other hand, remain relatively constant across time, countries and
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party families. In this thesis, I take these various differences into account. Nevertheless, 
the main aim is to look at broad, cross-national patterns in the nature of issue systems. I 
thus focus on the similarities rather than the differences across contexts.
In accordance with this aim, my empirical approach uses two datasets that 
provide information on a series of issues. The first source of data is two expert surveys 
carried out by Laver and Hunt in 1989 and by Benoit and Laver in 2002-3 (Laver and 
Hunt, 1992; Benoit and Laver, 2006). These expert surveys contain positional and 
salience information for six issues, four of which were asked in both rounds. The 
second source of data is the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al., 2001; 
Klingemann et al., 2007). This large cross-national research endeavour has analysed 
party manifestos since 1945 using a single coding scheme. I extract party positions and 
issue salience for ten issues based on the 56 categories coded. This dataset, although 
more complex in structure than the expert surveys, provides an important across-time 
element that allows me to examine party policy change in detail. In total, I consider 
party positions and issue salience in 23 countries (mainly located in Western Europe 
and the English-speaking world). Throughout the thesis, the findings from the two data 
sources are compared, with consistent results taken as strong support for my theoretical 
arguments (Marks, 2007).
Theoretical contributions
This thesis contributes most clearly to the study of party competition: it furthers the 
debate on the nature of political ideologies and suggests additional considerations that 
affect the strategic behaviour of political parties. The claims advanced here also have 
relevance for the broader study of political representation, as issue interconnections can
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limit the freedom of choice of voters and can influence coalition formation and thus 
public policy outcomes.
First, the theory of issue interconnections as applied to political parties makes an 
important theoretical contribution to the study of party ideologies. It is not usual to 
present ideologies as issue systems made up of variously connected components. 
However, I argue that this is a simple and useful way of understanding what a party’s 
ideology actually is. This thesis therefore provides an answer (‘a package of 
interconnected policy positions’) to a constitutive question (‘what is a party ideology?’), 
and the answer in itself sets the foundation for an explanation of party behaviour 
(Wendt, 1998). Conceiving of party ideologies as issue systems is built on Converse’s 
framework designed for voter beliefs, but it is also relevant for Downs’ (1957) 
suggestions concerning the ideological coherence of political parties.
Even though Downs is now often seen as a rational-choice scholar with simple 
vote-seeking assumptions concerning the motives and behaviour of political actors, a 
re-reading of his 1957 work shows that his understanding of ideology is relatively 
complex. Ideology, which he defines as ‘a verbal image of the good society and of the 
chief means of constructing such a society’ (1957: 96), is first and foremost a useful 
‘cost-saving device’ (1957: 99). Voters thus use ideologies to decide which party to 
support without having to find out information on all the party’s positions. This means 
that parties can try to fashion an ideology that will generate electoral success. To attract 
votes, parties need to be ‘responsible and reliable’ (Downs 1957: 109). As a result, it is 
rational for parties to exhibit a certain consistency in their policies: ‘Any party which is 
both responsible and reliable will probably have an ideology which is relatively 
coherent and immobile’ (ibid.). In sum, Downs provides a vote-seeking motivation for 
programmatic coherence.
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Downs’ approach to ideology has remained relatively under-employed in 
political science research, with the work of Hinich and Munger a notable exception 
(Munger and Hinich, 1993; Hinich and Munger, 1994; Hinich and Munger, 2008). 
Mostly, however, the vote-seeking approach has been taken to indicate non-ideological 
party behaviour, and party programmes in this simplified view would not be 
characterised by issue linkages. The policy interconnections approach to party 
ideologies presented in this thesis builds on Downs’ claims regarding the attractions and 
consequences of ideologies and suggests that party programmes will be characterised 
by interconnections whether they are motivated by policy implementation or by 
electoral success. Those who assume parties and politicians to be policy-motivated, 
such as Wittman (1973, 1983), would undoubtedly agree that party ideologies are 
characterised by policy interconnections, but linkages between issue areas should also 
develop if we assume parties to be mainly interested in increasing their vote share. A 
pure vote-seeking approach that ignores the fact that a party will develop policy 
interconnections is not an accurate representation of party preferences and behaviour. 
Instead, party programmes are ideologies in the sense defined by Converse (1964): they 
are packages of interconnected policy programmes.
The policy interconnections approach is related to studies of party system 
dimensionality. This term refers to the number of underlying conflicts that are needed to 
adequately summarise the distribution of policy positions of political parties on all 
salient issues. For example, it is often argued that many countries have two-dimensional 
party systems, with economic issues on the first dimension and issues related to 
liberalism and authoritarianism on the second (Kitschelt, 1994; Hooghe et al., 2002). 
The conceptual underpinning of issue interconnections is similar to that of party system 
dimensionality, with both based, for example, on a spatial model of party competition.
25
However, dimensionality is a system-wide concept, while issue interconnections refer 
to the ideologies of each party individually. The level of analysis in this thesis is 
therefore lower. Nevertheless, there are important connections between these two 
concepts. In particular, dimensionality may affect the circumstance-based 
interconnections present within party ideologies, while issue systems can influence the 
nature and evolution of party system dimensionality. This thesis therefore contributes to 
the dimensionality literature by providing a related but lower-level analysis and 
suggesting a further cause for the level of dimensionality and its change.
The second theoretical contribution of this thesis relates to the strategic 
behaviour of political parties. The two key debates addressed are the limits to Downsian 
vote-maximising strategies and the use of salience as an electoral tool. Downs (1957) 
suggests that parties’ main and even overriding goal is to win votes. For example, he 
argues that this is the primary reason they formulate an ideology at all. However, this 
very simple approach to party goals has been nuanced in the years since 1957 
(Grofman, 2004). Famously, the number of party goals has been extended to include 
office and policy (Budge and Laver, 1986; Strom, 1990). In addition, the relatively 
strong assumptions underlying Downs’ model have been relaxed. Modifications that 
have been suggested include probabilistic voting (Cox, 1987; Hinich and Munger, 
1997) and the influence of party activists (Aldrich, 1983; Laver, 1997; Schofield, 2003) 
and of campaign donors (Miller and Schofield, 2003).
These party goals are important because they also provide different explanations 
for why parties move -  or fail to do so. While Downsian vote-maximising strategies 
would appear to mean that parties will move wherever there are votes to be had, 
Downs’ own conception of ideology, as described above, means that there is a certain 
rationality to sticking to previous commitments and remaining relatively immobile.
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Party activists and campaign donors may also tear parties away from pure vote- 
maximising strategies by insisting that their programme be realised. As Downs himself 
acknowledged, his prediction of median convergence does not hold in multi-party 
settings, which of course make up the majority of party systems in the world. Finally, 
niche parties may have a particular incentive to carve out their own political home 
within a party system, and this is often located far from the party-political median 
(Meguid, 2005; Adams et al., 2006; Ezrow, 2008b).
This thesis adds to this debate by providing a further reason why parties cannot 
pursue pure vote-maximising strategies. The dynamic interconnections between issues 
mean that parties cannot move on each issue at will. Instead, they will have 
consequences for other policy positions within the party’s programme. If the party fails 
to adapt its overall ideological package accordingly, it may gain a reputation as an 
incoherent and inconsistent actor -  and, as Downs argues, this is electorally 
disadvantageous. Unless a party is therefore willing to carry out policy change on the 
series of tightly interconnected issues, it will be reluctant to maximise votes.
The policy interconnections approach also has relevance for the role of salience 
within party strategies. The salience theory of party competition was originally 
suggested as an alternative to the Downsian spatial model, with the main argument 
being that parties tend to ‘talk past each other’ when they compete, instead of 
confronting each other over specific policy choices (Budge and Farlie, 1983). In the 
salience model, parties thus stress those topics on which they have an electoral 
advantage and de-emphasise those on which they are weak. Recently, there has been a 
revival of interest in salience as a feature of party competition, though this time it is 
generally integrated into the spatial model (Meguid, 2008; Tavits, 2008; Libbrecht et 
al., 2009; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009).
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This thesis adds to this recent renewal of interest in two ways. First, I suggest 
that it is right to see salience as a more flexible element of party strategies than position 
(Petrocik, 1996; Steenbergen and Scott, 2004). In other words, salience 
interconnections are generally weaker than position interconnections. This means that 
parties face fewer constraints when trying to modify the salience levels of individual 
issues. Second, certain issue positions are more likely to be stressed than others. In 
particular, there is a strong incentive for some parties to emphasise unusually extreme 
views (as defined above). I therefore provide an additional explanation for varying 
salience levels by considering the place of the relevant policy position within the 
party’s overall profile. This argument also ties into the examination of Downsian vote- 
maximising strategies, as the emphasis on unusually extreme issues goes against the 
predictions that this most simple approach to party goals would make.
Finally, this thesis also has relevance outside the field of party competition 
research. In particular, it affects the possibility of political representation through 
parties (Pitkin, 1972; Stimson et al., 1995; Miller et al., 1999; Powell, 2000). In this 
process, parties stand between voters on the one hand and governments and policy 
outputs on the other. Policy interconnections in party ideologies limit both the freedom 
of choice open to voters as well as the process of coalition formation.
Issue interconnections limit voter choice because they restrict the number of 
policy combinations that are likely to be presented to voters. If voting took place on 
each policy area or even each individual topic separately, issue interconnections would 
not be a restriction. However, in representative democracy the choices open to voters 
are essentially package deals (Thomassen, 1999, p. 34), so that it becomes important 
how parties are likely to combine different issue positions into a whole programme that 
is then presented to voters. If, as I have argued, the tendency towards interconnections
28
is stronger within parties than within voters, then issue linkages provide a further 
restriction on the types of choices voters can make. This problem is akin to that posed 
by low dimensionality. In small party systems, it is no surprise that competition will 
take place on relatively few dimensions. However, larger party systems could feasibly 
create more complex dimensionality, but this is rarely the case (Miller et al., 1999; 
Benoit and Laver, 2006). Policy interconnections could provide one reason for the 
relatively simple choices presented to voters, in addition to factors such as the 
usefulness of left-right as a heuristic device and the low political sophistication of 
voters. The flipside of this simplicity is of course that more unusual or complex 
constellations of preferences among voters will not find representation easily.
Issue interconnections can also influence processes of coalition formation and 
thus the resulting policy outputs. The effects are here less direct than the limitation on 
voter choices but are nevertheless possible. For one, issue interconnections influence 
party system dimensionality, as noted above. The dimensionality of a party system is 
important in shaping the likelihood and attractiveness of various coalitions and in 
increasing the complexity of the process. For example, a major feature of theoretical 
debate has been the underlying instability of coalition of multidimensional spaces 
(McKelvey, 1976; Schofield, 1978) as well as solutions to that problem (Laver and 
Shepsle, 1995; Adams and Adams, 2000). If issue interconnections are important for 
understanding party system dimensionality, then they also have consequences for our 
understanding of coalition formation. The interconnections between issues may also 
influence which coalition partners appear attractive to a party in search of parliamentary 
support. If the two parties fit well except for their opposing positions on one issue, the 
two parties’ amenability to compromise on that topic may depend on how closely it is 
integrated to these parties’ overall policy profile.
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Empirical contributions
This thesis has relevance beyond its theoretical contributions to the study of party 
competition and political representation. In particular, it adds empirical knowledge to 
two areas of party-political research: first, it maps in detail the static and dynamic issue 
interconnections for position and salience as well as the occurrence of ‘unusual’ issue 
positions, and second, it presents a way of measuring party positions on a series of 
issues over time using the Comparative Manifesto Project.
First, this research maps the connections between the distinct issues in party 
competition. The contribution here is twofold. First, it is established to what extent 
party ideologies can be described as packages of interconnected policy positions. It is 
not uncontroversial within the literature on party ideologies to argue that parties possess 
coherent, well-structured ideologies. This debate is evident in the aforementioned 
contrast between vote- and policy-seeking parties (Downs, 1957; Witmann, 1973, 
1983). The empirical work in this thesis explicitly considers how distinct issues within 
parties’ policy programmes are interconnected. The ties between issues are examined 
from a number of different and innovative angles. The main body of my empirical work 
concentrates on measuring static and dynamic interconnections for both position and 
salience across 23 countries. In examining static linkages, party ideologies are analysed 
at lower levels of aggregation: the differences between the economic left and right, 
between party families and between families of nations are thus considered in detail. 
Finally, this research concludes with an assessment of the existence of ‘unusual’ issue 
preferences, defined as positions that are relatively extreme or moderate compared to 
the party’s mean position. Second, the range of issues included in my analysis is very 
broad, and as a result the amount of empirical information provided consequently large. 
In the expert surveys, I consider a minimum of six issues for each of the two years,
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while in the manifestos I cover ten distinct policy areas. The empirical mapping of 
linkages between issues is therefore the first major empirical contribution of this thesis.
Second, this thesis develops a way of measuring party positions on ten issues 
using existing manifesto data. The Comparative Manifesto Project has been the subject 
of continued debate concerning its usefulness as a source of information on party 
positions. While the dataset provides a wealth of information due to its breadth of 
coverage both in terms of parties included and of the categories coded, the measurement 
approach, which is based on the salience theory of party competition, does not provide 
direct information on party positions. However, it is this information which most 
political science research would require. As a result, a variety of methods have been 
developed that relatively successfully extract left-right positions from the manifesto 
data (Budge and Laver, 1992a; Laver and Garry, 2000; Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006). 
They have been cross-validated with other sources of information, with generally 
satisfactory results, and have been used to investigate a variety of research questions. 
Despite its imperfections, the CMP data therefore has gained a measure of 
respectability as a source of left-right policy positions.
Given the nature of my research topic, a simple left-right measure is of course 
not useful. However, the CMP data has not generally been seen as a possible source of 
information on positions beyond the left-right dimension (Dalton, 2009, p. 165), and 
even the left-right measure has been criticised (Pelizzo, 2003; Benoit and Laver, 2006). 
As part of the research into policy interconnections, I propose a way of using the CMP 
data to measure and use positional information on ten issue areas. The approach builds 
on the subtractive left-right method suggested by Budge and Laver (1992a) and on the 
salience measurement carried out by Stoll (Stoll, 2005, 2008). Using this approach, the 
CMP can provide information on ten issues ranging from economic policy and liberal-
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authoritarianism to urban-rural relations and education. This new method of analysing 
CMP data is the main methodological advance of this research.
Plan of the thesis
This thesis is made up of two theoretical and five empirical chapters, with a conclusion 
that sums up my findings and provides ideas for future research. The first two chapters 
contain the main theoretical contribution. Chapter 2 places this research into the context 
of the existing literature and provides the motivation for this study. First, it describes 
and justifies the use of the spatial model of party competition, which underlies most of 
the arguments made in this thesis. Second, it outlines the concepts of issue constraints 
and interconnections and provides reasons why it should be applied to party ideologies. 
Finally, this first chapter also addresses the theory of party system dimensionality, a 
concept closely related to that of policy interconnections.
Chapter 3 builds on this groundwork and presents the theory of policy 
interconnections in party competition. It begins with a definition of issue systems and 
static and dynamic interconnections before considering the probable patterns of 
variation between parties -  for example by left and right, by country and by party 
family, as well as within issue systems -  for example between position and salience or 
across time. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how policy interconnections 
influence party competition, especially in terms of party system dimensionality, 
Downsian vote-maximization, citizen choices and policy outcomes.
Chapter 4 considers the advantages and disadvantages of different measurement 
approaches of issue interconnections. The issues contained in the two expert surveys 
and the party manifestos, the two sources of position and salience information used in 
this thesis, are then described in detail.
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Chapter 5 maps the existence of static interconnections, both across the 23 
countries in the aggregate as well as by economic left and right, by party family and by 
family of nations.
Chapter 6 uses the information on static interconnections to predict the existence 
of dynamic linkages. First, however, I present in detail how Downsian vote-maximising 
strategies by political parties can be restricted by dynamic interconnections and then 
map them, again using expert surveys and party manifestos. The results are compared to 
the findings on static interconnections, with particular attention paid to the difference 
between logic- and circumstance-based linkages.
Chapter 7 applies the theory of policy interconnections to salience. First, the 
salience theory of party competition is described, followed by an assessment of the 
applicability of policy interconnection theory to its study. I then map static and dynamic 
interconnections for salience using expert surveys and party manifestos.
Chapter 8 provides a different way of looking at the place of issue positions 
within policy profiles of political parties. It considers policy interconnections by 
examining the ‘unusualness’ of a party’s position on an issue compared to its mean 
position on all other issues. After empirically mapping this phenomenon, I consider 
whether parties increase their emphasis on policy areas where their positions are more 
unusual within their overall profile. Relative extremeness and relative centrism are 
compared and the institutional influences on this party behaviour assessed. The effect of 
unusualness on salience is assessed in a cross-sectional analysis as well as over time.
Finally, in the Conclusion I tie together the theoretical and empirical findings 
and summarise the core arguments in the light of the results as a whole. I finish by 
considering how this work has furthered and challenged existing research and by 
outlining possible ways this topic could be investigated further.
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Chapter 2
Constraints and dimensionality in party competition
Anybody who spends any time at all paying attention to political events will develop 
opinions on a whole range of topics: for example, an individual may oppose the 
invasion of Iraq, support the removal of the inheritance tax and also believe that the 
European Union is a bureaucratic behemoth. The development of opinions and 
positions, sophisticated or not, is a constant process in any political system. If there is 
an underlying consistency to these positions, it is possible to say that an ideology forms 
the basis and provides the source for the different opinions professed (Converse, 1964; 
Gerring, 1997). Issue positions are not created anew with each topic that emerges on the 
agenda; instead, there is a fundamental belief system from which opinions spring. In 
other words, our opinions are often linked to one another. For parties, too, issue 
positions are not independent, but are formed and persist in an environment 
characterised by significant constraints. In fact, these constraints may be stronger for 
parties than for voters.
This chapter presents three key approaches to studying political ideologies, each 
of which contributes to the theoretical basis of the present research: the spatial theory of 
party competition, individual-level issue constraints and party system dimensionality. 
The spatial theory of party competition is the foundation of any examination of 
ideological constraints. Though this theory is by now well-established, it may at first 
glance appear surprising that complex policy views can be summarized as numbers on a
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scale. I thus begin this chapter by explaining why it is possible to conceive of issue 
positions as numerical locations within a geometrical, ‘Euclidean’ space.
I then move on to consider how the links between issue areas have been 
examined at the level of voters and of party systems. The concept of issue constraints 
has so far only been directly applied to individual-level research, but I argue that it can 
be usefully employed to study party ideologies and programmes as well. Here, I 
consider in detail the reasons why issue constraints should exist within packages of 
party positions.
Finally, the links between issues in party competition have so far been analysed 
mainly using the concept of dimensionality, which applies the idea of issue constraints 
to the level of the political system. The focus of this thesis is not on party systems but 
rather on the attributes of particular parties and of specific policy interconnections, but 
the findings concerning dimensionality will provide a first indication of how different 
issue areas are linked. In this section, my discussion is centred on the approaches used 
to determine the dimensionality of party systems and on the various suggestions 
concerning the number and content of dimensions.
Issue positions as numerical locations: the spatial theory of party 
competition
One of the main foundations of this thesis is the spatial theory of party competition. 
According to this approach, parties compete by choosing positions on political issues, 
and these positions can be represented spatially. This means that it is possible to 
transform the policy stances of political parties into comparable numerical values. For 
example, using a scale from 1 to 9, a party at 5 would be in the political centre. A party 
at 3 or 7 would be equally distant from the political centre, but to different sides (the
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‘left’ and the ‘right’). Hotelling (1929) is generally credited with introducing into 
academic debate the idea that parties can be located along a single continuum; he also 
argued that they should converge on the median position of that dimension. He used the 
example of a small town where all the houses are situated along the main highway; 
given this set-up, the best location for two grocery stores would be adjacent to each 
other in the centre of town. Hotelling (1929, pp. 54-5) explicitly saw political 
competition between two parties as analogous. His approach was picked up by others 
(Smithies, 1941; Black, 1948, 1958), but it was Downs’ (1957) Economic Theory o f  
Democracy that really established spatial approaches to party competition in political 
science. Since then, it has become the foundation for most analyses of party politics.
The transformation of complex political debates into numerical scores can at 
first sight appear unusual and simplistic. Two objections could be made: politics is not a 
matter of geometry and it is too complex to be summarised in such simple terms. 
However, there is good reason to believe that the spatial approach actually reflects the 
way humans think about complex and abstract matters. Recent analyses of human 
cognition indicate that we tend to think in concepts borrowed from Newtonian 
mechanics (McGinn, 2007). Categories such as space, time and motion underlie much 
of our analysis of events and frame our thinking. It is likely that we see party politics in 
similar ways, so the spatial analysis of party competition reflects an instinctive 
cognitive approach to understanding politics. Indeed, it has become natural to say that a 
party is ‘to the left’ of another or moved ‘too far right’ to win the election. Geometrical 
and numerical comparison is an instinctive way of thinking about how parties compete.
Moreover, it is no surprise that complex political debates can be simplified into 
simple spatial terms. Poole (2005) gives a detailed explanation of the cognitive 
limitations that lead people to reduce the great number of possible issues to a reduced
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‘basic space’ with just one or two dimensions. Even if party elites could cope with the 
demands of a complex political world, this would not apply to voters (Downs, 1957). 
More precisely, there may be three reasons why parties reduce the complexity of their 
ideological offering: first, voters may find it difficult or impossible to process highly 
multidimensional information (‘cognitive limitations’); second, they may not be willing 
to spend the time and energy to understand complex platforms (‘cognitive costs’); and 
third, parties have limited resources to transmit their position to voters (‘advertising 
costs’) (Ferejohn, 1993, p. 112). Parties therefore have an incentive to simplify their 
political programmes into relatively clear and straightforward terms.
Of course, most research using the spatial theory of party competition does not 
restrict itself to very simple assessments of party positions which, for example, only 
state that one party is to the left or to the right of another. Instead, actual scores are 
usually assigned to each party, as indicated above, and this means that parties are seen 
as acting within a well-defined geometrical space. It is unlikely that voters regularly 
think of party positions in numerical terms, and even party elites may have a difficult 
time reducing complex views to a single number. However, this step from a general yet 
vague spatial approach to a clear-cut numerical world is not as far-fetched as it may 
seem. The numerical scores should only be seen as an approximation of real party 
positions, but one that can be surprisingly accurate. Moreover, the use of such detailed 
spatial models and testing has proved itself through a great number of empirical 
applications. The spatial understanding of party competition has found application in 
studies of voting behaviour and parliamentary politics and has yielded theoretically 
grounded, substantial results. For example, including policy distances has been 
consistently found to help explain voter preferences and voter choice (Clarke et al., 
2004; Duch and Stevenson, 2008), while parliamentary behaviour has been found to be
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related to the legislator’s spatial location (e.g. Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; Hix et al., 
2007). In other words, the spatial theory works. As a result, it is possible to conclude 
that geometrical, numerical spatial models provide a firm foundation for the study of 
party competition.
While this thesis builds on the spatial theory of party competition, I do not argue 
that parties only compete by taking up positions on geometrical (‘Euclidean’) 
dimensions. Instead, this is just one of parties’ possible actions, even if it is one of their 
most important choices. Apart from spatial positioning, parties also take decisions 
regarding the importance or salience of each political topic in their programme (Budge 
and Farlie, 1983). This feature of party competition is also addressed at length in this 
thesis and provides the focus of two chapters. Beyond policy competition, parties also 
try to gain a competency (or ‘valence’) advantage over their competitors (Stokes, 1963). 
Finally, it is even possible that political parties may simply hope that the fact that their 
candidate is more likeable, trustworthy or good-looking will boost electoral results. In 
line with recent research on party competition, I do not claim that one theory perfectly 
captures the nature and outcomes of political conflict. Instead, spatial positioning is just 
one -  but an important -  feature of how parties compete, and can usefully combined 
with other approaches (Kriesi et al., 2006; Meguid, 2008; Rohrschneider and 
Whitefield, 2009).
Issue constraints among voters and parties
Parties therefore compete at least partly by taking up positions on political issues. A 
party needs to decide on its stance on each politically relevant topic. In this thesis, I 
consider the extent to which these decisions are in fact independent and argue that it is 
unlikely that political parties are able to choose freely which position to take on each
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issue. Instead, parties are constrained in the way they combine stances on different 
policy areas. The idea of ‘issue constraints’ is taken from research into voter ideology 
(Converse, 1964) but can be applied to political parties. In fact, it may be that this 
concept actually has greater relevance for parties than for voters.
Voter preferences and issue constraints
This concept of ‘issue constraints’ as the key characteristic of coherent ideologies was 
first suggested by Converse (1964), who examined ‘belief systems’ among mass and 
elite publics. A belief system is ‘a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the 
elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence’ 
(1964, p. 207). In other words, constraints are the defining feature of belief systems, as 
they produce ideological coherence and consistency. Only if constraints exist can we 
say that a voter has a real ideology. Poole summarises the idea of constraints in simple 
terms: ‘ideology is the knowledge of what goes with what’ (2005, p. 12). Constraints 
are useful as they make it easier to interpret a complex reality. The more highly 
constrained political issues are, the more simply they can be summarised. At the 
extreme, single words -  Converse suggests ‘liberalism’ and ‘conservatism’ -  can 
transmit an extraordinary amount of information to the voter (Converse, 1964, p. 214).
To Converse, there are two aspects to issue constraints. First, in a static context, 
they ‘may be taken to mean the success we would have in predicting, given initial 
knowledge that an individual holds a specific attitude, that he holds certain further ideas 
and attitudes’ (1964, p. 207). For example, if we know that an American voter is in 
favour of abortion, we would also suspect that he or she would be in favour of gay 
marriage and against the death penalty. Second, in a dynamic context, constraints imply 
that changes in one element of a belief system ‘would psychologically require, from the
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point of view of the actor, some compensating change(s) in the status of idea-elements 
elsewhere in the configuration’ (1964, p. 208).
Where do these constraints come from? They spring from two sources: logic and 
circumstance. First, issue positions can be constrained because there is a logical 
connection between the two policy areas. Such constraints are therefore innate 
characteristics of the issue themselves. Two examples may help to illustrate this source 
of interconnection. First, we can think of a situation characterised by a budget 
constraint. Thus, the links between ‘government revenues, government expenditures 
and budget balance’ can be seen as the result of logical association (Converse, 1964, p. 
209; see also Milyo, 2000). When there is a restriction on the amount of money that can 
be spent, then there is necessarily a logical connection between two issues that require 
public expenditure: in the classic example, guns and butter. The second way we can 
think of logical sources of interconnections is by reference to underlying values. Finer 
(1987) and Bobbio (1996) both identified an economic and a liberty dimension to 
political ideologies. For them, all issues within each of those two dimensions are 
logically linked. This means that all politically relevant topics are related to either 
economic or liberty, and our views on each topic stems from our underlying ideological 
stance on one of these two dimensions. Of course, which issues are linked in terms of 
logic can be a matter of debate: it is unlikely that everyone will agree which issues are 
tied in terms of logic and which are not.
The second source of constraints identified by Converse is circumstance. These 
are constraints that exist through processes that are not clearly and relatively 
uncontroversially linked to an inherent logic that connects the two issues. According to 
Converse, the two sources of circumstantial constraints are quasi-logic and society.
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‘Quasi-logical’ sources of constraint are based on the consequences of ‘cogent 
argument’: these constraints spring not strictly from logic but have merely been 
experienced as ‘logically constrained clusters of ideas’ (Converse, 1964, p. 210). A 
truly logical interconnection means that that a position on one issue necessarily has to 
be combined with a certain position on a second issue. In the case of quasi-logical 
associations, this consequence is less stringent even though convincing arguments may 
underlie the interconnection. One example of this phenomenon is found in the United 
States: while the Democrats are generally against restrictions on personal liberties, e.g. 
abortion and divorce, they are in favour of strong gun control (Poole, 2005, p. 203). The 
same fundamental argument -  individual freedom -  could be seen as the value 
underlying support for both abortion rights and liberal gun laws. However, Democrats 
may prize more highly the freedom of living in a gun-free society. Quasi-logic 
constraints are based on well-founded arguments, but unlike logical constraints the 
direction of the ties is not well-defined. Thus, liberalism can serve as a justification for 
both restrictive and liberal gun laws; the actual nature of the link to abortion views is 
therefore less stringent and context-dependent. The historical evolution of the issues in 
the United States means that the constraints on these two issues have developed in 
opposite directions and are quite strong. The ties between issue positions eventually 
become ‘quasi-logical’ because citizens view the two issue positions as naturally 
associated, even if their actual basis is possibly up for debate.
Social issue constraints do not spring from logical or even quasi-logical sources. 
According to Converse (1964, p. 211), there are instead two ways in which social issue 
constraints can come into being. First, some views simply tend to co-occur due to the 
characteristics of certain segments of society. Each of these niches has specific interests 
and sources of information, so issue positions will become linked even without logical
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or quasi-logical necessity. For example, Green parties tend to be both strongly in favour 
of environmental protection and of liberal immigration and integration laws. The 
connection between the two is not strictly logical, but perhaps not surprising due to the 
social origins of environmental movements in well-to-do and well-educated social 
strata. Second, constraints are a result of the diffusion of ideologies within each social 
segment. Elites in each niche develop certain packages of beliefs that are then spread 
among all members of that segment. They eventually see these packages as ‘necessary 
wholes’. Patterns of ideological beliefs become self-perpetuating over time due to the 
parties’ need to appear credible and responsible and because of the path-dependent 
development of party programmes (Downs, 1957; Knight, 1992; Marks and Wilson, 
2000). There is clearly some overlap between Converse’s social and quasi-logical 
sources of constraints. However, what distinguishes merely social from quasi-logical 
constraints is the absence of even a perceived logical link between the two issues.
The central distinction remains that between logical and non-logical ties 
between two issues. In the first case, there is some stable, inherent and almost 
incontrovertible linkage between views on two topics. In contrast, non-logical ties -  be 
they quasi-logical or social -  stem from circumstance. The ties in this case are 
historically and socially contingent. In sum, constraints can be distinguished by the 
existence or absence of logical ties between the two issues in question, and this 
distinction is a key way of understanding differences between policy interconnections.
Sources o f  constraints on party ideologies
It is not obvious that political parties should be constrained in their ideologies. After all, 
they are not unitary actors: we should beware of the danger of anthropomorphising 
parties and expecting similar cognitive mechanisms to operate for parties in the same
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way as they operate for individuals. Moreover, there is no direct reason why purely 
vote-seeking parties should care whether their policy programmes is appropriately 
interconnected or not. In a simplified Downsian view, it is only important is whether the 
chosen policy positions promise electoral success. However, there is good reason to 
believe that political parties are in fact heavily constrained ideologically. Indeed, it is 
likely that the pressures leading to strong issue constraints are more important among 
parties than among voters.
Returning to the two sources of issue constraints identified for citizen belief 
systems, each should also apply to political parties, albeit for different reasons. First, 
the constraints may be the result of the dictates of logic. Downs (1957), for example, 
argues that parties have a need for coherent and stable ideologies. In his words: ‘Simple 
logic dictates that ... ideologies exhibit at least some coherence because no party can 
rationally espouse a policy set containing mutually exclusive proposals’ (1957, p. 109). 
This means that positions on different issues are not always distinct or separable. 
Separability is a common assumption in multidimensional spatial theories of voting: a 
party’s position on one issue does not limit its positions on other issues (an assumption 
criticised by Milyo, 2000; Benoit and Laver, 2006, pp. 25-31). However, as Milyo 
argues, trade-offs are at the heart of politics: in the classic example, spending more on 
guns means there is less money left for butter. In other words, all issues are in this view 
‘subject to some overarching budget constraint’ (Benoit and Laver, 2006, p. 29; see also 
Hinich and Munger, 2008). Parties will experience issue constraints because they 
attempt to formulate an internally coherent ideology.
Why should parties care about having a logically consistent platform? 
Presumably, an incoherent ideology will cost votes. Downs (1957) argues that parties 
will be punished if they seem incoherent and inconsistent. They will not propose ‘an
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unorganised jumble of policies’ (1957, p. 110) since they would then appear 
irresponsible and unreliable to voters. Since voters tend to use ideology as a shortcut in 
their decision-making and parties want to attract as many voters as possible, 
maintaining a level of coherence in the policy package is thus a strategic requirement 
for rationally acting parties. This view is echoed by Munger and Hinich (1993, p. 37), 
who argue that successful ideologies are characterised by logical and temporal 
consistency, that is, parties endorse the same policy in similar situations and do not 
radically change position on policies previously espoused. Parties do this because 
‘[vjoters evaluate candidates based on their reputations for probity, commitment and 
consistency’ (1993, p. 43).
Coherent ideologies are useful to parties as they help them to communicate their 
positions. Voters may not be inclined to spend a lot of time learning about each party’s 
precise programme (Downs, 1957; Ferejohn, 1993; Denzau and North, 1994). The cost 
to citizens of gaining such information is likely to be greater than the possibility that his 
or her vote will count in the election. However, ideologies provide an easy information 
shortcut. This is due to the nature of voter choice: in elections, political parties combine 
positions on salient issues into a package of policies. Electors do not decide on single 
issues. Instead, when voting for a particular party, they vote for the entire ‘package 
deal’ on offer (Thomassen, 1999, p. 34; Stimson, 2004). If the packages of positions 
that parties present to voters are heavily constrained, then one word -  Converse 
suggests ‘liberalism’ and ‘conservatism’ -  can transmit an extraordinary amount of 
information to the voter (1964, p. 214). Using simplified left-right terms reduces the 
transaction costs of communicating policy positions to voters (Downs, 1957, p. 96ff; 
cf. North, 1990). There is convincing evidence that voters often think in simple left- 
right terms rather than comparing, issue-by-issue, their position with that of parties
44
(Miller et al., 1999). Because political advertising and public position-taking can 
contain only very broad descriptions of party programmes, politicians cannot 
distinguish themselves very subtly from their opponents (Hinich and Munger, 2008). As 
a result, the use of relatively uncomplicated and thus highly constrained policy 
packages also has communication advantages for parties: establishing a ‘brand name’ is 
easier if ideological packages are kept simple (Snyder and Ting, 2002).
Finally, one of voters’ central concerns according to Munger and Hinich is the 
danger that parties will fail to implement the promised policies. Building an internally 
consistent ideology is one way for parties to convince voters that the party platform will 
indeed serve as the basis for action (Ferejohn, 1993; Hinich and Munger, 2008). 
Ideological coherence is how parties solve the problem of credible commitments: the 
main means by which parties persuade voters that they will not move -  the ‘primary 
goal of campaigns’ -  is ideology (Munger and Hinich, 1993, p. 42). While parties are 
not perfectly consistent, there is ‘a threshold above which contradictions in an ideology 
weaken its foundations of legitimacy and cause it to lose adherents rapidly’ (1993, 
p. 37).
Of course, the internal coherence of party programmes need not only stem from 
such instrumental concerns. Politicians may simply be pursuing their sincere beliefs 
(Adams and Adams, 2000, p. 148). After all, party elites are citizens too, so their policy 
goals will reflect the ‘underlying correlation structure that exists in the electorate’ 
(ibid.). As Converse (1964) notes, elites are more likely to hold consistent ideologies 
than the mass public. The sources of such ideological constraints among elite actors can 
be both logical and social. What is important is that these constraints will also be 
present in the programme formulated jointly by the party’s politicians. Even if we 
conceive of the party elite quite broadly, say to encompass all party activists, the level
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of information and political sophistication should mean that constraints among party 
leaders and members will be replicated within the party programme. This explanation 
for constrained policy spaces is related to the sociological view of party ideologies 
(Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; von Beyme, 1984). In this view, political parties have 
‘highly distinct and durable identities’ (Marks and Wilson, 2000, p. 434) whose 
historical origins are tightly linked with their ideology (Mair and Mudde, 1998). For 
example, von Beyme (1984) emphasises the ideological coherence and commonalities 
within party families. The historical evolution of party ideologies means that there is a 
clear social or circumstantial source of constraint on party programmes.
Looking beyond the party elite, voters provide another reason why we should 
expect party ideologies to be characterised by constraints. Parties generally seek to 
position themselves where there are voters, and since voters’ views tend to be 
characterised by a certain -  though imperfect -  level of interdependence, party 
programmes should exhibit similar constraints (Adams and Adams, 2000, p. 148). This 
source of issue constraints within party policies is notable because it is completely 
independent of a party’s desire or concern for internal coherence. Instead, if parties face 
constraints simply because voters do so too, then the constraints are simply a product of 
strategic positioning. There is nothing intrinsic within various issues that make certain 
policy packages more or less likely to occur: parties are only placing themselves where 
they can attract as many voters as possible. Presumably, the largest agglomerations of 
voter positions exhibit relatively strong coherence and consistency: while ideological 
constraints among some voters are weak, the most frequently occurring combinations 
are more likely to be logically interconnected.
Finally, parties may exhibit strong constraints because they have an incentive to 
prevent the emergence of unconstrained issues. Schattschneider (1960, p. 64) sees
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politics as a conflict of conflicts, with some issues ‘winning’ by imposing their 
divisions onto society. This victory is important as political cleavages are not easily 
compatible: depending on which issue is dominant, politics will take different forms. In 
other words, the alignments that result from the competition between conflicts shape the 
fundamentals of politics. Since this is the case, Schattschneider argues that ‘control of 
the scale of conflict has always been a prime instrument of political strategy’ (1960, p. 
8). A similar argument is made by Riker (1986), who sees the manipulation of the 
dimensionality of policy space as a key element of party strategies. An example of the 
importance of the ‘conflict of conflicts’ is the salience of European integration: 
according to Hix (1999, p. 78), parties in Europe have tried to avoid open competition 
on integration-related issues as this conflict would divide them internally instead of 
differentiating them from their opponents. Parties therefore collude in order to keep 
cross-cutting, internally divisive issues off the political agenda (Crum, 2007). If such 
policy areas do not become salient, the actual policy space that parties operate in will 
remain relatively simply structured. High constraints may thus be the result of parties’ 
efforts to allow competition only on certain issues.
The constraints within party ideologies should be stronger than among voters. If 
voters’ aggregate positions were the only source of parties’ issue constraints, then these 
would be expected to be quite weak, just as they are among voters. However, the 
existence of two other sources of constraints within party ideologies -  the need for 
coherence and the replication of elite and activist beliefs -  mean that issue constraints 
are likely to be stronger among parties than among the electorate. First, unlike voters, 
parties face the danger of being punished if they present incoherent and contradictory 
policy packages to the public. This external sanction does not exist for voters: no one 
polices the internal consistency of citizen preferences. Second, elites tend to be more
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ideologically coherent than average voters, and it is of course the well-informed, 
politically interested and engaged citizens who decide on party policy. Moreover, while 
many voters may not spend much time reflecting on the consistency of their beliefs, 
party policy tends to be debated and discussed at length. This should also prevent the 
emergence of significant incoherence within a party ideology.
There is some empirical evidence that ideological constraints are indeed greater 
among parties than among voters. For one, the issue opinions of voters are generally 
relatively heterogeneous. As Converse (1964) already found, voters do not always think 
in ideologically coherent terms, and the opinions they profess are of an impressive 
diversity. There is often an overlap between supporters of each party (e.g., Chamock 
and Ellis, 2004). The range of opinions present among party voters is relatively large 
and more diverse than that found within the party elite. There is clear evidence of this in 
the United States. There, parties have become increasingly polarised over the last 
decades, leading to a situation where the distance between the two parties has increased 
substantially (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). Issue alignment has strengthened among 
party elites, with each side becoming more homogenous. This has not been mirrored by 
an equally strong development among party voters, which remain heterogeneous and 
characterised by significant ideological overlap (Baldassarri and Gelman, 2008). To the 
extent that empirical evidence of the difference in ideological constraints between 
voters and parties exists, it seems that constraints are stronger among the latter. This is 
far from surprising considering the theoretical arguments outlined above.
To sum up, a key variable concerning voters’ belief systems is the extent that 
they exhibit constraints. The source of these constraints can be logical or circumstantial. 
Such constraints are also likely to exist among political parties because they are 
punished for ideological inconsistency, because party elites are the most likely to be
48
ideologically coherent and because parties follow voters’ constrained aggregate 
positions. The sources of ideological constraints are therefore a mixture of the logical 
and the circumstantial. Finally, parties are probably more likely to be ideologically 
constrained than voters.
The issues that go together: party system dimensionality
Party ideologies are undoubtedly characterised by strong internal constraints, but their 
precise nature and content have been examined in the existing literature mainly through 
the lens of the concept of party system dimensions. This concept captures the extent to 
which different issues ‘go together’ at the systemic level and thus provides a first look 
at issue interconnections in party ideologies. Examining dimensionality here has two 
purposes: first, it is a concept that is related to the concept of issue interconnections 
and, second, existing descriptions of the number and content of dimensions provide an 
indication of the type of interconnections that should be expected. In this section, I 
define the term ‘dimensions’ before addressing two different approaches to 
understanding party system dimensionality, the first based on a priori theorising and the 
second guided by empirical information.
What are dimensions?
There are two conflicting definitions of dimensions, and it is worth being clear about 
the meaning used in this thesis. The first definition -  which is not used here -  sees 
dimensions as the main lines of conflict that find expression within a political system. 
This is the approach taken by Lijphart (1984) and Stoll (2005, 2008). However, neither 
Lijphart nor Stoll address the issue of how the various dimensions are related.
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The second use of the term dimension, and the one that I will use here, pays 
attention primarily to the way salient issues in party competition are linked. Under this 
definition, each dimension is a summary of correlated party positions on a series of 
issues. For example, take a political system where parties compete only on economic 
and education policy. If on both of these issues all parties take up identical spatial 
positions, then it is very easy to summarise political conflict in that system: one 
fundamental dimension underlies party competition. Even if the positions on the two 
issues are merely similar (and not identical), we can summarize party competition using 
one dimension without losing too much necessary detail. Thus, if all parties are located 
at similar points on economic and education policy, we can collapse these two issues 
into one dimension. If all issues within a political system can be collapsed in this way, 
then just one dimension remains -  usually referred to as the left/right dimension. 
Because dimensions are based only on the similarity of party positions, there need not 
be a substantive meaning to the dimensions found by collapsing issue positions. 
Dimensions are constructs and do not necessarily conform to a preconceived idea of 
what politics is about.
The difference between a dimension and an issue is identical to that between the 
action space and the basic space (Poole, 2005). An action space is the pure, 
unadulterated collection of all ‘contemporary political issues [and] government 
policies’ (Ordeshook, 1976, p. 308; cf. Poole, 2005, p. 14). Where political conflict is 
carried out, whether among legislators in parliament or parties in elections, this is done 
in an action space. In this, all actors can be located at a specific point, as long as they 
indeed take up a position on each salient issue. The action space thus contains all party 
positions on salient issues. As a result, it is complex and difficult to represent visually. 
The positions of political actors are more easily understood if we refer to the ‘basic
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space’: this captures the ‘underlying evaluative, or basic, dimensions’ (Poole, 2005, 
p. 1). These basic dimensions are the fundamental preferences from which political 
opinions on all issues are drawn. This reduction of political competition to a simplified 
form is psychologically convenient, as it is difficult for us to grasp the complexities of 
the action space. Seeing the world in lower dimensions allows us to interpret politics 
more easily. Poole’s conception of the basic space builds on multidimensional scaling, 
which summarises the similarities between various units, ‘modeling] these similarities 
as distances between points representing the [units] in a geometric space’ (Poole, 2005, 
p. 7). The basic space does not contain all the information included in the action space. 
Instead, it is a reasonably accurate simplified representation of the relationships 
between actors. Dimensions are thus descriptive shorthand representations that 
summarise essential characteristics of a more complex reality.
As may have become clear in this discussion, dimensions are directly related to issue 
constraints. While issue constraints exist for every political actor, whether an individual 
or a party, dimensions reflect the general effect of such constraints on political 
competition. I have argued that party policy packages are likely to be characterised by 
strong constraints. If issue positions are constrained in similar ways for all parties, then 
the content of party competition can be reduced to a low-dimensional space. The 
dimensionality of party competition therefore captures the system-wide presence of 
issue constraints. The types of dimensionality that have been identified therefore give a 
first indication of the policy interconnections likely to be exist within party ideologies. 
It is thus worth describing in some detail how issues have been seen to be linked in 
party systems.
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How many dimensions are there?
One Two or more
How is 
dimensionality 
determined?
A priori /  
deductive
Hotelling (1929), Black (1948), Downs 
(1957), Budge (1994), PoweD (2000), 
McDonald and Budge (2005)
Finer (1987), Flanagan (1987), Inglehart 
(1977,1990,1997), Bobbio (1996), 
Kitschelt (1994,1995), Laver and Shepsle 
(1995), Schofield and Sened (2006)
A posteriori /  
inductive
Miller et al (1999), Rohrschneider and 
White field (2009)
Poole and Rosenthal (1997), Hooghe et 
aL (2002), Warwick (2002), Benoit and 
Laver(2006)
Table 2.1 Party system dimensionality: main distinctions within the literature
Party system dimensionality has two main characteristics: number and content. 
The minimum number of dimensions is naturally one, and this dimension then forms 
the aforementioned left/right continuum. This does not mean that party competition can 
always be summarised in this way, and party systems will vary in the number of 
dimensions needed to capture political competition (Benoit and Laver, 2006). When 
there is more than one dimension, the content of each dimension can vary. Since 
dimensions do not themselves require logical connections between their component 
issues, the make-up of each dimension can potentially be quite different in each 
country. For example, in one country, party positions on immigration may coincide 
largely with parties’ stances on economic policy, while in another system the issue may 
be more strongly integrated with a libertarian-authoritarian dimension. A further 
difference is between those who determine dimensionality ex ante and those who use an 
empirically-driven approach. As summarized in Table 2.1, the literature on party system 
dimensionality divides along two main lines: first, scholars disagree about the number 
and, if there is more than one dimension, the content of each line of conflict; second, 
they differ in the method of determining dimensionality.
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Ex ante versus empirical determination o f  dimensionality
Overall, there are two basic ways in which the number and content of dimensionality of 
party systems have been determined in the literature. In the first approach, the content 
of political ideologies is considered and the number and content of dimensions decided 
ex ante, based on theoretical reflection. The second looks instead at the party positions 
on salient political issues and decides on the nature of party system dimensionality 
based on empirical analysis. These two approaches can be said to reflect the two 
sources of issue constraints. While the first sees dimensions as the result of the 
fundamental logical connections between issues, the second sees issues as linked 
mainly because of social or circumstantial factors.
Many researchers into party competition take an ex ante approach to the 
determination of party system dimensionality. This means that they decide on the 
number and content of party system dimensions without basing this decision directly on 
empirical evidence. The first strand of such research proceeds solely based on the 
analysis of political ideologies; here, the authors consider what dimensions can 
potentially exist within a political system. The decisions reached are necessarily 
subjective and open to debate, but have been important in framing the direction of 
research. Examples of accounts based primarily on the consideration of political 
ideologies are Finer (1987), Bobbio (1996) and Kitschelt (1994). In many cases, an ex 
ante decision on party system dimensionality is nevertheless empirically informed, that 
is, based on other research or in-depth knowledge. Here, a given dimensionality is used 
as the starting point for further research. This is the approach used, for example, by 
Downs (1957), Hooghe et al. (2002) and McDonald and Budge (2005). Ex ante 
determinations of dimensionality are united by the fact that little or no effort is made to 
seek empirical validation. This does not mean that these accounts do not differ: while
53
Downs and McDonald and Budge assume a simple one-dimensional party system, 
Finer, Bobbio and Kitschelt argue that party systems are mostly two-dimensional.
Another strand of research has taken a different approach to determining party 
system dimensionality. Here, party positions on a series of issues are taken as a starting 
point, and no specific links between issues are assumed. Using this positional 
information, the dimensionality of the party system is determined using statistical 
methods. This means that this approach is closely linked to the definition of 
dimensionality introduced above, as the nature of the ‘basic space’ is inferred from the 
information provided by the ‘action space’. For the United States Congress, 
dimensionality has been determined using roll-call votes and multidimensional scaling 
(Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). Two examples of cross-national research into party 
system dimensionality are Warwick (2002) and Benoit and Laver (2006). Both use 
common data reduction techniques -  principal components and factor analysis, 
respectively -  to uncover the dimensions underlying party competition, highlighting 
again the close link between statistical techniques and dimensional theory.
The number and content o f  party system dimensions
Both approaches to determining party system dimensionality have provided a variety of 
different answers concerning both the number and the content of the dimensions. On the 
one hand, there are a number of authors who argue that party systems can be usefully 
simplified into one dimension. This would mean that the policy interconnections 
between all salient issues would be strong. On the other hand, a large body of work has 
questioned this approach and argued for the existence of multiple dimensions, at least 
potentially. In particular, it has been suggested that there are two main dimensions, 
economics and society/culture, which are logically independent of one another.
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One-dimensional representations o f party competition
At their simplest, party systems can have just one dimension: a straightforward left- 
right continuum. The concept of ‘left and right’ was not invented by political scientists. 
Rather, the tendency to characterise political opposition using a single dimension has 
existed since the beginnings of modem representative democracy. The first use of left 
and right as a shorthand for ideological positions was probably during the French 
Revolution, where members of the National Assembly sat according to their political 
views. At one of its meetings in 1789, the more revolutionary, ‘destructive’ members 
sat to the left of the speaker and the less revolutionary, ‘constructive’ members to the 
right (Finer, 1987, p. 324; Hakhverdian, forthcoming, p. 2). In the first spatial models, 
party competition was also represented as occurring on one single dimension 
(Hotelling, 1929; Smithies, 1941; Black, 1948; Downs, 1957).
This one-dimensional representation of political competition is still used very 
frequently in political science research. Authors such as Budge (1994), Powell (2000) 
and McDonald and Budge (2005) argue that representing party positions using one 
dimension remains the most insightful approach. For example, according to McDonald 
and Budge (2005, p. 33) ‘[t]he one-dimensional Left-Right representation has so many 
advantages of parsimony, comparability and theoretical relevance, that there are strong 
presumptions in favour of its use’. Budge (1994, p. 456) thus argues that using one 
dimension enables party positions to be ‘directly visualised’ and easily interpreted. In 
addition, he argues that restricting analysis in this way allows useful cross-national 
comparisons of party positions; including further dimensions is not practical in his view 
(1994, p. 456). He adds that ‘a more directly compelling reason’ for using a one­
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dimensional policy space is that this is how parties and media tend to present party 
policies in election campaigns (Budge, 1994, p. 457).
What would a one-dimensional party system mean for the existence of issue 
constraints within party ideologies? If there is just one dimension, all salient issues can 
be collapsed into a single scale. Thus, positions on all issues are interconnected. This 
applies to both static and dynamic interconnections, that is, at one point in time, or 
when considering party policy change. In terms of static interconnections, a one­
dimensional party system means that we can predict a party’s position (relative to other 
parties) on all issues based on our knowledge of its position on just one issue. Turning 
to dynamic interconnections, a party that moves to the right or left in a one-dimensional 
system would carry out such a move on all component issues of that dimension. While a 
one-dimensional system requires that all issues be collapsible into one continuum, the 
issues that are summarised by that one dimension need not always be the same. The 
make-up of the dimension is therefore context-dependent. This ability of the terms ‘left’ 
and ‘right’ to absorb a variety of diverse topics explains why it is such a powerful 
concept. As Huber and Powell (1994, p. 294) state: ‘The language of “left” and “right” 
creates a unidimensional discourse that can assimilate the various issues and 
alternatives that continuously appear before the electorate.’ This conception of left and 
right is used, for example, by Laver and Budge (1992b), Miller et al. (1999) and Powell 
(2000).2 In essence, these authors therefore argue that the issue constraints within party 
programmes are generally considerable, to the extent that positions on all topics are 
strongly interconnected.
2 Some authors use left-right to mean the class conflict and economic ideology (Thomassen, 1999, p. 38). 
For example, Downs (1957) argues that the left-right dimension, the basis o f his theory, consists o f  
positions on economic matters.
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Two-dimensional approaches
This is not a view shared by all political scientists. While a one-dimensional 
representation of party competition can give us a useful simplified picture of politics, 
this picture may miss out details that would help us understand politics because it 
reduces party competition to the most basic form possible. As Benoit and Laver (2006, 
p. 13) argue, ‘[t]he richer the description of politics we seek, the more dimensions we 
need to describe the positions of political actors. The more dimensions we use, the more 
fine-grained our descriptions of politics can be.’ In addition, the historical and 
sociological development of party systems appears to point to frequent 
multidimensionality, as do accounts based on empirical assessments of the basic space. 
It is not just the fact of multidimensionality that is important; the content of each 
dimension is also significant. The issues that make up the dimensions indicate which 
issues go together (or ‘what goes with what’), providing information on the 
interconnections present on a system-wide basis. In the following, I describe a series of 
different conceptions of multidimensionality based on different approaches, 
highlighting the relationship between the dimensions and the content of each.
Using an ex ante approach, some authors argue that there are two fundamental -  
and ever-present -  dimensions to politics. Broadly, these two dimensions are economic 
and social/cultural. Finer (1987, p. 324), for example, identifies four distinct ‘sets of 
attitudes’ and argues that this is a more accurate depiction of the nature of political 
debate than the simple use of left and right. In his view, a political left and right is 
complemented by an economic left and right. The political left is associated with the 
ideas of progress, civil liberty, internationalism and secularism, while the political right 
is sceptical about human nature, nationalist, and morally and socially conservative. The 
economic left favours state intervention on behalf of the disadvantaged, while the
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economic right believes in the free market and a minimum of state involvement in the 
economy. The four sets of attitudes can be combined freely: for example, Finer sees 
European liberal parties as combining a stance on the political left and the economic 
right (1987, p. 325).
A relatively permanent two-dimensional world of party competition is also 
consistent with Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) historical-sociological approach to the 
development of party competition. They argue that parties emerged and confronted each 
other in a series of conflicts: church-state, rural-urban, centre-periphery and owner- 
worker. These cleavages amount to a conception of party competition as structured 
around four dimensions, which may or may not find expression in any given (Western 
European) country. The key here is that parties can capture support by reflecting one or 
more societal conflicts, with their core voters fundamentally isolated from the electoral 
marketplace. In other words, parties can compete on a series of potentially separate 
dimensions. Kriesi et al. (2008a) argue that Lipset and Rokkan’s four cleavages actually 
boil down to two core dimensions: economics and culture. According to them, these 
two dimensions are permanent fixtures of party systems, and they are strengthened by 
the fact that they absorb and integrate new conflicts rather than being overshadowed or 
replaced by them. There are thus several accounts that argue that there is a general 
potential within party systems for a two-dimensional structure of competition, based 
around economic policy and socio-cultural attitudes.
A second line of argument proposes that the development of a new dimension of 
political competition occurred in the last half-century. Broadly, the old dominant 
dimension summarising economic positions has been joined by a new axis that contains 
what could be termed ‘non-economic’ issues. Such issues are commonly grouped 
together under various titles, but most frequently they are given the name New Politics
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(Flanagan, 1987; Muller-Rommel, 1989; Poguntke and Muller-Rommel, 1995; Dalton, 
2006). Inglehart (1997) describes these debates as clashes between postmodernists and 
fundamentalists, with each defending different sides of a conflict of values. Kitschelt 
(1994, 1995) argues that there is a liberal-authoritarian dimension that covers all issues 
concerned with the organisation of society and the quality of politics and is unrelated to 
economic goals. All these authors state that non-economic topics -  under whatever 
name -  are increasingly important to political competition and group them within a 
second dimension that is separate from the ‘old’ economic dimension.
To Inglehart (1977, 1990), the two dimensions of political conflict are 
materialism/modernism and postmaterialism/postmodemism; Flanagan (1987) calls this 
the difference between ‘old’ and ‘new’ politics.3 Inglehart argues that industrial 
societies have been undergoing a process of value change: materialist goals, i.e. 
economic and physical security, are gradually being replaced by postmaterialist goals, 
for example self-expression and personal fulfilment. This value shift has consequences 
for politics. As people’s priorities have changed, so has the political agenda, leading to 
a growing importance of the modem-postmodern or old-new polarisation (1997, p. 
237). Issues such as the environment, abortion and gay rights are taking on the 
importance that, say, the nationalisation of industry used to have. Postmodern issues are 
fundamentally distinct from the divisions of traditional politics, namely ‘conflict over 
ownership of the means of production and distribution of income’ (1997, p. 237).
3 Confusingly, the term New Politics has also been used very differently by Poguntke and Muller- 
Rommel (e.g., 1995). Like Inglehart, they argue that old politics was about economic and military 
security and that a new political divide emerged in the 1960s and 1970s (1995, p. xi). However, they 
stress the nature o f political participation rather than beliefs and values. New Politics thus means ‘the 
interrelated extension o f participatory dispositions and techniques and the partial change o f the political 
agenda through the surge o f new political demands’ (Poguntke, 1993, p. 9). The central elements o f  the 
political ideology o f New Politics activists are: individualism, equal rights, participatory democracy, 
ecology, unilateral disarmament, third world development and leftism (Poguntke, 1987, p. 78). This 
approach to New Politics is thus narrowly focussed on the new political movements that emerged on the 
left around 1968 and after. They are the type o f movement that Flanagan would call New Left and which 
Kitschelt terms left-libertarian.
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For Flanagan, old and new politics are clearly separated: as he states, ‘the point 
is that the New Right is as much non-materialist as the New Left’ (1987, p. 1308).4 This 
could be taken to imply a complete independence of the two dimensions of conflict. In 
fact, both Inglehart and Flanagan argue that parties only take positions either on 
new/postmodem politics or on old/materialist politics. This clearly contradicts one of 
the core assumptions of this thesis, namely that parties generally take positions on all 
salient issues. Looking at contemporary party politics, though, the assumption of this 
thesis is given weight. Green parties do take position on economic matters, especially as 
they have grown to become permanent parts of the political landscape. Far-right parties, 
meanwhile, often play upon economic fears and uncertainty. As a result, it is perhaps 
reasonable to adapt Inglehart and Flanagan’s argument to the extent that the two 
dimensions are independent rather than completely separate. In other words, knowledge 
of a party’s position on new/postmodem politics does not help an observer to determine 
that party’s economic views, which anyway will be of little salience to such a party. 
The same applies for the new/postmodem views of old/materialist parties.
The concept of a libertarian-authoritarian dimension has been strongly shaped 
by Kitschelt’s work (1994, 1995). He starts from an ex ante approach but also marshals 
considerable sociological evidence in support of his argument. For him, there is an 
independent dimension that cross-cuts the traditional economic axis of political conflict: 
liberal-authoritarianism. According to Kitschelt, this dimension includes policies 
concerning individual rights and freedoms, law and order, participatory democracy as 
well as environmental policy. This is also the sense in which Hooghe et al. (2002) have 
formulated their influential gal-tan dimension (green-altemative-libertarian/traditional- 
authoritarian-nationalist), which forms the basis of their research into party responses to
4 This is an argument also made by Savage (1985), who sees a postmaterialist constituency within both 
the left and the right.
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European integration. Starting often from ex ante beginnings, the libertarian- 
authoritarian dimension has thus become a frequent feature of research into political 
competition, irrespective of whether the emergence of this dimension is seen as recent 
or not.
This approach appears to be justified when considering the real-world evidence 
provided by empirical analyses of basic spaces. Warwick (2002) considers the number 
of dimensions present in West European political systems using manifesto and expert 
survey data. He finds that a single socio-economic dimension is not enough to 
summarise political competition. Instead, two further dimensions are also present: 
postmaterialism and social control. These can be seen as broadly equivalent to liberal- 
authoritarian topics. Benoit and Laver (2006, ch. 5) also find that only three countries 
have simple one-dimensional structures: the US, the UK and Switzerland. One of their 
core arguments is thus that most party systems are multidimensional, so that simple 
one-dimensional representations are likely to miss much of the detail that characterises 
and differentiates political systems. However, they do not find a clear-cut pattern of 
dimensional content. Each country differs in the issues that form part of its dimensions.
There is thus a remarkable consistency in the two-dimensional depictions of 
party systems. Most authors see a left-right, economically-based dimension as the 
primary line of conflict between political parties. The second dimension generally refers 
to ‘non-economic’ issues. What exactly falls under this heading remains, however, a 
matter of debate. While some authors restrict it to questions of liberty and authority, 
others add elements such as environmental policy, participatory democracy, 
interventionist foreign policy, immigration and so on. Moreover, the empirical evidence 
from the Benoit and Laver expert survey points to great diversity between countries as 
well. Not only are there additional cross-cutting issues in some countries (e.g., religion,
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regional nationalism and European integration), but the content of the two main 
dimensions also varies. Nevertheless, there remains a large body of research that 
distinguishes between economic issues and (variously named) second-dimension issues. 
It is therefore likely that this distinction is also important for interconnections within 
party ideologies, in particular because the two dimensions appear to be free of strong 
logical interconnections.
Conclusion
This chapter has brought together the three theoretical and empirical literatures that 
underlie the present research. First, a key past argument is that party competition can be 
summarised in spatial and numerical terms. Parties take positions on political issues: 
this is one of the core assumptions of the spatial theory of party competition. However, 
it is not the case that the positions on all issues are independent. This has been 
examined in great detail for individual voters and for party systems by looking at issue 
constraints and dimensionality respectively, which provide the next two political 
science foundations for this thesis.
It is thus well-established that, among voters, a well-developed ideology means 
that positions are characterised by constraints. These can be both static and dynamic, 
that is, describe correlation among issue positions at one point in time and correlation 
among position change. It is also well-established that party positions on the large 
amount of issues debated in a political system can usually be reduced to a smaller 
number of dimensions: in Poole’s terms, there is a basic space that underlies the action 
space. Dimensionality has been determined both ex ante, based on the analysis of 
political ideologies, and empirically, using data sources to establish the nature of the 
basic space. The answers concerning the number and content of dimensions in real-
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world party systems have also differed between those arguing for broad 
unidimensionality and proponents of more complex multidimensional spaces.
The theoretical approach of this thesis is thus based within the work of Converse 
and his individual-level concepts of issue interconnections and constraints. These can 
be easily applied to party ideologies as well. Parties have a clear incentive to develop 
coherent, consistent platforms: such coherence is rewarded at the polls because then 
parties can more easily communicate their views, are seen as responsible and reliable 
and can solve the problem of credible commitment. Moreover, there will be a general 
tendency towards ideological coherence simply because party elites are well-informed 
and politically sophisticated and because parties will follow the aggregate positions of 
voters. Finally, parties can sometimes prevent the emergence of issues that are 
unconstrained and could therefore threaten the stability of the party system. Thus, 
parties will exhibit interconnected policy programmes independent of whether their 
overriding motivation is votes or policy, as both fundamental aims will lead parties to 
develop constrained ideologies. The simplified Downsian argument that parties will 
simply place themselves wherever the greatest electoral gain is to be had is therefore 
unlikely to be empirically valid.
By applying these individual-level concepts to political parties, this thesis re­
considers how party views on different issues are translated into the more simplified 
low-dimensional spaces that are found across contemporary democracies. Instead of 
proceeding directly to the aggregate basic-space continuums, this thesis takes a step 
back and considers how specific issue pairs are connected. The present research thus 
provides more detail on particular issue linkages than can be achieved by considering 
only party system dimensions and makes explicit the policy interconnections that low­
dimensional spaces are created from. This research takes a step back in another way as
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well: instead of comparing party systems, the focus lies in the attributes of particular 
parties and of specific policy interconnections. This approach is not just a re-evaluation 
of the nature of party ideologies and of party system dimensionality: throughout, the 
effects of policy interconnections on party competition are examined. Building on the 
literature presented here, the following chapter develops in detail the theoretical 
approach of policy interconnections, examining the key characteristics and the most 
important effects of this feature of party programmes. This theory will then provide the 
basis for the empirical analysis in the subsequent chapters.
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Chapter 3 
A theory of policy interconnections in party ideologies
At the core of a political party stands its ideology. In Michels’ (1962 [1911]) words: ‘A 
party is neither a social unity nor an economic unity. It is based upon its programme.’ 
Each party ideology contains its stances on different issues, and these positions are not 
independent of one another but connected by overarching constraints. Thus, party 
programmes are characterised by issue linkages. Based on the conclusion of the 
previous chapter, this chapter presents the theory of policy interconnections and their 
effect on party competition. Gerring (1997, p. 970) has argued that ideologies, though a 
term with diverse interpretation and muddied uses, can at the very least be seen as a ‘set 
of idea elements that are bound together’. Sets of elements are commonly described as 
systems, so party ideologies can be seen as ‘issue systems’.
This chapter describes the basic characteristics of issue systems within party
profiles. After defining the key concepts, the main attributes of issues and their
interconnections are considered. In particular, I distinguish between two aspects of
policy interconnections -  their basis in logic or circumstance and their static or dynamic
nature -  and between four issue characteristics -  position, salience, interconnectedness
and unusualness. This chapter also presents possible ways that policy interconnections
may be structured predictably, in particular across time, party families, countries, and
left and right. Finally, the likely effects of the nature of policy interconnections on party
competition are examined. Issue interconnections are not merely an incidental
characteristic of the way parties formulate programmes: they have important
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implications on party strategies and party system dimensionality. Beyond parties 
themselves, issue systems can have an impact on the extent of citizen choice and on 
political outcomes resulting from elections.
This chapter is organised as follows. It begins with a definition of issue systems 
and a description of their basic characteristics. Then, the possible systematic differences 
across left and right, party families, and countries are examined. Finally, the effects of 
policy interconnections on political competition are considered.
Party ideologies as issue systems
A system is commonly defined as a ‘set of elements standing in interaction’ or an 
arrangement of interrelated components (Snyder, 1993, p. 6). The term has been applied 
widely in the natural and social sciences: two examples are the solar system and the 
international system (Waltz, 1979).5 The aim of such analyses is to present a picture of 
all the components of the system and, more importantly, how they stand in relationship 
to one another. Knowledge of these interconnections provides an understanding of the 
sequence through which outcomes are realised; a frequent example in the social 
sciences is the events leading up to World War I, where the structure of the system of 
nation-states played a crucial role in the breakout of conflict.
The application of the term ‘system’ to political parties is of course not new. In 
the context of party competition, a party system is the collection of parties within a 
polity and their relationship to each other (Sartori, 1976; Smith, 1989; Bardi and Mair, 
2008). A party system is thus more than just its components, the ‘set of parties’ in a 
political system (Bardi and Mair, 2008, p. 153). What distinguishes party systems from
5 An occasional second characteristic o f systems is that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts: ‘the 
entire system exhibits properties and behaviours that are different from those o f the parts’ (Jervis, 1997, 
p. 8). Treating a system just as the sum o f its parts has been called a reductionist approach (Jervis, 1997, 
p. 12f.).
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sets of parties is that the ‘patterned interactions’ among components are an essential 
element of each system (Sartori, 1976, pp. 43-4). The core of the analysis of party 
systems is therefore the nature of the interaction between the political parties, rather 
than just the parties individually or collectively.
Party programmes themselves can be analysed in the same way: party ideologies 
are also systems, that is, they are sets of interrelated components.6 The components of 
party-ideological systems are distinct issues or policies. Each of these issues has two 
fundamental attributes, position and salience (Kitschelt, 1994). A party thus makes two 
choices concerning each issue on which it competes, its position and its salience. To 
qualify as a system, the various issues need to be interrelated. Importantly, the nature of 
interconnections is variable, so the effect on other elements produced by change in one 
component depends on how that component is related to the rest of the system. Broadly 
speaking, the elements of a system can be tightly or loosely coupled (Snyder, 1993, 
p. 12). Therefore, a simplified conception of a party programme is as a system of 
variously salient issue positions that differ in the extent of their mutual interconnection. 
Party ideologies -  if conceived of as issue systems -  have two main features: their 
components and the links between them. When describing both the components and 
their interconnections, it is possible and useful to distinguish between different 
attributes of each issue component as well as between different aspects of 
interconnections. More precisely, the connections between issues have two possible 
sources, logic and circumstance, and can be static or dynamic in nature. The 
components, or issues, can be described using four attributes: the position and salience
6 A party programme may also possess the second characteristic o f systems by being more than the sum 
o f  the various issue components. For example, the differences between party families have been 
described as differences in what parties are, not what they do: an ideology is more than a policy profile 
(Mair and Mudde, 1998, p. 224). However, in the following I disregard this second characteristic: I focus 
on the interrelationships between the distinct components that form the system. The nature o f the system 
as a whole is therefore o f less importance for the topic o f this thesis.
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Issue attributes
Position
Salience
Interconnectedness
Unusualness
The policy stance of the party on the issue
The emphasis the party gives the issue
The extent the issue is linked to other within the party 
programme
The extent to which a policy position is more extreme 
or moderate than the party’s mean position
Types of interconnections
Basis
Logic
Circumstance
Manifestation
Static
Dynamic
Issues are connected due to an inherent constraint 
contained within the nature of the two issues 
Issues are connected due to quasi-logical, social or 
historical reasons
The extent to which the position/salience of one issue 
predicts the position/salience of another 
The extent to which change in the positions/salience 
of two issues co-occurs
Table 3.1 Issue attributes and types of interconnections
the party gives to each as well as each issue’s overall interconnectedness and 
unusualness. A summary of interconnection types and issue attributes is presented in 
Table 3.1, together with the definitions of each distinction. In this section, these types of 
interconnections and attributes of components are described in detail.
A final note concerns the use of systems to describe the policy bundles that 
make up party ideologies. The term ‘system’ may imply an overly scientific approach to 
the study of ideologies, with issues rigidly linked and consequences perfectly 
predictable. However, this is not how issue systems should be understood. Issue 
systems merely reflect an underlying structure that characterises party programmes and 
allows the distinction between characteristics of each component and of the links 
between them. Moreover, no simple determinism is implied. The influence of
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interconnections on patterns of policy positions is therefore probabilistic rather than 
deterministic (Hall, 2003). I do not argue that strong interconnections mean that the 
party position must be in the predicted location or that a party must move in the same 
way on both issues; instead, strong interconnections only increase the probability of 
such a pattern.
The characteristics of policy interconnections
In the context of party programmes, two aspects of issue interconnections need to be 
distinguished: interconnections take static or dynamic forms. Static links between issues 
are those that are in place at one point in time. They can be well described by referring 
to the predictive power of one issue for the other: the stronger the interconnections, the 
more the position on one issue can predict the position on the other. In other words, if 
the interconnections between issues are strong (‘tight’), knowing a party’s position on 
one issue allows us reliably to predict its position on the second issue. The weaker the 
issue connections, the more difficult it is to make such a prediction. Dynamic issue 
interconnections concern party policy change. In all systems, interconnections are most 
visible in a dynamic context: if one component changes, this will also produce changes 
in related parts of the system (Jervis, 1997, p. 8). The question here concerns the system 
effects that occur when a political party changes its stance on one issue. If two (or 
more) issues are very tightly linked, then movement on one issue should have clear and 
immediate consequences for the second issue. If the issues are loosely linked, then 
policy change in one area should be free of implications for other issues.
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Types o f  static interconnections
There may be a variety of static issue interconnections, but three different types of 
interconnections in particular can be distinguished: complete independence, linear 
association, and non-linear association. These three different types can be illustrated 
using the diverse accounts of how liberal-authoritarianism and economic policy are 
connected in party competition. These two issues have been described as the 
fundamental line of division that is characteristic of political conflict (Finer, 1987; 
Kitschelt, 1994; Bobbio, 1996), and a variety of different conceptions of the 
interconnections between them have been put forward. The two issues are therefore 
well-suited as an illustration of the three types of interconnections presented here.
Complete independence
The simplest way two elements can be interrelated is, of course, not at all. Two issues 
within an ideological system can thus be characterised by a lack of interconnections: 
they are then completely independent from one another. If this is the case, knowing a 
party’s position on one issue would not provide any indication of the party’s position on 
the second issue. Statistically, this would be called a situation where two variables 
exhibit a lack of association or correlation. Graphically, party positions would form a 
cloud, with no effect of one variable on the other visible. The regression line 
summarising the relationship between positions on the issues would be flat: changing 
the value of the first variable would not cause a change in the prediction for the second 
variable. Complete independence between two issues is illustrated in Figure 3.1: the 
parties are randomly distributed on the two fundamental axes of political conflict.
In terms of liberal-authoritarianism and economic policy, this lack of association 
was suggested as the most likely form of interconnection by Finer (1987), who states
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that there are no logical reasons why positions on the two topics need to be 
interdependent. For example, he argues, a party on the economic left could without 
difficulty take up positions on either the political right or the political left. According to 
the empirical analysis carried out by Flanagan and Lee (2003), the relationship between 
economic issues and the new authoritarian-libertarian dimension does indeed follow 
such a pattern. Putnam (1973, p. 217) also argues, based on a survey of British and 
Italian MPs, that support for political equality is equally divided between the economic 
left and right. As in Figure 3.1, the line that expresses the relationship between the two 
fundamental conflicts is therefore flat: economic and socio-political issues are 
orthogonal to each other, and one cannot predict a party’s position on one topic from its 
position on the other.
Linear association
McDonald and Budge (2005, pp. 42-4) argue that issues are too often imagined as being 
orthogonal to one another. In other words, they are seen as being at right angles to one 
another, implying that positions on one issue are independent from positions on the 
other. If this were true, it would be impossible to predict a party’s position on one issue 
from its position on another issue, as described above. However, they argue that it is 
more likely that most issue positions are correlated to some extent. The most 
straightforward correlated relationship would be linear. Such representations of party 
competition are indeed the simplest and most common representation of the strength of 
different linkages. For example, Kitschelt (1994) sees political competition as taking 
place along a straight line that has shifted over the years. Imagining issue connections 
as straight lines is clearly related to the statistical technique of simple linear regression, 
which constructs the line that best captures the relationship among a set of data points.
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If the interconnection between two issues is linear, then it is possible to predict a 
party’s position on an issue from its position on another issue, no matter where the party 
is located. Thus, the relationship underlying the prediction is constant across the 
political spectrum. The interconnections between two issues can vary in strength, and 
this is captured by the extent to which the predicted line is accurate. In other words, the 
better the line fits the distribution of parties on two policy areas, the stronger the issue 
interconnections. The strength of interconnections is therefore well summarised by the 
amount of variance that is explained by the line that best describes the association 
between the two issues.
Even if a linear association is found, the nature of the interconnections can vary. 
At its simplest, there could be a direct correspondence between positions on two issues: 
y = x. In other words, if party A is three ‘ideological units’ to the right of party B on 
one issue (‘x ’), party A is also predicted be to three units to the right of party B on the 
second issue (‘y’). Adding a constant and a coefficient to this equation (i.e. y = ax + b) 
alters the nature of the relationship: the constant (‘b ’) affects whether positions on the 
second issue are generally more (or less) extreme than on the first, while the coefficient 
(‘a’) determines the range of policy positions parties take. This can be easily illustrated 
graphically (Figure 3.2). Line 1 has a 45-degree slope and has a constant equal to 0, so 
the two positions would be ‘identical’, at least in their ideological content. In Figure 
3.2, party B is the same distance to the left of party A on both issues. Line 2 has a 
different slope, so the nature of the linear association is different: party D’s position on 
liberal-authoritarianism is only marginally different from party C’s, even though party 
C is much further to the right on economic policy. This does not mean, however, that 
the strength of issue interconnections is lower for Line 2. On both lines, party positions 
on the two issues that are being compared are related in a linear, predictable way. In
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fact, the strength of the association could easily be greater for Line 2 if the distribution 
of parties fits this line better. The constant and coefficient simply affect how party 
positions on the independent-variable issue are translated into dependent-variable issue 
positions. When considering the linear association between two policy areas, the 
strength of issue interconnections is therefore accurately captured only by the amount of 
variance explained by the linear prediction.
Of course, we are unlikely to find perfectly linear relationships in real-world 
party politics. However, a linear representation of the interrelationship between issues 
can be a reasonably accurate summary of the links between party positions on two 
issues. The interconnections between liberal-authoritarianism and economic policy have 
been presented in this manner. Kitschelt (1994, 1995), for example, argues that these 
two dimensions are now correlated due to a realignment in the policy space over the 
past decades: the economic left has become libertarian while the right has incorporated 
authoritarian appeals. The main axis of political competition is now left-libertarian 
versus right-authoritarian and no longer simply left versus right. However, it has also 
been suggested that the correlation between the two issue areas is in the reverse 
direction to that predicted by Kitschelt. For example, Duch and Strom (2004) find that 
economically right-wing parties are more likely to endorse the goal of liberty than left- 
wing parties. It is thus possible to argue that there is a connection between positions on 
economic and socio-economic issues, but with economic liberalism likely to be 
combined with social liberalism rather than authoritarianism. What both conceptions 
have in common, however, is that they see the relationship between the two issue areas 
as fundamentally linear in nature.
74
Non-linear association
Since many issues within party competition are thus likely to be related and not 
independent, McDonald and Budge (2005) have a point in arguing that the assumption 
that policy spaces are orthogonal is unrealistic. However, one can raise a similar 
objection to their argument. While they argue that dimensions can either be correlated 
or independent, we can quite easily also conceive of other types of relationship between 
issues. For example, there might be a U-shaped link, so that extreme positions on both 
sides of one issue are connected with extreme positions on one side of the second issue. 
Using the terminology of linear regression, the relationship between the two issues 
would then be quadratic. Again, the interconnection strength would be equivalent to the 
accuracy of the predicted line of association. A U-shaped association is also shown in 
Figure 3.2.
The interconnections between liberal-authoritarianism and economic policy 
have also been seen as U-shaped. For example, Bobbio (1996) argues that respect for 
liberty distinguishes extremists from moderates: ‘The different attitude to freedom is 
the relevant criterion for distinguishing the moderate wing from the extremist wing on 
both left and right’ (1996, p. 78). In Bobbio’s view, the centre-left and the centre-right 
are libertarian, that is, they oppose totalitarianism, while the extreme left and extreme 
right are authoritarian. Their similar view on liberty explains why the economic 
extremes can become potential allies (Bobbio, 1996, p. 79). Translating Bobbio’s 
approach into two-dimensional terms, his prediction is that there will be a quadratic 
relationship between economic and social issues. Perhaps the best-known empirical 
example of such an interrelationship is given by Hooghe et al. (2002, p. 968), who 
suggest that the link between left-right ideology and party positions on European 
integration is best described by an ‘inverted U’. They argue that centrist parties tend to
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be in favour of European integration, while parties on the far right and far left are 
generally more Eurosceptic.7
So far, the discussion has only considered static interconnections, that is, the 
cross-sectional association between party positions on distinct issues. The second 
feature of issue interconnections is their potential dynamic character. It is here that the 
nature of issue systems takes on significant importance for the development of party 
competition over time.
Dynamic interconnections
In systems, the links between components are above all visible over time and through 
processes of change. Specifically, interconnected parts of a system change together. The 
strength of the interconnections has an effect on how the parts move: the more tightly 
two elements are tied to each other, the more similar the movement of these two system 
components. As a consequence, parts that are less connected to others are also more 
independent in their movement overall. In his description of the interconnections 
between policies among voters, Converse already identified the possibility that issue 
constraints may not just be static but also dynamic (1964, p. 208). In terms of voter 
ideologies, a dynamic interconnection means that opinion change on one issue ‘would 
psychologically require, from the point of view of the actor, some compensating 
change(s) in the status of idea-elements elsewhere in the configuration’ (1964, p. 208). 
A shift in one element of the system occurs with or leads to related changes in other 
system components.
7 The shape o f  the ‘U ’ does not need to be symmetric: the tail on one side could be shorter than on the 
other. Hooghe et al. (2002, p. 977) identify such a pattern for the link between party positions on New  
Politics issues and European integration. On the traditional-authoritarian-nationalist half o f the 
dimension, there is a strong relationship with positions on the EU, as extreme parties are reliably 
Eurosceptic. On the Green-alternative-libertarian half, the relationship is much weaker.
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This approach can also be applied to how parties carry out ideological change as 
a political strategy. Party programmes are, as argued above, conceivable as issue 
systems made up of a series of interrelated policy elements. If two issue areas are 
linked, then this will have an effect on how parties move on these topics. If a party 
changes its policy position on one of these issues, then it will have to follow suit on the 
second, interconnected issue; if not immediately, then within a brief period of time. 
Otherwise, it will leave itself open to the charge of inconsistency and incoherence. As 
we have seen, there is an electoral incentive in maintaining an ideologically convincing 
platform, and this has an effect on how parties carry out policy shifts.
Dynamic interconnections, i.e. correlated policy movement, need not only be the 
direct result of a concern for ideological consistency within the party elite. It can also be 
the consequence of the composition of the party leadership and the nature of its activist 
and voter base. Thus, party policy change can also occur if a different coalition of 
actors within that party takes over the reins. This new leadership will have a different 
set of opinions and policy preferences. Since some of these will be correlated and 
interconnected, party policy change on sets of issues will also tend to co-occur as a 
result. For example, a social democratic party may be split between centre-left and left 
groups. The left faction may have more statist economic preferences, but also be more 
libertarian, environmentalist and Eurosceptic. If the left faction gains new weight in the 
party, the overall position of the party will have changed on several issues, and in this 
way will be characterised by dynamic interconnections. Similarly, dynamic 
interconnections may be the result of change in the activists or in the support base of the 
party. Just as with internal factions, positions among activists and supporters will be 
characterised by static interconnections. If a party changes its position, either because a
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different group of activists gains ascendancy or because it is trying to attract a different 
group of voters, then correlated policy movement should occur.
The basis o f  interconnections: logic and circumstance
The distinction between static and dynamic interconnections refers to the two ways in 
which the linkages between issues are visible to observers. Another distinction between 
issue interconnections is also important, namely whether the origin of the linkage lies in 
a strong underlying logical connection or in circumstantial historical and social 
developments. As described in Chapter 2, this distinction was first made by Converse 
(1964), who divided interconnections into logical, quasi-logical and social sub-groups. 
Here, the last two types of interconnections are grouped together as ‘circumstantial’ 
since both quasi-logical and social linkages are similar in their lack of clear logical ties. 
‘Logic’ and ‘circumstance’ are both abstract categories, so it is worth explaining in 
more detail the nature of this distinction.
First, issue positions can be linked to one another because there is a logical (i.e. 
intrinsic and inherent) connection between the two policy areas. A clear example of 
such a case is the budget constraint that limits expenditure on two items (‘guns’ and 
‘butter’). Here, there is an inherent link between two policy areas because a position on 
one of the two issues has a direct effect on the position or range of positions that can be 
taken on the other (see also Converse, 1964; Milyo, 2000). In effect, there is one issue, 
the level of public expenditure, which connects the two issues. Not all intrinsic 
connections are as obviously logical as the situation of a budget constraint, but all logic- 
based connections are based in some way on a value or dimension that underlies and 
binds together specific policy positions. Many students of political ideologies, for 
instance Finer (1987) and Bobbio (1996), have identified an economic and a liberty
dimension to political ideologies. For them, all issues within each of those two 
dimensions are intrinsically linked. Thus, as Poole (2005) notes, knowing someone’s 
views on abortion will help when attempting to guess his or her views on gay marriage: 
the issues are tied together through the underlying value of liberalism. Similarly, an 
issue area such as environmental protection is linked to economic ideology as policy 
positions on it can have economic consequences. Greater environmental regulation will 
increase the burden on businesses and costs to the consumer. Overall, inherent or 
intrinsic linkages can be summarized as those connections based on some underlying 
mutual constraint or political value.
The second source of interconnections is circumstance. These are constraints 
that exist through processes not based on an inherent linkage. As described in Chapter 
2, circumstance-based linkages are those where interconnections have developed over 
time. Converse (1964, p.211) argues that such circumstantial linkages are those that 
happen to exist within certain social segments. He offers two explanations for the 
development of such interconnections. First, the association between two issue 
positions may be spurious, with both views the result of a third, non-ideological factor. 
Above, the example of Green parties’ generally pro-immigration and pro-environment 
stance was mentioned: while there is no logical connection between the two positions, 
they can be explained by the social origins of these parties in middle-class, highly 
educated social strata. Second, Converse argues that circumstantial interconnections can 
be the result of ideological diffusion carried out by elites. These elites develop certain 
packages of views and then spread these among all members of their social group. 
Eventually, the issue positions are seen as naturally associated. The important 
characteristic of circumstantial ties is thus that there is no necessary inherent linkage 
between two issue positions. There is nothing within the content of the issues
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themselves that mandates a policy connection. Instead, if such a linkage exists it is the 
result of historical and social developments. In sum, constraints can be distinguished by 
the existence or absence of inherent logical ties between the two issues in question; of 
course, what constitutes a logical linkage may well be a matter of debate.
The interconnection bases o f  static and dynamic linkages
The two distinctions made above -  between static and dynamic interconnections and 
between logic and circumstance as the bases of interconnections -  are not unrelated. 
Static interconnections can be brought about due to logical and circumstantial 
foundations. As discussed above, both bases of interconnections are likely to exist 
frequently among political parties. However, when we turn to dynamic interconnections 
the basis of the policy linkage takes on importance.
It is when issues are inherently connected that dynamic interconnections are 
most likely to exist. If two issues are linked through a need for coherence, then this tight 
association means that parties will tend to modify their position on both issues at the 
same time and in a similar manner. Otherwise, the party will open itself up to charges 
that its policy package is inconsistent. In many cases, the associated policy shifts that 
characterise dynamic interconnections may even simply occur automatically as the two 
issues are so closely linked in the minds of politicians. In the example of factional 
replacement in a social democratic party, a centrist faction wrested power from a left- 
leaning subgroup. This change in party leadership would lead to policy modification on 
an issue pair because they are characterised by strong inherent links: the party may thus 
become, say, more in favour of deregulation and more pro-European at the same time.
Dynamic interconnections are less likely to occur when issues are only linked by 
circumstance. A dynamic interconnection based on circumstance would mean that there
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is an association of policy change simply because positions tend to co-occur, for 
example within certain segments of society or among groups of activists, or because an 
association has developed over time. Looking again at the example based on factional 
replacement, the argument here would be that policy change will co-occur as the leaders 
and activists that make up the newly dominant faction have systematically different 
preferences to the old faction. In the 1990s, Tony Blair’s pre-election repositioning of 
Labour included both a move to the economic centre as well as well as a toughening up 
of the party’s stance on law and order. These two policy preferences are not directly 
linked through inherent ties but reflect a co-occurrence of these views among the newly 
dominant group within the party. Dynamic interconnections are more are more likely to 
be based on inherent ties rather than circumstance.
This leads to a pair of predictions regarding the occurrence of static and 
dynamic interconnections. First, since dynamic interconnections are likely to require a 
logical foundation, there will be fewer dynamic than static interconnections. This means 
that the total number of issue pairs exhibiting dynamic interconnections will be lower 
than for static linkages. Second, only logic-based static interconnections should be 
replicated at the dynamic level. Since circumstance-based static linkages do not provide 
a strong foundation for a dynamic interconnection, such static interconnections are 
unlikely to be mirrored by a dynamic linkage. However, logic-based static linkages are 
likely to also have dynamic counterparts. In sum, there will be fewer dynamic than 
static interconnections, and those dynamic linkages that do exist should be on issue 
pairs linked through logic.
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Component attributes within issue systems
Static and dynamic interconnections describe the links between two particular issue 
components. Turning back to the individual issues within a party ideology, each 
component also has specific attributes. First, each party has a certain position on each 
issue and endows the policy area with a specific salience. Second, the pattern of 
interconnections for parties means that each issue also has a given overall 
interconnectedness as well a level of relative unusualness. This section describes the 
relationship of these four concepts to policy interconnections.
Position and salience
While most theories of party competition since Downs concentrate on the positions 
parties take, there are other important party activities with regard to issues. Parties also 
have to decide what importance to accord to each issue;8 this is usually called the 
‘salience’ of an issue, as compared to the party’s position (Budge and Farlie, 1983). In 
the original formulation of the salience theory of party competition, parties are seen as 
talking past each other, to the extent that it is not accurate to see parties as taking 
opposing positions on the same issue. Instead, parties compete by stressing only those 
issues on which they have a comparative advantage. In more recent attempts at 
integrating salience and position, this sharp distinction has been blurred, with parties 
now seen as making choices regarding both aspects of policies (Meguid, 2005; Kriesi et 
al., 2006; Tavits, 2008; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009).
It is likely that the interconnections within issue systems are weaker in terms of 
salience than in terms of position. Parties tend to find it easier to amend the salience of
8 This is not meant to imply that parties are completely free in this choice; other actors (e.g. other parties, 
the media) have an important agenda-setting function.
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an issue than their position, for two reasons. First, the overall internal programmatic 
logic is less affected by salience change. The relationship between economic and 
environmental policy can provide an example of this. Environmental protection often 
has significant implications for economic policy, for instance by requiring increased 
government regulation. As a result, the two issues are likely to be strongly connected in 
terms of position due to the inherent logical ties between the two policy areas. 
However, this does not mean that a party that chooses to campaign primarily on 
environmental policy must also stress economic policy. While a party would find it hard 
to espouse positions on two areas that are fundamentally contradictory, it could quite 
easily emphasise one strongly and fail to address the other.
Where salience interconnections do exist, they are likely to occur on issue pairs 
whose static interconnection is logic-based. The reasoning here is similar to the 
comparison between the static and dynamic linkages between issue positions; there, 
only logic-based static interconnections were seen as good predictors of the existence of 
dynamic linkages. The constraints on salience ties are also likely to be weak compared 
to the static linkages between positions. When salience interconnections are present, 
their foundation is likely to be in logic rather than circumstance. There is little reason 
for issue pairs to be consistently linked in their salience if there is no logical association 
between the two. However, if the two topics are closely related in terms of their content, 
then parties may exhibit clear patterns in their salience interconnections.
Second, the need for ideological stability has less of an influence on the choice 
of issue salience. As we have seen, Downs (1957, p. 109) argued that party positions 
are likely to be generally stable as parties need to project an image of reliability and 
responsibility. Moreover, even when parties do attempt to change position, their success 
may be limited due to voters’ ‘perceptual inertia’ (Ordeshook, 1976, p. 295); and party
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reputations may be difficult to change easily (Petrocik, 1996). Modifying issue salience 
is more easily achieved. Issue importance has far less of an impact on ideological 
coherence than issue positions. Moreover, it might be relatively straightforward for a 
party to change the extent to which it stresses a policy area. As a result, parties may try 
to exploit the relative flexibility of issue salience to make up for their positional rigidity 
(Steenbergen and Scott, 2004, p. 167). Past reputation creates less of a limitation for 
salience change than it does for positional change. Since salience and salience change is 
less limited by internal logic and ideological stability, the overall level of 
interconnections is likely to be weaker than for positions.
Interconnectedness and unusualness
The place of each policy area within the overall pattern of interconnections can be seen 
as an attribute of that component of the issue system. Within each party ideology, each 
component will thus have overall characteristics that describe its place within the party 
programme as a whole. Two such characteristics are the general interconnectedness of 
an issue as well as the unusualness of a position within the party ideology.
First, the interconnectedness of issue areas as a whole will vary: within a party’s 
ideological profile some issues will be more independent, generally speaking, than 
other issues. While some policy areas will have strong static and dynamic 
interconnections with many other issues, other topics will be characterised by the 
relative absence of such linkages. This may also mean that it is easier to move on such 
weakly-linked issues than it is on issues that are mostly characterised by strong 
interconnections. The effect of issue interconnections is thus not just on specific issue 
pairs, as each issue differs in its overall amenability to party movement.
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Second, a position within a party profile can be characterised by comparing it to 
the other positions that form part of the issue system. One way of summarising this 
comparison is by considering the position’s unusualness in relation to the system in 
general. The degree of unusualness is here the extent to which a policy position is more 
extreme or moderate than the party’s mean position. The assumption is that parties will 
tend towards a similar level of extremism on all issues in an effort to increase the 
coherence of their policy programme and to allow the use of heuristics by voters 
(Ferejohn, 1993; Thomassen, 1999; Poole, 2005; Sniderman and Levendusky, 2007). 
Given a mean distance from the political centre, each issue position within a system 
will differ in the extent to which it is unusual. This concept is explained in more depth 
in Chapter 6.
The structured diversity of issue systems
Policy interconnections are not the same for all parties in all countries, and yet the 
differences between them are not entirely random and unstructured. Instead, there are 
likely to be clear patterns that underlie the variation of issue systems across context. 
This can be described as ‘structured diversity’. While it is not accurate to argue that 
policy interconnections are entirely constant, the differences we find stem from a clear 
underlying pattern. The term ‘structured diversity’ is used by Rohrschneider and 
Whitefield (2009, p. 284f.), and they argue that Central and East European party 
systems can be characterised in this way. In their view, party competition is not 
identical across all contexts, but the differences between countries are not random or 
unexplainable. Instead, patterns of party positions and salience vary due to specific 
country-level factors that complement a broader cross-national trend. This approach 
also applies to policy interconnections. Here, I will describe four possible patterns of
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issue systems, which can differ predictably between left and right, between party 
families, between countries and across time.
Left and right
The strength and nature of interconnections may differ systematically between the left 
and right halves of each issue. Before addressing this possibility, it is worth explaining 
in what sense a policy spectrum may be considered to be made up of two ‘halves’. Such 
a conception is, of course, at odds with the unique Euclidean space that forms the basis 
of the Downsian model of spatial party competition. However, it has been suggested 
that political issues are not continuous. Instead, they may be characterised by a ‘neutral 
point’ that divides an issue into two sides (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989; Bruter 
and Harrison, 2007).9 They claim that there is a fundamental difference between being 
on one side of a political debate rather than on the other, an argument also put forward 
in terms of cleavage voting and party system change by Bartolini and Mair (1990). 
Therefore, describing issues as continuous Euclidean spaces might underestimate the 
importance of the direction of the policy position, that is, which side of the issue the 
party is taking. If the two sides of a political issue are fundamentally separate, then the 
kinds of issue interconnections present on either side may differ as well.
Policy interconnections may differ between left and right in terms of both 
strength and nature. The first case is that the strength of the interconnections varies 
between left and right. For example, the predicted line of association could be a better 
fit for the distribution of political parties on the left than for those on the right. Here, the
9 Accepting the possibility o f a ‘neutral point’ does not mean that I accept or use the heavily-criticised 
directional model o f voting (Westholm, 1997; Lewis and King, 1999), which drops positional 
competition in favour o f competition based on emphasis and direction. Here, I merely argue that the 
existence o f a central point at which the two sides are clearly distinguishable might have an effect on the 
interconnections present on each side.
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line can look identical on both sides; what matters is the extent to which this line 
accurately summarises the location of political parties. Thus, the extent to which one 
issue can predict another may differ systematically between left and right. The most 
extreme contrast between the two sides would be a very strong association on one side 
and complete independence on the other. In this case, the predicted line on one of the 
two sides would be flat, while there would be a clear slope on the other. In Figure 3.3, 
this case is represented by Line 1, with the parties represented as circles.
Another possibility is that the direction of the association is different on each 
side, so that the slopes on the two sides mirror each other. This is illustrated by Line 2, 
with the relevant parties on the right marked as boxes. Thus, extreme parties at opposite 
ends on the first issue -  thus radically different -  are actually similar on the second 
issue. The strength of the interconnection is nevertheless equal on left and right. 
Graphically, the distribution of parties would then resemble a V-shape; this difference 
in direction is very similar to a U-shaped quadratic relationship between two issues.
Turning again to the example of liberal-authoritarianism and economic policy, 
there are empirical indications that the relationship between these two issues do vary 
between each side of the political divide. There has historically been a greater variety of 
parties on the right than on the left (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan, 1970, p. 158; 
Boix, 1999). On the economic right, there have always been both liberal and 
authoritarian parties, partly due to the fact that these parties were formed based on 
cleavages that mobilised prior to owner-worker divisions (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). 
Moreover, at least partly for non-economic reasons, liberals found it difficult to work 
with conservatives and Christian Democrats, so that these parties continued to exist as 
separate forces. The left, which was of course not necessarily more united, tended to 
disagree mostly on economic matters. More recently, political parties have had to
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respond to changing social and value structures (van der Eijk et al., 1992, p. 426f.; 
Kriesi et al., 2008b). The left has had to incorporate new political priorities into their 
programmes (Kitschelt, 1994; Rohrschneider, 1994). Indeed, it can be argued that the 
emergence of the ‘new left’ and the strategic reorientation of social democracy have 
strengthened the links between economic egalitarianism and social liberalism on the 
left. On the right, however, the success of the extreme right has underlined further the 
contrast between economic ideology and views on liberal-authoritarian concerns. While 
the mainstream right has thus had to respond to the increasing salience of authoritarian 
concerns, parties that combine economic and social liberalism remain very much 
relevant. Thus, the ideological heterogeneity of parties on the right appears to be greater 
than that of parties on the left. In the terms used above, there seems to be a linear 
association between the two issues on the left, while the right is characterised by
complete independence; in Figure 3.3, Line 1 summarises this left-right difference 
graphically.
Party fam ilies
Party families may also differ in their issue interconnections as they broadly capture 
general patterns in party ideologies. The use of families to categorise parties is of 
course not without conceptual and methodological difficulties. As Mair and Mudde 
(1998, p. 214) argue, the concept of party families is one that is intuitive to most 
observers but ‘nevertheless remains one of the most under-theorized and least-specified 
approaches to the general classification of parties’. In their view, party families 
continue to be a useful way of distinguishing between parties, as the classification ‘goes 
right to the heart of a party’s identity and is therefore more likely to address the 
question of what parties are, rather than ... the question of what parties do’ (Mair and 
Mudde, 1998, p. 220). The two main characteristics that separate party families from 
each other are their shared historical origins and their overall ideology (Mair and 
Mudde, 1998, p. 223f.). This approach is related to that of von Beyme (1984, p. 43f.), 
who stresses the differences between the Weltanschauungen of party families. As 
pointed out by Mair and Mudde, the approach goes back to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), 
who argued that parties should be understood as the representatives of the core 
cleavages that divide societies. Party families can be taken to represent fundamentally 
different ideologies, and the concept of the party family thus goes beyond mere policy 
positions and captures an essential difference between parties.
However, while their essence may be more than their simple policy profiles, 
each member of a party family nevertheless still competes on the basis of an ideology 
which can be summarised in terms of their policy interconnections. The diverse
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historical origin and social grounding of party families means that they may differ 
systematically in their types of issue interconnections. Consequently, looking at how 
these may differ by party family, it is possible to consider whether some issues are more 
consistent parts of their ideologies than others. As Marks and Wilson (2000, p. 434) 
argue, parties in the Lipset and Rokkan framework have ‘highly distinct and durable 
identities’, and these condition their reaction to emerging policy areas. This means that 
even issues that were not important during the party’s creation may be tied strongly to 
original positions.
There are two ways to explain how issue interconnections can differ for party families. 
First, it may be that the strength of the links between two issues varies depending on the 
party family. For example, in Kitschelt’s (1994) analysis of ideological change among 
social democratic parties, their placement on economic policy and liberal- 
authoritarianism ends up in a diverse pattern, with parties’ positions on economic policy 
unrelated to views on social liberalism. For other party families, there may well be a 
link between their stances on these two issues: thus, Christian Democratic parties that 
are more liberal socially may also tend to be more liberal economically. In Figure 3.4, 
party family SD (‘Social Democrats’) shows no relationship between the two issues, 
while party family CD (‘Christian Democrats’) does.
Second, party families may also differ in their positional diversity on issues. This is 
also illustrated in Figure 3.4. Party family A does not vary very much on economic 
policy, but shows a large spread of positions on liberal-authoritarianism. Party family B 
exhibits the same pattern but varies on economic policy instead of on liberal- 
authoritarianism. Party family C shows a similar amount of variation on both issues.
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Note: SD = Social Democrats; CD= Christian Democrats; A to D = hypothetical party 
families
The positions of party family D are very similar to one another on both issues. 
The strength of interconnections can be linked to this difference in the extent of intra­
family variation. If the party family is consistent on both issues, connections are strong; 
if, however, variation is large on one issue but low on the other, the interconnections are 
weak. Overall, it is likely that policy areas closely related to the core of that party 
family’s identity will exhibit less intra-family variation. One should expect, for 
example, Green parties to vary little on their position on environmental issues but 
perhaps more on economic policy. Social Democratic and Conservative parties should 
be relatively consistent on economic issues; the same should be the case for Liberal 
parties and liberal-authoritarianism.
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Countries
The types of interconnections present within political parties’ issue systems can also 
vary depending on the country under consideration. This will be influenced by three 
interrelated country-specific factors: history/society, party strategies and institutions. 
First, the types of issue systems in each country will depend on the historical evolution 
and social make-up of each country. These country attributes will of course not affect 
interconnections based on inherent logic, but interconnections can also be based on 
looser sources such as quasi-logic and dominant aggregate voter distributions. The way 
in which two issues are seen as ‘naturally associated’ -  such as gun laws and the death 
penalty -  and the location of voters will of course be affected by each country’s specific 
development.
Moreover, the number and content of issues that are present in each political 
system will differ. We know from existing empirical work that, unsurprisingly, 
countries differ quite significantly in the number and type of salient cleavages that play 
a role in party competition (Lijphart, 1984; Stoll, 2005); this is likely to apply to issues 
as well. Of course, the extent to which socially important cleavages and issues are 
translated into party systems differs by country (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). In this, 
parties themselves play an important role, as they can decide whether to turn latent 
conflicts into particised issue divisions (Schattschneider, 1960; Riker, 1986). This 
means that the extent to which parties in each country have activated certain political 
divisions will influence the number and nature of the issues present in party conflict. 
This in turn is likely to affect the types of issue systems, if only by influencing the total 
number of issue components within each system.
Finally, party system size may have an effect on the types of issue systems 
present in each country. This goes beyond the numerical impact of the number of
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parties on dimensionality addressed in the previous chapter. Kitschelt (1994, p. 34) 
argues that a larger party system also means that the policy space becomes more 
‘crowded’. In Kitschelt’s view, the choice of electoral programmes by a party will 
depend on the positions of its competitors, in particular the extent to which certain 
political spaces are still unoccupied. If there is only one dimension of political 
competition, a system with fewer political parties creates ‘convergent spatial 
incentives’, while larger party systems induce ‘divergent spatial incentives’ (Dow, 
2001, p. 111).10 This is due to the fact that the ideal positions for vote maximisation are 
nearer to the centre when there are fewer competitors in the system. There is thus a 
stronger incentive for ‘product differentiation’ when a system is more fragmented (Cox, 
1990; Kitschelt, 1994, p. 118).
If this is applied to a polity where the potential for multidimensionality exists,
then an increase in the number of parties could also mean that parties will have an
incentive to show greater flexibility in terms of their issue interconnections. So parties
may be motivated to combine issue positions in more diverse ways if they face a greater
number of competitors. However, the theoretical counter-argument -  that larger party
systems create tighter interconnections between policy positions -  has also been made.
Sartori (1976, p. 304) states the simple hypothesis that ‘the more the parties, the more
their competition tends to spread along a linear, left-right type of space’. In other words,
the interconnections are tighter if there are more parties in the system.
Multidimensionality will only occur when there is a second dimension where two or
more parties (forming part of a larger party system) compete only with each other, in a
distinct arena. Sartori sees an even greater need for simple representations of political
competition where there are a large number of parties. Theoretically, it is difficult to
10 An argument could also be made that electoral systems can affect strategic incentives as well.
However, the primary effect o f  electoral systems in this context is likely to be their influence on party 
system size (Duverger, 1954; Cox, 1997), so the focus here is exclusively on party system size.
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decide which of the two accounts is more plausible; here, I thus mainly want to point 
out the possibility that issue interconnections may differ systematically depending on 
party system size.
Time
Issue systems can also change over time, although this should happen less often than 
might be expected. A change in an issue system is a change in the relationship between 
two of the component issues within a party ideology. This could mean a wholesale 
change from strongly interconnected to independent, but an issue pair could also simply 
weaken in terms of the extent of the mutual linkage. Such change could be restricted to 
one party within the party system or could affect it as a whole. In terms of static 
interconnections, change over time means that one issue becomes a more or less strong 
predictor of the chosen position or salience on the other issue. For dynamic 
interconnections, change over time implies that, when a party moves on one issue, the 
implications for a second issue strengthen or weaken.
The extent to which change over time is possible depends on the source of the 
particular issue interconnection. Those based on logic should be the least amenable to 
change: if two issues are linked due to the need for ideological coherence, this pair is 
unlikely to evolve much over time. A possible example could, however, be the links 
between economic and environmental policy. In general, these two issues areas are seen 
as closely linked, at least partly due to the need for internal coherence. It would have 
been difficult for parties to defend a platform that was based on free-market reforms but 
advocated stronger environmental regulation. However, a case has been made recently, 
for instance in the Stem Review on the economics of climate change, that tighter 
environmental regulation is necessary to protect economic growth in the long run
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(Stem, 2006); it could therefore be logically consistent to advocate economic growth 
and environmental protection. Nevertheless, in most cases a change in the fundamental 
logical links between two issue areas should be rare.
However, other sources should be more amenable to change over time. For 
instance, the quasi-logic that in the United States binds support for weak gun laws to 
opposition to abortion and gay marriage could be undermined in the long run (Poole,
2005). Issue interconnections may also simply result from the aggregate distribution of 
voter preferences, and these may shift more frequently over time. Thus, it may be that 
some packages of issue positions are quite rare in the electorate, for example an 
opposition to immigration coupled with left-leaning economic policies. However, due 
to social and political change, these two issue position may become more heavily 
represented, leading parties to follow suit by weakening their interconnections on that 
issue pair. This can be reflected in static terms, as the extent to which economic policy 
can predict a party’s immigration stance may weaken. However, the change may also 
be dynamic, with movement on economic policy no longer mirrored by movement on 
immigration. However, in general it appears that issue interconnections should be 
relatively stable, as the causes behind issue system change are likely to be gradual and 
rare.
Issue interconnections and political competition
Issue interconnections would be of little interest if they did not have an effect on 
political competition more generally. However, the way issues are linked to one another 
is of significant importance for the way parties compete. In this section, I will first draw 
in detail the distinction between policy interconnections and party system 
dimensionality; in particular, I will show that issue interconnections within party
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ideologies influence the dimensionality of the party system as a whole. Then, I will 
argue that policy interconnections represent a further limitation on pure Downsian party 
competition and, finally, I will address the larger implications of issue interconnections 
for voter choices and policy outcomes.
Policy interconnections and party system dimensionality
Describing the shape of party systems and the nature of policy interconnections requires 
treading the line between oversimplified and overwhelmingly detailed description. This 
was already recognised by Lipset and Rokkan (1967, p. 36), who contrasted the dangers 
of ‘getting lost in the wealth of fascinating detail’ and of ‘succumb[ing] to facile
c
generalities’. As an approach, examining policy interconnections provides a greater 
level of information than looking at party system dimensionality, yet the additional 
detail is useful and helps to understand both dimensionality and policy competition.
Policy interconnections and party systems are related concepts. They are related 
because both concepts concern the links between policy areas; they are different 
because the former refers to the ideologies of individual parties, while the latter 
considers the policy packages of all parties within a political system. While 
dimensionality is a concept that operates at the system level, issue interconnections and 
issue systems operate at the party level, that is, an analytical step below that of party 
system dimensionality. When comparing policy interconnections, we look at parties and 
issues, not party systems and dimensions. The approach is therefore more disaggregated 
than comparing party systems, and the level of detail provided consequently greater. 
Studying the links between policy areas at this lower level allows the study of the 
characteristics of parties and issues as opposed to party systems as a whole. This means 
that different topics can be examined. Two examples are:
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■ The precise interconnection in static and dynamic terms between two specific 
issues, for example environmental and economic policy, that is, whether positions and 
salience of one predict position and salience of the other and whether position and 
salience move together on both issues.
■ The attributes of the issue systems of specific parties, in particular the 
unusualness of certain issues within their programmes, and of different policy areas, in 
particular their general interconnectedness.
In dimensional analysis, using a greater level of aggregation, these characteristics of 
party ideologies could not be examined as easily as dimensions refer to the nature of the 
party system as a whole rather than the attributes of particular parties.
Yet the two concepts are of course clearly related and the boundaries not easily drawn. 
It is worth illustrating the links between policy interconnections and party system 
dimensionality using a simple example, Figure 3.5. The starting situation is a two- 
dimensional three-party system, where party positions on the only two salient issues are 
not correlated. Party A is liberal and on the economic left, Party C is authoritarian and 
on the economic right. Party B1 is centrist on economic policy but more socially liberal 
than the other two parties. On economics, the order of parties is thus ABC, but on 
liberal-authoritarianism BAC. In this party system, knowledge of a party’s economic 
policy position is not of significant help in predicting a party’s views on liberal- 
authoritarianism. More precisely, it appears that economics and liberal-authoritarianism 
are statically linked for parties A and C, but not for B.
What about party policy change? For parties A and C, dynamic interconnections 
are similarly simple: all issues are strongly linked, and movement on one issue would 
also lead to movement on all other issues. They would thus move along the straight line 
indicated in the Figure. However, party B has a more complex issue system: its position
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Figure 3.5 Party system dimensionality and policy interconnections
on liberal-authoritarianism is independent of its position on economic policy in terms of 
its interconnections. This means that, for that party, change in the economic policy 
position has no consequences for its views on liberal-authoritarianism, and vice versa. 
By moving from B1 to B2, party B collapses the two dimensions of party competition: 
as B2 is at the centre on liberal-authoritarianism, this decreases the dimensionality of 
the party system as a whole. Nevertheless, there has been no change in the nature of the 
issue interconnections for parties A and B. In sum, party system dimensionality and 
issue systems are clearly related - but not identical -  concepts.
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Issue systems and Downsian party competition
Issue systems are a limitation on pure Downsian party competition (Downs, 1957). In 
what has been called the ‘comic-book’ version of this theory (Grofman, 2004), party 
positions on a single left-right dimension of economic policy are chosen as a simple 
consequence of the distribution of voter preference. In a two-party system, parties 
should locate themselves at the position of the median voter. Moreover, parties will 
closely track any changes in the median voter’s opinion. This simplified version of 
Downs’ account depends on a large number of assumptions (Grofman, 2004). Its 
predictions are modified if one takes into account, for example, the need for campaign 
contributions (Miller and Schofield, 2003) and the influence of party activists (Aldrich, 
1983; Schofield, 2003). Other variations of Downs’ model, such as abstention and 
alienation, different electoral systems and multidimensionality, have also led to greater 
nuance in the rational-choice conception of party competition (Smithies, 1941; 
McKelvey, 1976; Cox, 1990; Adams et al., 2005). Starting from the very basic model of 
Downsian competition, a more realistic picture of how parties pursue electoral success 
has been constructed.
Issue systems represent another limitation on the pure Downsian understanding 
of party competition. One reason for this is that static interconnections provide a 
different explanation of party locations in the policy space. As Marks and Wilson have 
argued, party positions are not always ‘efficient responses to electoral incentives’ 
(2000, p. 434). Parties cannot simply consider the range of salient policies and choose 
the one on each that is closest to the median voter. This is not possible in issue systems 
characterised by strong interconnections. In such party profiles, positions are 
interdependent, with choices in one policy area necessitating a similar position on 
closely interconnected issues.
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Of course, if issue systems are the same for parties as they are for voters, 
interconnections are not a limitation on political parties’ strategic choices. In other 
words, if the interconnections present within citizens’ packages of policy positions are 
identical to those within party programmes, then parties’ choices are not additionally 
constrained by the interrelationships within issue systems. However, this is unlikely to 
be the case in any realistic political system. Voter opinions tend to be more complex 
than those of parties: there is a greater diversity in issue interconnections among 
citizens than among their political representatives. This may simply be a result of 
numbers, as there are obviously far more voters than there are parties, so the likelihood 
that there will be more and different patterns of policy interconnections is naturally 
larger. Finally, voter opinions are likely to be growing more complex as part of the 
more general process of electoral dealignment and cognitive mobilisation (Dalton, 
2006; Mair, 2008). It is probable that the diversity of voter opinions is always greater 
than that of party ideologies.
It is not just because of the multiplicity of voter views that issue systems are 
likely to be less tightly organised among individuals than among parties. As we have 
seen, parties have a particular incentive to be seen to follow the dictates of logic and 
present a coherent, reliable platform (Downs, 1957; Ferejohn, 1993). While voters are 
not punished for ideological incoherence, this may well happen to parties. Moreover, 
citizens have few practical incentives to shape a relatively simple ideology, while 
parties benefit from providing a useful heuristic for voters. In addition, the actors who 
decide on party policy are all members of the political elite: these are exactly the type of 
people Converse (1964) would expect to exhibit stronger issue constraints. In sum, it is 
likely that the issue interconnections within party profiles are stronger and less diverse
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than among voters, and, as a consequence, the nature of issue systems represents a real 
limitation on positional choice as a pure result of electoral incentives.
A second reason why issue systems represent another limitation on the pure 
Downsian understanding of party competition is that dynamic interconnections mean 
that party movement cannot be seen as the simple reflection of changes in the median 
voter position. Instead, if two issues are dynamically interconnected, movement on one 
issue also leads to similar policy change on the second issue. The party may choose to 
change its position on one issue in order to achieve its strategic objectives. These can be 
pure vote-seeking, of course, but they may also be mediated by (among other factors) 
the influence of activists, campaign resources and probabilistic decision-making, or 
motivated by office- and policy-seeking considerations (Strom, 1990). The choice to 
move on one issue, however, may have consequences for other components of the issue 
system. Here, again, this is not relevant or problematic for parties if issue systems 
among voters and parties are identical, as the associated movement caused by 
interconnections would also reflect voter views. Yet, the arguments above have shown 
that such party-voter congruence of issue systems is unlikely to be the case. Therefore, 
issue interconnections limit pure Downsian policy change due to the lack of 
independence between policy areas.
Issue systems, voter choices and political outcomes
So far, I have considered the implications of issue systems for party systems and party 
competition in isolation, that is, without considering the events that precede and follow 
elections: voters’ choices and public policy outcomes. Yet, the existence of issue 
interconnections has political effects on these two aspects of political conflict and thus 
for democratic decision-making in general.
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First, the pattern of policy interconnections may have an effect on the choices 
that citizens can make. More specifically, citizen choices are limited by the existence 
and nature of issue systems among political parties. This is because the complexity of 
voter preferences on distinct issue areas is unlikely to be fully represented by the party 
system. Policy interconnections within party ideologies contribute to this lack of 
equivalence. I have already described above that the interconnections among political 
parties should be stronger and less diverse than among citizens. Moreover, as a result of 
factors such as the strategic incentives created by electoral systems (Cox, 1987), there 
will be fewer political parties within each political system than there are common issue 
system types among citizens. This means that policy interconnections, which constrain 
the positions and movements of political parties, also limit the political choices open to 
voters. This may also reduce the ability of voters to select and control their 
representatives effectively (Ferejohn, 1993).
These limitations are partly the result of the fact that citizens have to vote on the 
entire package of policy positions presented by parties (Thomassen, 1999, p. 34). As 
Stimson (2004, p. 61) argues: ‘The problem is that the mechanism of choice [in 
elections] does not permit the expression of multiple and conflicting views.’ If it were 
possible to choose a party for each distinct issue area at a time, voters would find 
themselves in a less restricted position. Parties would still be limited in their freedom of 
choice concerning their positions, as the requirements of logic and coherence would 
still apply. However, voters could pick the party that best fits their position on each 
issue, even if their precise issue system was not represented by any one political party. 
Yet, given that elections in representative democracies are always on packages of 
positions, the fact that political parties operate within a world of constrained issue 
systems means that voter choice is fundamentally limited. In Stimson’s (2004, p. 61)
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words, ‘as the number of issues goes beyond, say, two or three, it becomes exceedingly 
unlikely that either of two candidates will have the same mix [of views on multiple 
controversies] you have.’ This problem is exacerbated by the fact that policy 
interconnections are stronger for parties than for voters.
Second, policy interconnections also have an effect on political outcomes. First, 
and most directly, the existence of strong issue linkages will limit the possible 
combinations of policies that will be enacted by governments. When choosing a 
government, voters also choose the specific package of policies they want to be 
realised; if the policy profiles are constrained, then so are governments’ policy outputs. 
To use a simplified example, economic policy might be strongly connected to 
environmental policy positions. In that case, it is very unlikely that a government will 
be formed that supports, say, free-market reforms as well as tough environmental 
protection through industry regulation. Issue interconnections can also have an effect on 
coalition formation, which will of course also influence policy outcomes. In particular, 
the strength of issue interconnections should affect the flexibility of potential coalition 
partners. Imagine a situation where two parties are attempting to form a government, 
but they are separated by great differences on a specific issue. The two potential 
governmental parties may be more willing to compromise if the issue in question is one 
that is relatively independent. This would mean that it would be easier for one or both 
parties to agree to a shift in their position in order to achieve the gains of office, as 
moving on this isolated issue would have very few effects on their policy profile as a 
whole.11 Policy interconnections may therefore also influence the dynamic of coalition 
negotiations. To sum up, issue systems will influence more than party ideologies and
11 I also assume here that the issue is not one o f overriding salience, at least for one o f  the two parties.
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strategies as they may place limits on voter choice, policy outcomes and coalition 
bargaining.
Conclusion
This chapter has presented in detail the theoretical framework that will guide the 
empirical analysis in the following chapters. Party ideologies are usefully 
conceptualised as issue systems: a set of interconnected issue components containing 
positional and salience information. These interconnections can be static or dynamic, 
that is, visible at one point in time or visible during component change. This chapter 
also shows how the policy interconnections approach is related to the concept of party 
system dimensionality.
Crucially, the issue components within a party ideology vary greatly in the 
extent of their mutual interconnection. It is this diversity that creates important 
implications for party competition: interconnections represent a further limitation on 
pure Downsian vote-maximising strategies. However, as policy areas are generally 
more tightly bound within parties than among voters, issue interconnections also create 
limitations for electoral democracy (in particular citizens’ freedom of choice) and for 
public policy outcomes (in particular the range of likely coalition outcomes). Patterns of 
policy interconnections can also vary predictably between the economic left and right, 
between countries and between party families; within each party, variation may exist 
over time or between position and salience.
So far, the discussion has remained largely theoretical, though continued 
reference was made to the well-examined issue pair of economic policy and liberal- 
authoritarianism. The following chapters will examine in detail and empirically the 
nature of policy interconnections and their effect on party competition. Chapters 5 and 6
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examine interconnections between issue positions: static interconnections are first 
mapped and then used to predict the occurrence of dynamic interconnections. Chapter 7 
turns to salience interconnections and examines their static and dynamic strength. 
Chapter 8 explores an issue-specific measure of interconnection strength -  unusualness 
-  and uses this to predict salience levels. Before turning to the empirical analysis of 
interconnections, it is first necessary to consider how issue positions and salience can be 
measured, and this is the focus of the next chapter.
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Chapter 4 
Measuring positions and salience in expert surveys and party 
manifestos
Measuring political science variables is one of the key challenges in the discipline. 
Even if we accept that complex empirical phenomena can be reasonably captured by 
relatively simple quantitative measures, there will still be a need to debate exactly how 
real-world occurrences should be transformed into comparable indices. While the 
discussions surrounding measurement may quickly appear arcane and over-detailed, 
these concerns are of central importance to comparative political science. If the aim is 
to compare in any meaningful way, either across countries or across time, then we need 
to be sure that our measurement strategy is accurate. This also applies to the location of 
party positions and estimates of issue salience.
Thus far, the focus of this thesis has been on the theoretical aspects of issue 
interconnections. Beginning with this chapter, these ideas are applied to an empirical 
analysis of the ideologies and programmes of political parties. To compare party 
stances, we first need to be able to measure position and salience on a series of distinct 
policy areas. Given the complexity of political debates and party ideologies, this is no 
simple or obvious task. The aim of this chapter is therefore to assess different ways of 
measuring party positions on distinct issue areas. Two data sources will prove to be 
particularly useful: the expert surveys of Laver and Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver 
(2006), and the work of the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al., 2001;
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Klingemann et al., 2007). Most importantly, both sources provide information on a 
series of different issues and provide for clear cross-country comparability.
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I assess possible approaches to 
measuring party positions and detail how expert surveys and party manifestos can be 
used as sources of evidence on issue interconnections. I then briefly describe the policy 
areas included in each survey and how position and salience are measured. In the final 
section, I present outline descriptive statistics for the two measures, including a brief 
analysis of their intercorrelation.
Approaches to measuring the positions of political actors
It will never be possible to measure policy positions directly. While we can determine 
with considerable certainty phenomena such as temperature or elevation, the assessment 
of the location of political parties will always be approximate (Benoit and Laver, 2006). 
This is because the measurement of party positions necessarily represents a simplified 
summary of a complex reality. Take, for example, a simple statement such as: ‘Labour 
is to the left of the Conservatives on economic policy.’ Already, this sentence contains 
certain important assumptions. For example, what is the time period under 
consideration: this week, this year or this decade? What topics fall under the heading 
‘economic policy’? And what level of the party is concerned: the party leaders, the 
parliamentary party or the party members? And, of course, what is it that means that 
Labour’s position is to the ‘left’ of the Conservatives’? In describing party positions in 
spatial terms, we always have to make important conceptual decisions, and these are not 
always made explicit.
Nevertheless, the usefulness of even approximate measurements of party
positions makes the endeavour worthwhile. Political scientists have taken several routes
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in trying to assess empirically the spatial location of political parties. These can be 
summarised under four headings: self-reported, behavioural, reputational and textual 
(Ray, 2007). First, self-reported party locations are based on information provided 
directly by political actors. The most straightforward example is opinion surveys, with 
party positions measured, for example, as the mean position of a party’s supporters. 
This information could also be provided by members of parliament (e.g. Farrell et al., 
2006). Second, the primary behavioural measurement of party positions is through roll- 
call votes. Here, the publicly available information on the voting behaviour of members 
of parliament is used to provide summary scales of the positions of individual 
legislators and party groups (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; Hix et al., 2007). Third, expert 
surveys measure party positions based on their reputations. The surveys differ 
significantly from one another in terms of the number and content of the questions 
asked and of the number of experts consulted, but all are based on the assumption that 
the aggregated assessments of well-informed observers will provide a reasonable 
approximation of a party’s spatial location. Finally, textual approaches use political 
documents to extract party positions.
Two types of textual analysis need to be distinguished. The first is based on 
hand-coding: this approach is represented by the Comparative Manifestos Project 
(CMP), which has used human coders in gathering data on party policies since 1945, 
using party manifestos (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2007). A more recent 
project based on human coding has used newspaper articles instead of party manifestos 
(Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008b). The second, more recent approach to text analysis is based 
on computer-assisted document coding, limiting the amount and extent of human input 
required (Laver and Garry, 2000; Laver et al., 2003; Slapin and Proksch, 2008).
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The data needed to map policy interconnections has to provide reliable and 
internationally comparable information on party positions on a series of issues. This 
means that measures that only provide positions on a left-right dimension are of no use, 
and neither are measurements that do not allow for direct comparisons across countries. 
A third requirement is that it be possible to follow changes in party positions over time, 
as a core feature of this research is the examination of dynamic interconnections. These 
three requirements mean that the sources of positional information that I can use are 
greatly reduced in number.
Two approaches to measuring party positions, self-reported and behavioural, are 
clearly not suited to mapping issue interconnections. First, self-reported measures are 
not useful for my purposes. Measures of party ideology based on MP self-placement is 
simply too thin on the ground to be used in this research. Voter-based information, 
which is of course more broadly available, is limited for two reasons. First, on a 
practical level, my need for easily comparable measures of party positions over time 
means that it would be difficult to find such information on a consistent series of issues 
in the wealth of (not necessarily overlapping) studies of voter opinion. If the questions 
and contexts are not consistent between countries and over time, then extracting party 
positions on a series of issues would require significant compromises in terms of 
reliability and accuracy. In addition, I am primarily interested in party elite’s 
ideological positioning; indeed, I mostly assume parties to be unitary actors. Voter 
assessments of party positions are not necessarily reliable or accurate. They are 
therefore not a methodologically appropriate source of positional information. Second, 
behavioural measures are not a useful source of party positions, either. 
Parliamentarians’ voting behaviour in most countries is characterised by govemment- 
opposition dynamics rather than policy differences (Hix and Noury, 2007). The United
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States Congress is unusual rather than typical in this regard. Even if policy voting was 
dominant, then the lack of broad and easily available cross-national data would 
represent a significant limitation.
Measuring party positions using expert surveys and manifestos
This leaves reputational and textual measures of party positions, both of which can be 
used to examine issue interconnections. In particular, this thesis makes extensive use of 
the expert surveys carried out by Laver and Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006) 
and of the textual data coded by the Comparative Manifestos Project (Budge et al., 
2001; Klingemann et al., 2007). Since there is no objective measure of party positions, 
each data source has its limitations -  but also its strengths. If the findings are consistent, 
using both sources will add considerable weight to the results (Marks, 2007). I will 
now describe what exactly is measured in expert surveys and manifesto coding and 
present the advantages and drawbacks of each measure in turn.
Expert surveys
The first expert survey in political science was carried out by Jean-Michael Morgan for 
his (unpublished) 1976 dissertation (Morgan, 1976; Gabel and Huber, 2000). Since 
then, a number of these studies have been conducted, beginning with Castles and Mair’s 
(1984) survey in the early 80s (Huber and Inglehart, 1995; Ray, 1999; McElroy and 
Benoit, 2007). The geographical coverage of these surveys has been increasing steadily, 
with broad coverage now of countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Benoit and Laver,
2006) and in Latin America (Wiesehomeier and Benoit, 2009) as well as the usual 
‘advanced’ democracies of Western Europe and the English-speaking world.
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Expert surveys have taken three forms. First, some surveys have simply asked 
for party positions on a left-right dimension (e.g., Castles and Mair, 1984; Huber and 
Inglehart, 1995). At the other extreme, the surveys carried out by Laver and Hunt and 
Benoit and Laver requested experts to place parties on at least seven distinct issue 
dimensions. Indeed, the first of these two broad-based surveys did not even include a 
question on the general left-right position of each party. Finally, a third group of 
surveys occupy a half-way point by measuring parties’ left-right positions as well as 
their stance on only a limited number of other issues. In the case of the 1999 and 2002 
Chapel Hill surveys, these are parties’ views on economic policy and ‘gal/tan’ topics.12
Even though they differ in the number of issues or dimensions examined, all
expert surveys are based on a strong a priori definition of policy spaces (Benoit and
Laver, 2006, p. 108). This means that in these surveys the leading researcher decides on
the issues to be measured in each country before asking for expert assessment of party
positions. This is also the case when the researcher consults experts in advance on the
topics that should be considered salient in each country. A further complication arises
when the survey contains questions concerning distinct issue areas rather than clearly
aggregate dimensions such as left-right or gal-tan. Even a question concerning party
position on, say, immigration is necessarily an aggregate assessment of separate
policies. To use Poole’s (2005) terms, expert surveys cannot assess party positions in
the ‘action space’, the pure, unreduced set of party positions on all political topics.
Instead, experts can only provide information on a simplified policy space. This may or
may not be equal to the ‘basic space’, the low-dimensional world that parties and
politicians actually operate in. As the main researcher pre-defines the main issues, the
nature of the action space is primarily determined by the survey approach chosen. The
12 Gal/tan refers to ‘green/altemative/liberal’ and ‘traditional/authoritarian/nationalist’. The most recent 
Chapel Hill survey (Hooghe et al., 2008) includes a far greater range o f issues, but for a smaller number 
o f countries than measured in Benoit and Laver.
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Laver/Hunt and Benoit/Laver surveys are the most open regarding the real shape of the 
action space, as they at least provide party positions on a relatively broad range of 
distinct issues and are agnostic concerning the way these are then reduced into a low­
dimensional space. Nevertheless, all expert surveys are by their very nature indirect 
measurements of policy positions (Benoit and Laver, 2006, p. 110).
The questions asked of experts possess surface clarity. However, to request an 
assessment of a party’s position on a given issue or dimension is actually vaguer than it 
appears. Budge (2000) highlights four key ambiguities. First, which party is being 
measured? Experts could, for example, assess party members or party leaders. Second, 
do experts judge party intentions or party behaviour? Third, what time frame is being 
assessed in order to determine party positions? Here, experts may look at the past 
month, the past year or even the past decade. Finally, what criteria do experts use to 
judge party positions? Referring to left-right judgements, Budge argues that it is not 
clear what each expert considers as part of that dimension and how each element is 
weighted. This is also true for other summary dimensions such as gal/tan, but can also 
apply to the distinct issues measured by Laver/Hunt and Benoit/Laver. Even when it 
comes to single issue areas such as immigration or the environment, it is not obvious 
what each expert considers to be part of each political topic. These four ambiguities 
would be less of a concern if experts varied consistently on each, but internal diversity 
among survey respondents is also likely. For example, some experts may give an 
assessment of party positions within the past year or so, while others will take a longer- 
term view.
In fact, the latter seems most likely: the assessments of policy positions by 
experts are remarkably stable over time (Volkens, 2007, p. 109). For example, the 
correlation between the left-right scores recorded by Castles and Mair (1984), Laver
112
and Hunt (1992) and Huber and Inglehart (1995) is extremely high (McDonald and 
Mendes 2001, p. 100). It seems that experts tend to ignore short-term changes in party 
positions and instead provide long-term estimates of left-right views. As a result, expert 
surveys scores will tend to underestimate the actual level of parties’ ideological 
movements. This of course means that it is difficult to assess party policy change using 
expert surveys (McDonald et al., 2007).
Another concern with expert survey measurements, especially for this research, 
is that the respondents might make party profiles appear more coherent than they in fact 
are. This is because the experts provide positions on each issue in turn. They are thus 
perhaps automatically inclined to giving similar scores to the party on each issue, 
maybe even more so if they are unsure of the party’s actual position. Moreover, the 
expert’s sophisticated understanding of politics is likely to create a tendency to see 
coherence where there is none: for example, a respondent may link positions on 
economics and the environment even though the party does not do so.
However, despite these conceptual and practical shortcomings, expert surveys 
possess a number of considerable virtues. Survey responses are conceptually clear as 
they are openly based on a spatial interpretation of party competition. The scores are 
thus ‘unequivocally positional’ (Laver and Garry, 2000, p. 621). In addition, each issue 
or dimension is relatively well-defined, as questions are explicit concerning what 
should be assessed by respondents, even if this is only a vague left-right scale. The 
information provided by experts is easy to interpret and straightforward. As a result of 
the survey, researchers are provided with a mean party score on a pre-defined scale. 
This also increases the comparability of party positions, not just within but also across 
countries. Given these significant advantages -  and of course the problems associated
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with the other approaches to positional measurement -  I use expert surveys as one of 
my two main data sources.
Party manifestos
The Comparative Manifestos Project is one of the most important research endeavours 
in political science (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2007). The extent of its 
coverage is impressive: it has made publicly available information on 1314 election 
manifestos by 651 parties in 51 countries (Benoit et al., 2009). For some countries, the 
range of elections included begins in 1945, providing researchers with a long time- 
series of party policies. This is one of the strengths of using texts as a source of 
information on party ideology: it is much easier to extract a position from a sixty-year- 
old text than it is to travel back in time to request an expert assessment. Such a 
document is also a real and unchangeable historical artefact that records a party’s 
programme at a specific point in time. In contrast to expert views, manifestos are thus a 
tangible and immutable object.
Why code manifestos? It is argued that these documents provide one, and 
possibly the only, collective and negotiated statement of party policies (Hansen, 2008). 
They are usually decided at a high level within a party and are produced to set out a 
party’s positions on a wide range of issues, addressing a broad audience. Moreover, 
party manifestos have been written for a long time, making them amenable to long-term 
analysis. These documents are therefore well-suited to content analysis. Yet the status 
of manifestos is not entirely clear or consistent (Ray, 2007, p. 17). They can be seen as 
contracts, advertisements or statements of principle. As contracts, manifestos would be 
(theoretically) binding and realistically implementable; as advertisements, they would 
adhere to less stringent norms of truth, accuracy and realism; and as statements of
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principle, they would reflect a party’s ideal policy preferences and have little 
connection to the election at hand. It is likely that manifestos vary in their purpose, and 
they could even combine all three elements. While manifestos may at first sight appear 
to be a constant, cross-national feature of party politics, they also differ in their aims 
and content. Nevertheless, systematically analysing party manifestos at the very least 
improves upon mere anecdotal political research and may provide a relatively 
consistent and coherent means of measuring party policies (McLean, 2006).
The CMP extracts information on party policies through the hand coding of 
these manifestos. Its general approach is somewhat idiosyncratic. For one, its 
conceptual foundations lie in salience theory (Budge and Farlie, 1983), a rival to 
Downsian positional theory whose core thesis is that parties tend to ‘talk past each 
other’, in other words, each party selectively emphasises only those topics on which it 
sees itself as having an electoral advantage. Parties thus do not take positions on the 
same issue in election contests, but compete on separate ideological ground. Based on 
this theory, each textual unit is assigned to 1 of 56 categories, with an additional 
category for ‘uncoded’ units. A unit is a quasi-sentence: this term refers either to full 
sentences or to parts of the text the coder sees as a stand-alone statement. The scores for 
each category are the percentage of each manifesto devoted to each topic. Yet, the 
salience approach is not pursued fully. Of the 56 categories, only 1 is purely salience- 
based (‘economic goals’). All other categories are either explicitly positional (and 
described as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’) or include a clear normative statement (McDonald 
and Mendes, 2001, p. 92). Indeed, the main use of the CMP dataset to date -  as well as 
the main controversies surrounding it -  have been based on the left-right scores 
extracted from the database (Budge and Laver, 1992a). In other words, a coding project
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based on the assumptions of salience theory has found greatest application as a source 
of positional information.
The CMP data has also been the object of other criticisms. In particular, users of 
the data have questioned the design of the coding scheme and its implementation. A key 
disadvantage is its use of a fixed coding scheme. This was originally developed in 1979 
(Pennings and Keman, 2002, p. 66), thirty years ago, and has started to show its age. 
For example, it does not contain an explicit reference to unemployment, while the topic 
of migration is also only inadequately reflected.13 The assumption that one coding 
scheme can summarise all political documents successfully is a strong one, and one that 
will become less defensible with time and with the inclusion of further countries. 
Already, many manifestos contain a large number of ‘uncoded’ text units: in Denmark, 
for example, the average since 1945 has been over 30 per cent (Hansen, 2008). In the 
most recent version of the CMP data, additional categories were included for the new 
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, but this has done little to remedy this 
problem. Laver and Garry (2000) have proposed a more flexible, collapsible and 
amendable coding scheme, but manifesto coders have not taken this up. In any case, it 
is now difficult to go back and re-code all manifestos, so there is little option but to use 
the data as it is now coded.
There is also little way of knowing how uncertain the manifesto coding is. First, 
each manifesto was in most cases only coded once. Human coding will always be 
subject to unavoidable errors and subjective judgements, but a minimum level of inter­
coder agreement is necessary for users of the data to be confident that the scores 
provide an approximate measurement. Even though the CMP coders received individual 
training, it is difficult to know how accurate the coding has been. Recent research
13 The only relevant categories are multiculturalism and nationalism.
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shows that coder reliability is remarkably low (Mikhaylov et al., 2008). Another form 
of error arises from the fact that only one manifesto is coded for each party for each 
election (Benoit et al., 2009). We can think of a manifesto as a randomly distributed 
representation of the party’s true policy stances. Each manifesto is then related to the 
party’s actual views, but there is uncertainty concerning the distance between the 
document and the party’s stance. Unlike expert surveys, the manifesto data contains no 
measurement of the uncertainty surrounding the data provided. Benoit et al. have 
provided a possible remedy for this second form of error, but the first source cannot 
currently be overcome.
The existence of such errors, which may be quite large, means that it is difficult 
to assess party movements. In contrast to expert surveys, parties change their political 
views considerably in the CMP-coded manifestos (McDonald et al., 2007). The 
question is then how this movement should be interpreted. Is it just random ‘noise’ 
arising from the inaccurate measurement of policy positions provided by manifesto 
coding? Or is it ‘real’ movement, that is, actual and intended policy change carried out 
by political parties? Among observers of political parties, there is no consensus on 
whether parties are overwhelmingly stable or frequently erratic (McDonald, 2004). The 
fact that the nature of the error in policy position estimates is unknown makes it 
difficult to assess ideological change within political parties, as we are unable to 
separate the ‘noise’ from the ‘signal’, that is, parties’ actual and intended movements.
Other doubts concerning the manifesto data have also come to the fore. Hansen 
(2008) has examined the Danish part of the CMP in detail and found significant 
shortcomings. For one, the documents used vary considerably in length: the number of 
words ranged from 268 to 16,371. In fact, there are many very short manifestos in the 
CMP dataset. According to Benoit and Laver (2007a), 14 percent of all manifestos have
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less than 50 quasi-sentences, and one-third contain less than 100. The shorter the 
manifesto, the greater the possible error in measurement. Moreover, Hansen also finds 
that the documents were not all party manifestos in the strict sense of the word. Some of 
the manifestos used were speeches in local constituencies, while others were selections 
from party newspapers. In total, the selection of documents is not consistent and 
somewhat eclectic. Pelizzo’s (2003) detailed analysis of the left-right positions of 
Italian parties also shows some startling inconsistencies compared to in-depth political 
analysis of each election. Finally, there is a large number of zeros in the coding of each 
manifesto (Hans and Honnige, 2008). In each document, over half of possible 
categories were not used. It is unclear whether these are strategically de-emphasised 
categories, issues that were not salient at that election -  or categories that suffer from 
significant overlap with others (Mikhaylov et al., 2008).
Despite this avalanche of criticism, CMP data is still worth analysing. For one, it 
has proved remarkably useful and does not perform particularly badly when compared 
to other sources of positional information (Keman, 2007). While not perfect, the data is 
also far from being completely random and unreliable. It is particularly remarkable that 
this coding method, based on salience theory, has shown itself to be useful as a source 
of positional information as well. Moreover, the time period, countries and parties 
covered is simply unparalleled in current research. Importantly, the project used a 
unique coding scheme for all manifestos, making scores directly comparable. Unlike 
the expert surveys, the manifesto data is at least unequivocal in terms of what it 
measures: each case refers to a specific time point, with information taken from a 
(usually) clearly defined document, analysed using a consistent coding scheme. For my 
purposes, CMP data is of particular use as it contains information on a wide variety of 
issues, with few a priori assumptions concerning the structure of the party-political
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space. In sum, manifesto data is useful because it has a proven track record, covers a 
long time period, can be used for positional analysis, is based on clear, transparent 
foundations and contains information on a broad range of topics. All these factors make 
manifesto data an indispensible source of information on policy interconnections.
Issues measured in expert surveys and manifestos
Party stances on political issues will be measured using two data sources, expert 
surveys and party manifestos. While using two data sources will add weight to my 
findings, it is also necessary to underline that, as described above, the two data sources 
are based on very different assumptions and approaches. It would go too far to expect 
results from both datasets to be completely identical. In addition, issue positions are 
extracted from each dataset using different approaches. In the following, the precise 
issues included in each dataset are described briefly, and the next chapters will address 
in more detail how these are used to measure issue interconnections in party 
competition.
Expert surveys
As already noted, the analysis of distinct issue areas is limited by the number of issues 
that have been included in expert surveys. Only two surveys, by Laver and Hunt (1992) 
and Benoit and Laver (2006) currently go beyond left-right and other summary 
dimensions. The two surveys, carried out in 1989 and 2002-03 respectively, are unique 
in that at least seven issues are covered for each country, with many more issues 
available for some political systems. However, two aspects limit the use of these issue 
measurements in my research. First, the questions differed in the two surveys. Benoit 
and Laver decided not to repeat the same questions in their follow-up to the original
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Laver and Hunt research. This is not surprising, as a question on the attitude to the 
USSR would have been nonsensical in 2003, while clericalism and urban-rural relations 
had both declined quite strongly in terms of political importance. Second, while the 
Laver and Hunt survey requested party positions on the same eight issues in almost all 
countries, Benoit and Laver decided to let the questions vary in the follow-up survey. 
This is of course a reasonable strategy to estimate national party positions, as the salient 
issues are not the same in each country (Stoll, 2005). However, this clearly limits the 
cross-national comparability of positions.
This leaves a core of four questions that are available for all countries in both 
surveys (see Table 4.1): economic policy (taxes versus spending), liberal- 
authoritarianism14, environmental policy and decentralization. Instead of simply asking 
for positions on such abstract concepts, experts were asked concrete questions (also 
presented in Table 4.1). These four core questions will also be the focus of the 
empirical analysis in the following chapters: using these issues, issue interconnections 
in static and dynamic terms are analysed for 23 countries.15 I do not, of course, claim 
that these four issues cover all important topics in the political debates of each country. 
However, the aim is to examine interconnections between issues cross-nationally and not to 
present an exhaustive account of political competition in each party system. The four 
main issues included are nevertheless wide-ranging and cover many of the core political 
conflicts in contemporary societies (see also Warwick, 2002, p. 104).
14 This is called ‘social policy’ in the Laver-Hunt and Benoit-Laver surveys; however, due to the many 
meanings o f that term, as well as in order to be consistent with the manifesto data and existing research, I 
have renamed this issue Tiberal-authoritarianism’ throughout. Obviously, this term is not perfect either, 
as the topics mentioned in the question refer more to liberalism than to authoritarianism, but it probably 
captures the intentions o f the survey question better than ‘social policy’.
15 The 23 countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US. I excluded parties scoring less than 1% at the most recent election 
from my analysis. Liberal-authoritarianism is not available for New Zealand in 2003; Decentralisation is 
not available for Israel in 2003.
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B&L survey L&H survey
Issue Question wording (2003) (1989)
Economic (Spending v. 
Taxes) Promotes raising taxes to increase public services. (-9.5) Yes Yes
Promotes cutting public services to cut taxes. (9.5) 
Favours liberal policies on matters such as abortion,
Liberal-authoritarianism
homosexuality, and euthanasia. (-9.5)
Opposes liberal policies on matters such as abortion, 
homosexuality, and euthanasia. (9.5)
Supports protection of the environment, even at the cost of
Yes Yes
Environment
economic growth. (-9.5)
Supports economic growth, even at the cost of damage to 
the environment. (9.5)
Promotes decentralization of all administration and decision­
Yes Yes
Decentralisation
making. (-9.5)
Opposes any decentralization of administration and 
decision-making. (9.5)
Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and
Yes Yes
Immigration
immigrants integrate into society. (-9.5)
Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and 
immigrants return to their country of origin. (9.5)
Several questions combined; negative values (up to -9.5)
Yes No
EU Support indicate support for further European integration or joining 
the EU, positive values (up to 9.5) indicate opposition to 
European integration or EU membership.
Yes No
Economic (Public Promotes public ownership. (-9.5). No YesOwnership) Opposes public ownership. (9.5)
Foreign policy
Supports friendly relations with the USSR. (-9.5)
No Yes
Opposes friendly relations with the USSR. (9.5)
Clericalism
Anti-clerical (-9.5) 
Pro-clerical (9.5) No Yes
Urban-rural relations
Promotes urban interests (-9.5) 
Promotes rural interests (9.5)
No Yes
Table 4.1 Issues and question wording in the Benoit and Laver and Laver and
Hunt expert surveys
Source: Laver and Hunt (1992), Benoit and Laver (2006).
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For each survey, a few other issues are also available, and these will also be 
included in the analysis when possible. In the Laver and Hunt survey, four other policy 
areas were included for almost all countries: public ownership, USSR, urban-rural 
relations and clericalism.16 In the Benoit and Laver survey, one further issue, 
immigration, is also available for a large number of Western European and English-
i  n
speaking democracies. Moreover, for European countries there is information on party
1 o
stances towards the European integration.
Party manifestos
As already described, the CMP codes party manifestos into 56 separate issue categories. 
In this research, these categories are not analysed separately. For one, doing so would 
present practical difficulties due to the large number of zeros contained in each 
manifesto (Hans and Honnige, 2008). Moreover, some categories are so similar that it 
does not make sense to analyse these as separate topics in party competition 
(Mikhaylov et al., 2008). Finally, and most importantly, the level of analysis is that of 
broader and general political topics or issue areas rather than detailed, time-specific 
issues. Similar to expert surveys, I do not look at each separate political problem but 
consider a higher level of aggregation, since the aim of my research is to analyse the 
interconnections between broad and relatively constant issue areas. A certain amount of 
aggregation of single political issues is a necessary step in order to make such an
16 Clericalism is not available for Iceland.
17 Immigration is not available for Israel. A further issue, regulation, is also available for many countries 
but is not analysed here as it is heavily correlated with taxes versus spending.
18 This information is not available for non-European democracies: Australia, Canada, Iceland, Israel, 
Japan, New Zealand and the US. The main question I use is EU Authority, as this should assess general 
support or opposition to integration better than EU Accountability. EU Authority, i.e. whether the party 
supports or opposes the areas in which the EU has influence, is available for most ‘old’ EU countries 
(except France and Ireland). In France, Benoit and Laver asked for the party position on whether the EU 
should be larger and stronger, while in Ireland experts assessed party positions on a stronger and more 
centralised EU. In Norway, assessment o f party support for joining the EU is used. For all questions, the 
party position can be broadly taken to represent the general position on European integration.
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analysis possible and worthwhile. For example, economic policy is examined as a 
whole rather than broken down into its components.
Here, I present in detail my aggregation of issue categories from the CMP 
coding scheme. The combinations of issue categories are based largely on Budge and 
Laver (1992a) and Stoll (2005). The precise decision on the issues chosen and their 
component categories was nevertheless finally made based on my own ‘accumulated 
substantive knowledge’ (Stoll, 2005, p. 7), which was used to assess the extent to which 
each category relates to the others. Of course, the way categories are combined is thus 
researcher-led, bringing with it an unavoidable subjectivity. However, as Stoll (2005) 
notes, the alternative would be to abandon the endeavour altogether. The ten distinct 
issue areas extracted from the CMP categories are thus as follows: economic policy, 
foreign policy, liberal-authoritarianism, cultural-ethnic attitudes, democracy, urban- 
rural relations, environmental protection, European integration and decentralization (see 
Table 4.2). For eight of these areas, two sides of each policy, a left and a right, are 
identified. This means that there are categories that clearly represent opposing positions 
on each issue. These sides have been titled ‘left’ and ‘right’ according to their general 
association, but this does not indicate hypothesised static or dynamic interconnections, 
nor does it reflect any value judgement.
What, briefly, is the content of each of these issues? On economic policy, the 
opposition is between those categories that represent redistribution, regulation and state 
involvement and those that reflect free-market, trade-oriented values. In foreign policy, 
sentences favouring pacifism and internationalism are contrasted with those that support
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"Left" issues "Right" issues
Socioeconomic issues
(from Laver/Budge, 1992):
403 (Market Regulation: Positive) 401 (Free Enterprise: Positive)
404 (Economic Planning: Positive) 402 (Incentives: Positive)
406 (Protectionism: Positive) 407 (Protectionism: Negative)
412 (Controlled Economy: Positive) 414 (Economic Orthodoxy: Positive)
413 (Nationalisation: Positive)
504 (Welfare State Expansion: Positive)
701 (Labour Groups: Positive)
(additional issues)
409 (Keynesian Demand Management: Positive) 702 (Labour Groups: Negative)
415 (Marxist Analysis: Positive)
503: (Social Justice: Positive)
103 (Anti-Imperialism: Positive)
105 (Military: Negative)
106 (Peace: Positive)
107 (Internationalism: Positive)
604 (Traditional Morality: Negative)
Foreign policy
104 (Military: Positive)
109 (Internationalism: Negative)
Liberal-authoritarianism
305 (Political Authority: Positive) 
603 (Traditional Morality: Positive) 
605 (Law and Order: Positive)
201 (Freedom and Human Rights: Positive)
202 (Democracy: Positive)
203 (Constitutionalism: Positive)
703 Farmers: Positive
Democracy
204 (Constitutionalism: Negative)
Urban-rural
Cultural-ethnic
602 (National Way o f Life: Negative) 601 (National Way o f  Life: Positive)
607 (Multiculturalism: Positive) 608 (Multiculturalism: Negative)
705 (Underprivileged Minorities: Positive)
706 (Non-economic Demographic Groups: Positive)
506 (Education Expansion: Positive)
Education
507 (Education Expansion: Negative)
Environmental protection
416 (Anti-Growth Economy: Positive)
501 (Environmental Protection: Positive)
European integration
108 (European Integration: Positive) 110 (European Integration: Negative)
301 (Decentralisation: Positive)
Decentralisation
302 (Centralisation: Positive)
Table 4.2 Aggregate issues and their category components as coded by the 
Comparative Manifesto Project
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the military and a national-interest based approach. The third issue, liberal- 
authoritarianism, is intended to summarise (and borrows its name from) Kitschelt’s 
(1994) dimension of the same name; in many ways, this issue is also similar to 
Inglehart’s postmaterialism (1977) and postmodernism (1997). It contains sentences 
related to social tolerance, hierarchy and liberalism. I have separated out of this conflict 
the issue of environment, which is represented in the CMP by just two categories. 
Under the rubric of democracy fall those categories that refer to constitutional rights 
and the importance of democracy. The cultural-ethnic issue summarises manifesto 
sentences that refer to nationalism, multiculturalism and minorities. Related to this is 
the urban-rural cleavage, containing just one category, which is retained, following 
Stoll (2008, p. 6), in homage to Lipset and Rokkan (1967): while the issue may seem of 
little relevance today, it was clearly a core issue in earlier years. Moreover, it was also 
included in the Laver and Hunt survey, so is worth examining for the sake of 
comparison. Education, an issue that is only rarely examined in party-political terms, 
contains categories referring to its expansion. Finally, two issues refer to multi-level 
institutional changes: European integration and decentralisation.
Combining CMP categories into larger issues attenuates one of the problems 
identified above, namely the danger of coder unreliability. A certain amount of 
‘seepage’ between related categories has been found (Mikhaylov et al., 2008): this 
means that quasi-sentences can be coded into any of several categories, making each 
single category an unreliable indicator. Often, but not always, this occurs on related 
categories (Meguid, 2008, p. 47). Combining related categories into one issue should at 
least overcome part of this problem, even if not all miscoding follows predictable or 
simple patterns. The ten issues introduced here will form the focus of the empirical 
analysis of party manifestos in the following chapters.
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Positions and salience in expert surveys and manifestos
The expert surveys and party manifestos thus provide information on a series of issues: 
four or more in the surveys and ten in the manifestos. For each of these issues, two 
types of information are required: the position the party takes on the policy area and the 
salience it allocates to it. In this section, the methods for extracting position and 
salience are described and the two data sources briefly compared.
Policy positions in expert surveys and party manifestos
Determining policy positions using the expert surveys is straightforward. In both 
surveys, party positions on each issue were assessed by the respondents on a scale 
ranging from 1 to 20, with a midpoint of 10.5. I have recalculated the issue ranges so 
that this midpoint is at 0, with the scale ranging from -9.5 to 9.5.19 For 1989 and 2003, 
there is thus a clear number that we can assign to each issue for each party. These are 
the position scores used throughout the empirical analyses. Figure 4.1 presents 
histograms for the six main policy positions measured in the Benoit and Laver survey 
and Figure 4.2 the eight issues in the Laver and Hunt survey.
Measuring the issue positions using party manifestos is far more complex than 
with expert surveys. It is thus worth describing in some detail the procedure used to 
extract positional information from a dataset at least nominally based on salience 
theory. The ten issue categories described above provide the starting point. By 
subtracting the percentage of left statements from the percentage of right statements, a 
raw left-right position for each issue for each party and election can be created. For
19 It might be objected that the measurement o f issue positions in both expert surveys is ordinal, so that 
they should not be treated as an interval-level variable in statistical analysis. However, as Warwick 
(2002, p. 105) argues, it is nevertheless reasonable to do so due to the precision o f the scale used and the 
likely interpretation o f the scale as interval-level by experts.
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Figure 4.1 Histogram of party positions on six main Benoit and Laver issues
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and  EU  (117: 16); data  from  B enoit and L aver (2006).
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127
example, for economic policy the salience of the nine left categories is subtracted from 
the five right categories. This is of course not possible for the two issues for which only 
one ‘side’ of the issue is represented by coding categories; the issues in question are 
environmental protection and urban-rural relations. For these two policy areas, the 
salience score is taken as a proxy for position.
To examine static interconnections, the long-run average positions for each
party across all elections are used. The mean left-right position is thus calculated for
20each party on each issue. This is done for two reasons. First, calculating the average 
score should increase the reliability of the measure. Long-term means are often used to 
assess the validity of CMP scales (e.g. McDonald and Mendes, 2001). Second, 
calculating the mean score creates a value for each issue for almost all parties. It would 
not be theoretically justified to include an issue position if that topic was not salient in 
the country at the time; a possible decision rule would be a country-election salience of 
1 per cent. Implementing such a cut-off line leads to a large number of missing values 
and limits the comparability of results between issue pairs.21 Using long-term averages 
means that a score is available for almost all issues for almost all parties. Clearly, some 
information is lost by averaging issue scores in this way, in particular the extent to 
which parties move, but this aspect of party programmes is considered extensively in 
the Chapter 6. Here, the increased reliability and availability of issue scores justifies 
averaging issue positions over time. Figure 4.3 presents the histograms for the ten issue 
positions extracted from the party manifestos. These long-
20 Parties were included in the analysis based on the following rules: first, all parties for which positions 
are available in either the Laver/Hunt or the Benoit/Laver surveys were included; second, o f  those parties 
not included in those surveys, all parties with more than 5 data points (^elections) available were 
included. This means that parties that only ran for election before 1989 and quickly disappeared were
excluded from the analysis.
21 In calculating the long-term issue positions, I excluded those elections where the topic was not salient. 
Only issues that are salient are worth examining if  one is to assess the correlation among policy positions: 
otherwise, it makes little sense to speak o f a concrete stance on a policy. I therefore exclude from my 
calculations elections where the country-election average salience is lower than one percent o f  
statements.
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Figure 4.3 Histogram of party positions on ten issues measured by party manifestos
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sentences; scale of x-axis varies by issue; y-axis shows the percentage o f parties with each score; 
sample sizes: 192 parties in 23 countries; EU: 148 parties in 17 countries; data from Budge et al. 
(2001), Klingemann et al. (2007) and own calculations.
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run averages can of course not be used to examine dynamic interconnections, so here 
the raw party-election scores are utilized; the precise model specification for this is 
described in detail in Chapter 6.
It is worth comparing the expert surveys and the manifestos to see the extent to 
which they measure the same phenomenon (Keman, 2007; Netjes and Binnema, 2007). 
Of course, perfect concordance should not be expected. For one, the two data sources 
are based on different theoretical assumptions, so it would be surprising if the resulting 
positions were identical. Second, the definitions of the policy areas are similar but not 
exactly the same. Most clearly, in the party manifestos there are no directly equivalent 
policy areas for the expert survey questions on liberal-authoritarianism and 
immigration. Finally, the time period considered is different. While expert surveys 
measure respondent opinion at one point in time, the CMP scores are long-run averages.
The correlations between the policy areas as measured by experts and 
manifestos are presented in Table 4.3. The CMP issues are listed in the rows, with the 
equivalent Laver and Hunt and Benoit and Laver policy areas in the columns. The CMP 
score is the simple long-run average of the raw policy score, that is, right minus left 
statements; for environment and urban-rural relations, the long-run salience averages 
are used. As expected, the association between the two measures is not always very 
strong, with most correlation coefficients between .3 and .5. The exception is economic 
policy, where the r-value is over .7 for both expert surveys. This is not surprising given 
that this category is very similar to the extensively validated left-right measure (Budge 
and Laver, 1992a), which correlates highly with other measures (Ray, 2007). Other 
issues where position measures on both datasets are similar are foreign policy, 
decentralisation and the EU. Correlation is also relatively strong on the environment, 
which supports the decision to use a simple salience measure where only one side of the
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Expert survey
L aver/
Hunt
B enoit/
Laver
Notes
CMP Issue
r 0.74 0.71
Econom ic Policy
n 134 141
r 0.54 correlation with expert survey question
Foreign policy
n 132 on 'USSR relations'
r 0.40 0.50
Libe ral-authoritarianis m
n 134 133
r 0.36 0.30 correlation with expert survey question
D em ocracy
n 134 133 on 'socialpolicy'
r 0.17 0.26 correlation with expert survey question
Culture-ethnic matters on 'socialpolicy'; significant at only
n 134 133 .05 level fo r  1989 survey
Culture-ethnic matters
r 0.37 correlation with expert survey question
n 132 on 'immigration'
r 0.36 0.51
D ecentralization
n 128 132
r 0.35
Urban-rural relations
n 132
r -0.47 -0.61
Environm ent
n 134 141
r 0.42 EU support measure fo r  expert survey
EU support
n 103 described in text
Table 4.3 Correlation between expert survey and CMP-extracted positions
Note: r-value of bivariate correlation between the CMP position (long-term average) 
and the expert survey position on the equivalent issue shown, with sample size in the 
row below; all correlations significant at .01 level except as noted.
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79argument is coded. Importantly, the correlations are always strongly significant and in 
the right direction. There is thus clear evidence that the policy positions in both data 
sources are related to a real characteristic of the parties examined.
Issue salience in expert surveys and party manifestos
As with policy positions, the two data sources differ substantially in how they measure 
issue salience. The expert surveys assess salience very straightforwardly: participants 
were asked for the ‘relative importance’ of each policy area for each party (Laver and 
Hunt, 1992; Benoit and Laver, 2006). The scale again ranges from 1 to 20, and these are 
the scores used throughout the empirical analyses in Chapters 7 and 8. Despite the 
surface clarity of these numbers, it is not obvious to what extent the expert assessment 
is based on a comparison to the rest of the party profile or the rest of the party system. 
Nevertheless, the expert surveys provide a reasonably clear, easily-employed 
measurement of salience on a series of issues. The histograms for the six Benoit and 
Laver and the eight Laver and Hunt salience scores are presented in Figures 4.4 and 4.5.
For the CMP data, the separate ten issues identified are again used. To establish 
party positions, ‘left’ statements had been subtracted from ‘right’ statements. Here, the 
calculation is even simpler, as we are merely interested in the total percentage of each 
manifesto devoted to each of the ten topics, so the sum of all mentions is used instead 
(i.e., ‘left’ plus ‘right’ statements). The histograms for the salience scores for eight 
CMP issues are shown in Figure 4.6 (with the relevant histograms for environmental 
policy and urban-rural relations in Figure 4.3).
Table 4.4 presents the correlation between the salience levels as extracted from 
the expert surveys and the party manifestos. As before, the columns refer to the two
22 The correlation is negative rather than positive as a higher score in the CMP averages signifies greater 
environmentalism whereas a higher score in the expert surveys less environmentalism.
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134
Expert survey Laver/
Hunt
Benoit/
Laver
Notes
CMP Issue
Economic Policy
r 0.54 0.22 significant only at .05 level fo r  2003
n 134 141 survey
r 0.23 correlation with expert survey question
Foreign policy
n 132 on 'USSR relations'
r -0.11 0.35 correlation not significant fo r  1989
Libe ral-authoritarianis m survey and significant only at .05 level
n 134 133 fo r  2003 survey
r 0.03 0.10 correlation with expert survey question
Dem ocracy on 'social policy'; not significant fo r
n 134 133 either survey
r 0.07 0.23 correlation with expert survey question
Culture-ethnic matters on 'social policy'; not significant fo r
n 134 133 1989 survey
r 0.17 correlation with expert survey question
Culture-ethnic matters on 'immigration'; significant at 05. level
n 141 only
r 0.59 0.51
De ce ntralization
n 134 132
r 0.40
Urban-rural relations
n 131
r 0.56 0.63
Environment
n 134 141
r 0.22 EU support measure fo r  expert survey
EU support described in text; significant at 05.
n 113 level only
Table 4.4 Correlation between expert survey and CMP-extracted salience
Note: r-value of bivariate correlation between the CMP position (long-term average) 
and the expert survey position on the equivalent issue shown, with sample size in the 
row below; all correlations significant at .01 level except as noted.
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surveys and the rows to the manifestos. Correlations are relatively high, with an r-value 
over .5, for environment, decentralisation and economic policy (in 1989). Other 
relatively high correlations (at between .39 and .5) exist for EU support and urban-rural 
relations. Again, most associations are in the right direction and significant, so there 
appears to be an underlying commonality between the two measures.
Conclusion
One indication of the importance of measuring the political positions of political actors 
is the fact that so many alternative ways of determining policy locations and issue 
salience have been proposed. Four potential measures have thus been identified: self- 
reported, behavioural, reputational and textual. Of these, the last two are useful for the 
examination of issue interconnections, and their best-known implementations are expert 
surveys and manifesto coding. However, while both approaches have undeniable 
benefits, each also suffers from clear shortcomings, though this is perhaps unavoidable 
considering the challenge in transforming complex political views into relatively simple 
numerical scores. In order to maximise the support for the empirical analysis, both 
sources -  expert surveys and manifestos -  will be used in the analyses in the following 
chapters.
The expert surveys by Laver and Hunt and Benoit and Laver provide a core of 
four issues that are generally central to the political debate, and these four topics can be 
supplemented by up to four issues if each survey is taken separately. The party 
manifesto dataset, originally based on a coding scheme with 56 categories, is reduced to 
ten broader policy areas. It is possible to measure both positions and salience using both 
data sources, and a brief comparison through correlations shows that the two measures 
are usually related, if only weakly. In the next chapter, these measures will be used for
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the first time in order to explore the occurrence of static interconnections among policy 
positions.
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Chapter 5 
Mapping static interconnections in party ideologies
As noted in the Introduction, Ian McEwan describes in his novel Saturday the difficulty 
of predicting people’s views on the Iraq war from their existing package of views. 
Knowing someone’s stance on the NHS or on the importance of childcare, he argues, 
did not help to guess correctly a person’s position on the US invasion. Such an attempt 
to predict one policy position based on other views is the focus of the chapter. Thus, 
static interconnections are measured in order to assess the extent that parties’ views on 
different issues are linked to one another. Such interconnections refer precisely to the 
predictive capacity (or lack thereof) alluded to by McEwan.
The main aim of this chapter is therefore exploratory. The existence of static 
interconnections is examined in two ways. First, a very general approach is taken: the 
occurrence of interconnections is described by looking at all parties cross-nationally. 
This first analysis thus presents the broad patterns of static linkages between policy 
areas. As described in Chapter 3, interconnections will however vary systematically 
depending on the side of the left/right divide, on the party family and on the country 
under consideration. How these interconnections vary forms the second part of the 
analysis of static linkages. This analysis makes it possible to decide which policy 
positions are consistently connected to one another and which are the result of historical 
and social circumstances. The findings presented here will form the basis of the analysis 
in the following three empirical chapters.
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This chapter is structured as follows. The existence of static interconnections is 
first mapped for the issues presented in the previous chapter. Next, possible variation 
across left and right, party families and groups of countries is investigated. In particular, 
consideration is given to the possibility of a general pattern that summarises the nature 
of static interconnections. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the main 
findings.
Linear static interconnections among policy positions
In this first section, the broad cross-national patterns of static interconnections are 
presented. In particular, the focus is on linear interconnections. As described in 
Chapter 3, these are linkages where a direct relationship between positions on two 
issues exists and is the same across the political spectrum. This is captured by the linear 
relationship y = ax + b, so the correspondence between positions is mediated by the 
existence of a constant (‘b’) and a coefficient (‘a’). What is more important than the 
precise nature of the association is its strength: to what extent does one issue position 
help predict another? In the following section, this linearity assumption is relaxed, but 
here the focus is on the existence of such simple relationships between positions on two 
issues.
Expert surveys
The analysis begins with the expert surveys, which are more simply structured and 
more easily interpreted. First, a principal components analysis (PCA) was conducted 
separately for both surveys: while this is mainly a descriptive tool, it provides easily 
interpretable results, which are presented in Table 5.1 for both the 1989 and 2003
139
2003 Survey 
Comp 1 Comp 2 Unexplained
Economic policy 0.51 -0 .22 0.21
Liberal-authoritarianism 0.46 0.03 0.32
Environment 0.50 0.09 0.16
Immigration 0.53 0.06 0.09
Decentralization -0.02 0.82 0.28
EU support 0.08 0.52 0.66
Eigenvalue 3.2 1.01
Variance explained 0.5311 0 .1804
n 117
1989 survey
Comp 1 Comp 2 Unexplained
Economic policy 0.49 0.17 0.26
Liberal-authoritarianism 0.53 0.16 0.18
Environment 0.16 0.59 0.17
Decentralization -0.14 0.73 0.19
Urban-rural relations 0.66 -0 .24 0.18
Eigenvalue 2.89 1.13
Variance explained 0.46 0.35
n 149
Table 5.1 Principal components analysis of party positions in the 1989 and 2003
expert surveys
Note: Component loadings over .5 in bold; components with Eigenvalues over 1 
extracted; varimax rotation used and rotated components shown; data from Laver and 
Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006).
surveys. For the 2003 survey, the PCA indicates that one main dimension 
summarises most positions well, explaining 53 per cent of the variance; four core 
issues of political conflict -  economics, liberal-authoritarianism, immigration and 
environmental policy -  are all to be found on this component.23 Two issues, 
decentralisation and EU support, load onto the second component, though the 
unexplained variance for EU support remains very high. In the 1989 survey, the PCA
23 The PCA for the 2003 survey includes all six widely-measured positions, which were measured as 
described in the previous chapter. Including EU support and immigration naturally reduces the sample 
size, but running the PCA without these issues provides identical results.
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again indicates that economics policy and liberal-authoritarianism are to be found on 
the first component (along with urban-rural relations), with decentralisation and 
environment on the second. So, environmental policy positions are linked with 
decentralisation in 1989 but with the more ‘mainstream’ topics in 2003, indicating that 
since 1989 this issue may have become more strongly tied to the more central political 
issues.
The results from this PCA provide a first look at the interconnections present 
between different policy positions in the expert surveys. Regression models can provide 
a firmer foundation for these claims, most importantly by indicating the nature and the 
strength of the linkage as well as allowing significance tests. Here, I followed a two- 
step procedure to establish first the existence and then the strength of the static 
interconnection. First, a series of multiple linear regressions was therefore run on the 
party positions in order to check whether an interconnection exists and how robust it is. 
In these regressions each issue was used as a dependent variable in turn, with the other 
issue positions as independent variables.24 The second step used the r-value of the 
bivariate association to assess the strength of the interconnection.
It is worth explaining this two-step approach in more detail. An example of the 
first step, which establishes the existence of an interconnection and its robustness, is 
presented in Table 5.2. The dependent variable in these regressions is economic policy, 
and the focus here is on the interconnection with liberal-authoritarianism. The simplest 
model with liberal-authoritarianism as the only independent variable indicates that the 
two positions appear to be closely linked, with a position 1 point to the right on liberal- 
authoritarianism predicted to be mirrored by a position .41 points to the right on 
economic policy. While the association remains if decentralisation is added as a further
24 The regressions were run using robust standard errors clustered by country.
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D ependent variable:
econom ic policy Model 1
Liberal-authoritarianism  0.41**
0.08
D ecentralization  
Environm ent 
Im m igration  
EU support
Constant 5.83**
0.66
Observations 153
R2 0.25
M odel 2 Model 3 Model 4 M odel 5
0.49** 0.07 0 .0 1 -0 . 0 2
0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
-0.04 -0.23* -0 .2 2 * -0.23
0.13 0.09 0.09 0 . 1 2
0.76** 0.67** 0.59**
0.05 0.09 0 .1
0.17 0.30*
0 .1 1 0 . 1 2
-0 . 1 2
0.07
5.69** 3.42** 3.40** 4  4 4 **
1.41 0.94 0.94 1.4
141 141 141 117
0.34 0.65 0 . 6 6 0 . 6 6
Table 5.2 Example of multiple linear regression on expert survey party positions
Note: Robust standard errors below coefficients; *: significant at 5% level; ** 
significant at 1 % level; dependent variable: economic policy (taxes versus spending); 
data from Benoit and Laver (2006).
predictor, it vanishes if environmental policy position is included. If immigration policy 
is added instead of environmental policy in Model 3, liberal-authoritarianism also loses 
significance (regression results not shown). However, liberal-authoritarianism is 
strongly correlated with both immigration and environmental policy (r=.79 and r=.66, 
respectively), so the positions on all these issues are perhaps too closely associated to 
estimate effectively any independent connections. The evidence therefore nevertheless 
points to an interconnection (albeit weak) between positions on economic policy and 
liberal-authoritarianism.
The key difficulty with the 2003 Benoit and Laver survey is thus the high levels 
of correlation between some issue positions, for example immigration and environment 
(r>.8). Similar concerns also make model-building difficult for the Laver and Hunt
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survey. Thus, economic policy is strongly correlated with public ownership and USSR 
relations; the same applies to liberal-authoritarianism and clericalism. I decided to drop 
clericalism and public ownership from my analysis as these two issues are substantively 
closely related to liberal-authoritarianism and economic policy, respectively, and are 
not included in the 2003 survey or in my manifesto recoding. I included information on 
USSR relations as this issue is substantively different from economic policy (even if 
positions are highly correlated) and foreign policy is one of the key manifesto issue 
groups. For both datasets, the regression results were therefore interpreted cautiously, 
with issues adding individually to each model and collinear variables removed to check 
the robustness of the results.
Using the approach illustrated above using economic policy and liberal- 
authoritarianism, I decided which issue interconnections are statistically significant. 
The next step is to establish the strength of the static interconnections. This was 
assessed using the r-value in pairwise correlations. While this ignores the potential 
influence of other policy positions, the r-value provides a relatively straightforward 
impression of the strength of the links between two issues. The static interconnections 
and their bivariate strength are presented in Figure 5.1. Each box represents the 
interconnection between two issues, as identified using multiple regressions. Boxes that 
remain unshaded are those where no interconnection was found. The shades of grey 
represent the level of the r-value of the bivariate correlation. Table 5.3 presents the data 
that makes up this figure, with issue pairs ranked in order of their strength, based on the 
r-value of their bivariate correlation. The first five issue pairs are those included in both 
rounds of the survey.
Among these five pairs, a broad pattern is visible: while three issues included in 
both surveys (economic policy, environment, liberal-authoritarianism) are strongly
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EU support 
Immigration 
Decentralization 
Environment
Liberal-authoritarianism I 
Economic policy
Urban-rural relations 
USSR relations 
Decentralization 
Environment
Liberal-authoritarianism 
Economic policy
B en o it and L aver L a v er  and H unt
  )
r-value >.3 and < .6
< .3
Figure 5.1 Summary of bivariate correlations between issue pairs in the 1989 and
2003 expert surveys
Note: O n ly  boxes w here  the issue in terconnection  is s ig n ifican t in m u ltip le  reg ression  
are shaded  in; shad ings refer to the strength  o f  the b iv aria te  asso c ia tio n  as recorded  in 
T ab le  3; each  bo x  sum m arises the correlation  betw een  one  issue  pair; da ta  from  B eno it 
and  L aver (2006) and  L aver and H unt (1992).
in terconnected , decen tra lisation  positions are re la tiv e ly  independen t. It is strik ing  that 
the o rder o f  in terconnection  strength  d id  not change b e tw een  1989 and  2003, w ith  on ly  
the  links b e tw een  decen tra lisation  and  env ironm enta l p o licy  c lea rly  w eaken ing . T he  
issue in te rconnec tions betw een these  four core issues thus ap p ear to  be re la tiv e ly  
consisten t. M ov in g  beyond  the four issues com m on to  th e  tw o  rounds o f  the  survey, w e 
can see th a t im m igra tion  and U SSR  rela tions also  form  p art o f  th e  g roup  o f  issues tha t 
are s trong ly  in terconnected , thus jo in in g  econom ic po licy , lib e ra l-au th o ritarian ism  and 
the env ironm ent. T he o ther tw o add itional issues -  u rb an -ru ra l re la tio n s and  E U  support 
-  are re la tiv e ly  w eak ly  in terconnected . W hile p o sitio n s on u rb an -ru ra l re la tions are  
genera lly  qu ite  c lo se ly  linked to econom ic po licy  and lib e ra l-au th o ritarian ism , they  are 
re la tiv e ly  independen t o f  positions on the env ironm ent, fo re ign  re la tio n s and  decent-
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Benoit and Laver Laver and Hunt
r n r n
Economic policy Environment 0.75 161 0.63 149
Liberal-authoritarianism Environment 0.66 153 0.61 149
Economic Policy Liberal-authoritarianism 0.5 153 0.66 149
Environment Decentralization 0.19 149 0.58 149
Economic policy Decentralization (-0.02 161) 0.26 149
Immigration Environment 0.81 149
Immigration Liberal-authoritarianism 0.8 141
Immigration Economic Policy 0.71 161
EU support Immigration 0.32 117
EU support Liberal-authoritarianism 0.24 117
Urban-rural relations Liberal-authoritarianism 0.69 149
Urban-rural relations Economic policy 0.54 149
Urban-rural relations Environment 0.22 149
USSR relations Economic policy 0.83 149
USSR relations Environment 0.7 149
USSR relations Liberal-authoritarianism 0.54 149
USSR relations Decentralization 0.52 149
USSR relations Urban-rural relations 0.22 149
Table 5.3 Bivariate correlations for issue pairs significantly associated in multiple
regression models
Note: Only issue relationships that remain robust in multiple regressions are shown (see 
text for details of this approach); ‘r’ refers to the r-value of the bivariate correlation; all 
bivariate correlations statistically significant at the 5% level except for economic policy 
and decentralisation (correlation not significant in 2003 survey); data from Benoit and 
Laver (2006) and Laver and Hunt (1992).
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ralisation. Positions on the issue of European integration are significantly related only 
to immigration and liberal-authoritarianism, and even there the relationship is weak. It 
is surprising, given existing research (e.g. Hooghe et al., 2002), that the link to 
economic policy positions is not significant.
A general pattern can be retained from this analysis. First, there is a core group 
of issues that tends to be strongly interconnected. This group contains the topics that are 
usually considered the main political conflicts: economics and liberal-authoritarianism, 
but also newer topics such as the environment and immigration. It is also worth noting 
that the stance on the USSR also joins this group, although foreign relations is a topic 
only rarely considered in analyses of party competition. Second, there are other issues 
which remain generally weakly or not connected. Party positions on EU support and 
decentralisation are broadly independent of other issues, at least compared to the core 
group. Urban-rural relations positions are placed somewhere in between these two 
groups. I now turn to the analysis of party manifestos to see whether this pattern is also 
present there.
Party manifestos
Compared with expert surveys, measuring the association between issue positions using 
party manifestos is more complex. As a result, I will first describe in some detail the 
procedure used to detect issue interconnections. Due to the advantages described in the 
previous chapter, the long-run average positions of parties are used. Using these 
positions as the dependent variable, a series of regressions is run in order to establish 
the existence of interconnections between issue pairs. So far, the approach is thus 
similar to that used for the expert surveys. However, while regressing the long-run
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positions on each other would be a possible first step, the unusual nature of the CMP 
data means that several other factors need to be controlled for:
■ First, national differences in issue positions need to be taken into account. To do 
so, the long-run systemic position for each issue is calculated: this equals the
9 Saverage position of all parties in each country except for the party in question. 
This variable was calculated only for those elections contested by the party.
■ Second, the observations for the manifesto data are not completely independent
(Benoit and Laver, 2007b, p. 95). As all percentages have to sum up to 100, the
total emphasis on each topic will depend on the salience of other issues in the
manifesto. If the total percentage of sentences devoted to decentralisation is 15, 
then -15 to +15 is the automatic range of the positional score. In the previous 
chapter, it was shown that issue salience (that is, the percentage of sentences 
devoted to a topic) varies widely, and this will influence the possible range of 
the positional score. It is therefore necessary to control for the salience of each 
issue analysed (Ray, 2007). Where possible, I thus also controlled for the 
average total salience of both issues.26
■ Third, salience could not be included for all issue pairs as the specification of
the model had to be adapted for certain cases. The modifications are necessary
because salience and position resemble one another, as measured in the CMP 
dataset. Specifically, there are two issues where I use salience as a measure of 
position: on environment and urban-rural relations, there are thus no negative 
mentions in the CMP coding scheme. Salience had to be dropped as this is 
identical to the party’s position for these issues. For liberal-authoritarianism, 
democracy, education and decentralisation, salience also had to be dropped.
25 For environmental protection and urban-rural relations, which only have coding categories for one side 
of the issue, this value is the same as long-run systemic salience.
26 These issues are economic policy, foreign policy, culture/ethnic matters and European integration.
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Dependent variable: Model 1 Model 2
economic policy b std. err. b std. err.
Foreign policy gg*** 0.19
Systemic position
Economic policy: systemic position .18 0.19 .13 0.16
Foreign policy: systemic position -.72** 0.32 -.64* 0.33
Salience variables
Economic policy: Salience .31** 0.14 .31** 0.13
Foreign policy: Salience _  ^j*** 0.14 .04 0.17
Constant -5.92 2.16 -6.32 2.01
R2 0.1383 0.2895
n 185 185
Note: *:p<0.1, **:p<.05, ***:p<.01
Table 5.4 Example of a multiple linear regression using CMP-extracted
party positions
Note: Model 1 includes the main controls (systemic position and salience); Model 2 
adds the party position on the independent variable issue; positions used here are 
economic policy and foreign policy; *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01; data from 
Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2007).
While positive and negative mentions do exist for all these issues, one side is 
rarely used by parties. For example, few parties ever argue against democracy, 
and as a result, the raw position is very similar to the raw salience. For liberal- 
authoritarianism, decentralisation, education and democracy, the correlation is 
above r=.90.
■ A final concern is that other country-specific factors may affect party policy 
position; this is addressed by using robust standard errors. I decided against 
adding country dummy variables to the models, as the size of the sample (at 
around 180 cases) means that this control would probably lead to an increase in
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Type II errors, that is, a failure to detect actual associations. Moreover, the 
inclusion of a measure of systemic position already takes account of some 
country-specific characteristics.
Table 5.4 presents an example of my approach by listing the detailed results of 
one regression. The dependent variable issue is economic policy and the independent 
variable issue foreign policy. The first model includes the average systemic position on 
economic and foreign policy and the average salience on both issues. In the second 
model, I add the raw average position on foreign policy. The coefficient for foreign 
policy position is strongly significant. Controlling for the other independent variables, 
each percent of manifesto coverage that stresses the military and the national interest or 
de-emphasises internationalism and pacifism is predicted to be associated with .88 
percent more emphasis on free-market economic policy. In simpler terms: the more pro­
military and nationalist a party’s foreign policy position, the more liberal its economic 
policy.
Differences in the strength of issue interconnections are assessed by comparing 
the ‘added R2’: the variance explained by the full model compared to that of the 
baseline model that excludes the average raw position on the independent-variable 
issue. This is by no means a perfect measure; sample sizes, for example, vary slightly 
due to my salience requirement. However, in the absence of other possible measures, it 
does provide an indication of the extent to which interconnection strength differs by 
issue pair. In the example above, the R2-increase created by adding the average foreign- 
policy position is over 15 percent, so quite substantial.
Figure 5.2 presents the simplified results of these regressions, following the 
approach in Figure 5.1. Each box represents one regression; the economic policy and 
foreign policy example above can be found in bottom left. Because of the large amount
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Urban-rural relations 
Education 
Decentralization 
EU
Environment 
Democracy 
Culture-ethnic matters 
Liberal-authoritarianism 
Foreign policy 
Economic policy
Amount of added 
variance explained (R2)
| more than .05 
between .02 to .05 
less than .02
Figure 5.2 Static policy interconnections using CMP-extracted party positions
Note: T he  n u m b er at the end  o f  each row  rep resen ts  the to ta l n u m b er o f  
in te rconnec tions fo r each issue (e.g. 7 for econom ic  po licy , 4 fo r foreign  p o licy  and  so 
on); each box  represen ts the added  variance exp la ined ; each o f  the tw o  issues is used  as 
the depen d en t v ariab le  in turn, w ith  the shad ing  su m m aris in g  the find ing  for bo th  
app roaches (e.g. the box  at the bo ttom  left con ta in s the in fo rm ation  on the reg ression  
w ith  econom ic  p o licy  as the dependen t v ariab le  and  fo re ign  po licy  as the  added  
indep en d en t variab le , as w ell as the regression  w ith  fo reign  p o licy  as the  dependen t 
variab le , and  econom ic  p o licy  as the  added  indep en d en t v ariab le ); boxes are on ly  
shaded  w here  the  coeffic ien t o f  the added  variab le  is s ta tis tica lly  sign ifican t at .1 or 
b e tte r  (as in  M odel 2, T able  5.4); the shad ings are  based  on  the am oun t o f  added  
variance  exp la in ed  by  the  add itional variab le  (e.g. m ore  than  .05 for econom ic  p o licy  
and  fo reign  po licy , see T able  5.4); m ore de ta iled  resu lts  in A ppend ix  5.1; da ta  from  
B udge et al. (2001) and K lingem ann  et al. (2007).
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of variance explained, this box is shaded dark grey. Boxes are left blank for regressions 
where the coefficient of the independent position variable was not significant. The full 
results that form the basis for this Figure can be found in Appendix 5.1. The number 
listed to the right of the correlation matrix for each issue indicates the total number of 
other issues significantly associated with that one policy area. For example, EU support 
is linked to six other issues overall and liberal-authoritarianism to five.
Overall, the manifesto data support the pattern that positions on the core policy 
areas -  such as economic policy, culture/ethnic matters and liberal-authoritarianism -  
tend to be statically interconnected. Taking the total number of interconnections as an 
indicator of overall linkage strength, culture/ethnic relations and economic policy rank 
most highly (7 out of 9 possible significant links), followed by the environment and EU 
integration (6 each). While foreign policy is tied to only four other issues, these four are 
some of the most important political conflicts -  economics, culture/ethnic matters, the 
environment and democracy -  and the ties are relatively strong. Liberal- 
authoritarianism is linked to five issues, including economic policy, culture/ethnic 
matters and the environment. Very rarely interconnected across the board are relatively 
minor issues: education (2), urban-rural relations (3) and democracy (3).
The decentralisation and European integration issues deserve a closer look. 
They had a remarkably low number of links with other issues in the expert surveys, but 
in manifestos they occupy a middle ground with respectively 5 and 6 significant 
interconnections. In the case of EU support, the links are often also particularly strong. 
In fact, its tight interconnections with economic policy and culture/ethnic matters 
capture two key aspects of the integration project and opposition to it (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2009). In contrast, the links tying decentralisation to other policy areas are 
generally rather weak.
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These overall patterns are broadly similar to those found in the expert surveys, 
where the strongest interconnections were also between topics central to political 
debate, that is, economic policy, culture/immigration, liberal-authoritarianism and the 
environment. The results from the expert surveys and manifestos are directly compared 
in Figure 5.3. Shaded boxes are those where an interconnection was found for both data 
sources. In total, 12 of the 18 static interconnections that were found in the expert 
surveys are also statistically significant in the CMP data; the interconnections that were 
not also found in the CMP are overwhelmingly the weaker ones. Moreover, the issue 
that was the most independent in the expert surveys -  decentralisation -  is only 
characterised by weak interconnections in the manifesto data. Some differences are 
nevertheless present, especially on the issues where links were generally weaker (EU, 
decentralisation, urban-rural relations). Given the different measurement approach and 
timeframe of the two datasets, the overlaps are nevertheless more remarkable than the 
differences.
Non-linear interconnections: left-right differences in linkage strength
So far, the assumption has been that positions are linearly related to one another. This 
means that the connections between policy areas are constant across the political 
spectrum and can be graphically summarised by a straight line. This assumption is, 
however, weakened somewhat when the occurrence of two other types of 
interconnections are considered: left-right differences and quadratic links. The main 
focus here is on left-right differences between static interconnections. In Chapter 3, it 
was argued that such differences may arise due to the different historical development 
of the left and the right. In particular, the right has generally seen a greater variety of
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Urban-rural relations
Decentralization
CMP n/a
CMP ESEnvironment
CMP n/aCulture-ethnic matters
ES CMPLiberal-authoritarianism
ES n/a n/aForeign policy
CMPEconomic policy
5 H H  Association found in both data sources
CMP Association found for CMP only
ES Association found for expert surveys only
n/a only available for CMP
Figure 5.3 Comparison of static policy interconnections found in expert surveys
and party manifestos
Note: F ore ign  p o licy  contains inform ation on U SSR  re la tions (L av er/H u n t) and 
cu ltu re /e thn ic  m atte rs  on im m igration (B enoit/Laver); issue  pa irs  m arked  w ith  n /a  are 
o n ly  av ailab le  fo r party  m anifestos; shaded boxes rep resen t issue pairs  w h ere  an 
assoc ia tion  w as found  fo r both  data sources; source o f  in fo rm ation : F igures 5.1 and  5.2.
parties than  the left, so the static in terconnections observed  m ay  w ell be  w eak er on  th is 
side o f  the m ain  po litica l divide.
L eft-righ t d ifferences can be investigated using  b o th  th e  expert su rveys and 
party  m an ifestos. It is w orth  no ting  here that the m ain  le ft/righ t d iv is io n  w as thus 
m easu red  b y  u sing  econom ic po licy  positions. A party  is co d ed  as ‘le f t’ i f  it is on that 
side o f  the  econom ic  issue. The assum ption is therefore tha t econom ic  id eo logy  is the 
m ain  u n d erly ing  c leavage in party  system s.
153
03606497
EU support 
Immigration^ 
Decentralization
Environment 
Liberal-authoritarianism 
Economic policy
□
Urban-rural relations 
USSR relations 
Decentralization 
Environment 
Libe ra 1-authoritarianism
Economic policy^ E
B enoit and Laver L aver and Hunt
r-value
>6
> 3  and < .6
k . 3
Figure 5.4 Left-right differences in static interconnections, Benoit and Laver and
Laver and Hunt expert surveys
Note: E ach  box is vertically  d iv ided  in half; the left side o f  the  box refers to  econom ic  
left parties and the righ t to econom ic righ t parties; econom ic left =  parties  be lo w  0 on 
econom ic  p o licy  (taxes versus spending), econom ic righ t =  those ab o v e  0 on  sam e 
issue; shadings b ased  on b ivaria te  correlation  o f  po licy  positions; on ly  bo x es w ith  left- 
righ t d iffe rences shaded  in; detailed  results in A ppendix  5.2.
E xpert surveys
T he find ings fo r the expert surveys are sum m arised  in F igure 5.4, w ith  fu ller resu lts  in 
A ppend ices 5.2 and  5.3. The figure, w ith  the B enoit and  L av er resu lts  on the left and 
the  L aver and  H unt resu lts on the right, is to be read  as follow s. F irst, the bo x es that are 
b lan k  are those  w here  there is no m easurab le d ifference in associa tion  fo r econom ic  left 
and  right. F o r exam ple, this applies in both surveys to libera l-au th o ritarian ism  and 
decen tra lisation : there  is no d ifference in the association  b etw een  these  tw o  issues on 
the  econom ic  left and the econom ic right. Second, each box is d iv ided  in to  tw o halves, 
w ith  the left h a lf  rep resen ting  the strength  o f  the in terconnection  on th e  econom ic  left
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and the right half that on the economic right. For example, in both surveys the 
association between issue positions for economic policy and environment is stronger on 
the right. Similarly, there is no association on the right for economic policy and liberal- 
authoritarianism, but a medium-strength linkage on the left.
Looking first at the four issues present in both surveys, there appear to be strong 
differences between the economic left and right. One key difference is the place of 
liberal-authoritarianism. This issue area is much more strongly connected to economic 
policy and the environment on the left than on the right. In short, liberal- 
authoritarianism is well-integrated into other political conflicts on the left, but far less 
so on the right. The place of environmental policy also varies between left and right, if 
less starkly. On the right, the association between economic and environmental policy is 
stronger than on the left. The inverse is true, however, for the links between 
environmental policy and liberal-authoritarianism: here, links on the left are stronger.27
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 illustrate this clear difference between the left and right 
sides of an issue by presenting two scatterplots for issue pairs where the association 
weakens on the economic right. Both plots are based on data from the Benoit and Laver 
survey. Figure 5.5 shows party positions on economic policy (on the x-axis) and liberal- 
authoritarianism (on the y-axis). The dotted line shows the predicted association based 
on a simple linear regression with economic policy as the only independent variable. 
The two solid lines present the results of the same regression augmented by an 
interaction that lets the slope vary between left and right, that is, between less than 0 
and more than 0. The summary results for these regressions are to be found in 
Appendix 5.3. The curved line represents a quadratic association between the two policy
27 The results for the Laver-Hunt survey are generally very similar to those o f the Benoit-Laver survey. 
Most o f the patterns are neatly replicated in the 1989 survey, with the one exception: the association 
between decentralization and the environment, which appears to have changed quite radically, perhaps as 
these issues have become less identified with Green parties.
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------------  Economic left / right
 Quadratic fitted line
Figure 5.5 Party positions on economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism
Note: T he range is -9.5 to 9.5; p red icted  lines show n for sim ple lin ear reg ression , for 
reg ression  w ith  left/righ t dum m y as in teraction term , and fo r reg ressio n  w ith  quadra tic  
term .
equation fo r  simple linear regression (robust standard  errors in p aren theses): libera l- 
au tho rita rian ism  (p red icted ) =  -.51 (.33) + .61 * econom ic p o licy  (.11), R 2=. 25 =153; 
with left-right dummy, liberal-au thoritarian ism  (p red ic ted ) =  1.10 (.83) +  .53 * 
econom ic  righ t d um m y (1 .46) +1.01 * econom ic p o licy  (.19) - .99 * econom ic  
po licy * eco n o m ic  righ t dum m y (.31), R 2=.29, n =153;
with quadratic term : liberal-au thoritarian ism  (pred icted) =  .67 (.49) +  .56 * econom ic  
po licy  (.12) - .06 * econom ic po licy2 ( .0 2 ) , R 2=.29, n =153; data  from  B eno it and L av er
(2006).
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Figure 5.6 Party positions on liberal-authoritarianism and environmental policy
Note: T he range is -9.5 to  9.5; p red ic ted  lines show n for sim p le  linear reg ression , for 
reg ression  w ith  left/righ t d u m m y  as in teraction  term , and  fo r reg ression  w ith  quadratic  
term ;
equation fo r  simple linear regression (robust s tandard  errors in paren theses): 
en v iro n m en t (pred ic ted ) = .37 (.17) + .53 * libera l-au tho ritarian ism  (.05), R 2= .43 =153; 
with left-right dummy, env ironm en t (pred icted) = -1.05 (.24) +  3 .84 * econom ic  right 
du m m y  (.43) + .48 * libera l-au thoritarian ism  (.04) - .28 * libera l-au tho ritarian ism  
♦econom ic  righ t du m m y  (.09), R 2= .62 , n =153;
with quadratic term : env ironm en t (pred icted) = 2 .09  (.37) +  .52 * liberal- 
au th o rita rian ism  (.04) - .06 * libera l-au tho ritarian ism 2 ( .0 1 ) , R2= .54 , n  =153; 
da ta  from  B eno it and  L aver (2006).
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Figure 5.7 Party positions on economic policy and immigration
Note: T he  range is -9.5 to 9.5; p red icted  lines show n fo r s im p le  linear reg ression , fo r 
reg ressio n  w ith  left/righ t dum m y as in teraction  term , and  fo r reg ressio n  w ith  quadra tic  
term ;
equation fo r  simple linear regression (robust standard  errors in paren theses): 
im m ig ra tion  (pred ic ted) =  -.88 (.27) + .75 * econom ic p o licy  (.07 ), R 2= .50 , n =149; 
with left-right dummy: im m igration  (predicted) = -.31 (.53) +  .15 * econom ic  righ t 
du m m y  (1 .21) +  .89 * econom ic po licy  (.14) - .34 * eco n o m ic  p o licy  *econom ic  righ t 
du m m y  (.22), R 2= .51, n =149;
with quadratic term: im m igration  (pred icted) = -.41 (.32) +  .73 * econom ic  p o licy  (.07) 
- .02 * econom ic  p o lic y 2 (.0 1 ), R 2=.51, n =149; 
da ta  from  B eno it and  L aver (2006).
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positions; this will be discussed later. In Figure 5.5, issue interconnections remain if 
we only consider the left but weaken or disappear for the right. This is similar in 
Figure 5.6, where the association between liberal-authoritarianism and environmental 
policy weakens severely on the right. For some issues, the associations weaken less 
strongly on the right, as seen in Figure 5.7, which shows the link between economic and 
immigration policy. Here, all three types of association (linear, left/right and 
quadratic) are very similar. Overall, there is thus strong evidence that static 
interconnections differ, depending on the side of the economic divide.
There are also left-right differences for those issue pairs only available for one 
of the two surveys. Positions on immigration and EU are only measured by Benoit and 
Laver and can be found in the matrix on the left in Figure 5.4. Immigration, which was 
found to be the most tightly connected issue in the previous section, is slightly more 
strongly linked to other political topics on the left, and less on the right. Here, the 
difference is not great and is rather one of degrees than of wholesale change. EU 
support shows no left-right differences. Turning to the Laver-Hunt survey, summarised 
in the matrix on the right, urban-rural relations also appears to be slightly more strongly 
connected to other issues on the left; this applies in particular to the positional links 
with economic policy and decentralisation. USSR relations have an ambiguous position 
in that it is more strongly connected to some issues on the left as well as to others on the 
right. USSR policy links with economics are thus stronger on the left, but connections 
are tighter on the right for the environment and decentralisation. In this changing 
position, USSR relations positions are similar to environmental policy.
In sum, the expert surveys show that there are clear differences between the 
static interconnections depending on whether we look at the economic left or the right. 
One striking finding concerns liberal-authoritarianism: the right and the left differ in
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how issues related to social liberalism and authoritarianism are integrated with other 
issues. On the right, positions on liberal-authoritarianism are independent of positions 
on economic topics and weakly tied to environmental views, while on the left these 
areas are closely linked.
Party manifestos
Left/right differences can also be examined using the data from party manifestos. One 
difficulty is the division of parties into the economic ‘left’ and the economic ‘right’. In 
the expert surveys, this was straightforward as the raw score of 10.5 (recoded as 0) is 
the exact midpoint of the scale provided. The manifesto data contains no such inherent 
or natural midpoint. The average raw economic policy score of 0 is used as a proxy for 
this point: parties with a mean of 0 on economic policy mention left- and right-wing 
economic policies in equal amounts. The results of the regression analysis are presented 
in Figure 5.8; only those issue pairs where the differences between left and right, as 
indicated by the interaction term, are statistically significant are shown. Appendix 5.4 
presents the bivariate correlations that underlie the colouring of this figure. The 
structure of this figure is similar to Figure 5.4, so the left and right side of each box 
represent the associations on the economic left and the economic right. Again, only 
boxes where there are significant left-right differences are coloured. Thus, an empty 
box does not mean that there is no interconnection, but simply that the links do not 
differ between economic left and right. The shadings represent the strength of the 
association; the two boxes marked by numbers indicate where an association exists but 
is in the opposite direction on the economic right.
The manifesto dataset confirms that issue interconnections differ regularly 
between left and right. A few key results are worth highlighting. First, the relationship
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Figure 5.8 Left-right differences in static interconnections, CMP-extracted policy
positions
Note: E ach  box  is v e rtica lly  d iv ided  in half; the left box refers to  econom ic  left pa rtie s  
and the righ t to econom ic  righ t parties; left and righ t d efined  as <0 and  >0 resp ec tiv e ly  
on econom ic policy ; shad ings b ased  on b ivaria te  co rre la tion  o f  po licy  po sitio n s; on ly  
boxes w ith  left-righ t d iffe rences shaded; 1: detailed  resu lts in A p p en d ix  5.4.
betw een  econom ic  p o licy  and  libera l-au thoritarian ism  is again  d iffe ren t on  each side o f  
the econom ic  divide. W hile  on the  left a re la tionsh ip  ex ists, th is  is absen t from  the 
econom ic right. T hough  no t sta tistica lly  significant, th ere  are  in d ica tions tha t the 
re la tionsh ip  b e tw een  libera l-au tho ritarian ism  and the en v iro n m en t is also  stronger on 
the left. S econd, th e  re la tio n sh ip  betw een  E uropean  in teg ra tion  stances an d  econom ic  
and cu ltural issues is in acco rdance  w ith recent research  (K riesi et al., 2008b ; H ooghe
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and Marks, 2009). On the left (but not on the right), there is a strong association with 
economic policy positions, while on the right (but not on the left), there are strong 
interconnections with culture/ethnic relations. Finally, there are general trends for some 
issues. Thus, decentralisation, education policy and urban-rural relations are generally 
better integrated with other issues on the economic right.
Evidence o f  quadratic interconnections
Finally, the review of the literature on issue connections suggested that some issue pairs 
might be associated in a ‘u ’ shape, with the extremes on one issue similar on the other. 
Examples are economic policy as the first issue and liberal-authoritarianism (Bobbio, 
1996) or EU support (Hooghe et al., 2002) as the other. On these issues, the extreme 
parties on economic policy on the left and right are united by their anti-liberal attitudes 
and their opposition to European integration.
However, the data sources used here show almost no evidence for U-shaped 
relationships between issues. In the expert surveys, quadratic terms are frequently 
significant in linear regressions, but fitted values show that this is the result of a 
weakening association towards the right rather than a U-shaped reversal of the 
association -  as in Figures 5.5 to 5.7. Another way of detecting a quadratic or U shape 
is to look at the left-right differences: if there is a change in the direction of association 
between left and right, then it is possible to speak of a U-shaped linkage. However, this 
does not occur in the expert surveys. More precisely, where the bivariate correlations 
for left and right have different signs, at least one of those correlations is not 
statistically significant. This is the case, for example, on economic policy and EU 
support. In the manifesto data, there is also little evidence for a change in the direction 
of association between two sides of an issue. While there is thus a large amount of
162
evidence that the strength of association differs between left and right, this does not 
mean that there are also quadratic or U-shaped associations between issue positions.
Party families
The existence of party families may structure and provide an underlying pattern for 
static interconnections. The left-right differences found above may therefore reflect 
how party families vary in the linkages between issue positions, as argued in Chapter 3. 
In addition, it is also worth examining the internal diversity of party families in terms of 
the positions they take up. The more a family varies in its position on an issue, the less 
that issue is a strong and consistent feature of that family’s policy bundles. In this 
section, party family differences in policy positions are therefore examined, again using 
expert surveys and manifestos.
Figures 5.9 to 5.11 present the mean party positions in the two expert surveys 
and the manifesto data for six party families: Greens, Communists, Social Democrats, 
Liberals, Christian Democrats and Conservatives.28 Figure 5.9 includes the six main 
Benoit and Laver issues, Figure 5.10 the eight Laver and Hunt issues and Figure 5.11 
the ten CMP issues, with mean positions and the range of the confidence interval 
represented by a solid circle and *+’ signs respectively. The scores for parties from the 
manifesto data are the ‘raw’ scores, simply the long-run average percentage of positive 
statements minus the average percentage of negative statements.29 The detailed mean 
scores and standard deviations are included in Appendix 5.5. The focus in the following 
discussion will be on the expert survey scores shown in Figures 5.9 and 5.10; except for 
a handful of issues, such as economic policy, environment and liberal- authoritarianism,
28 Information on the ‘family membership’ o f parties was taken mainly from the manifesto datasets 
(Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2007).
29 Again, for environment and urban-rural relations, the raw scores are the simple salience scores. Scores 
between issues should not be compared, only between parties.
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Figure 5.9 Party positions by party family, Benoit and Laver expert survey
Note: M ean  and 95%  confidence  in terval for each  p a rty  fam ily  show n; 
C o m s= C om m unists , G m s= G reens, S D s= S ocial D em ocra ts , L ibs= L ib era ls ,
C D s= C hristian  D em ocrats, C ons= C onservatives; full resu lts in A ppend ix  5.5; data  from  
B eno it and  L aver (2006).
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Figure 5.10 Party positions by party family, Laver and Hunt expert survey
Note: M ean  and 95%  confidence in terval for each party  fam ily  show n; 
C o m s= C om m unists , G m s= G reens, S D s= S ocial D em ocrats , L ibs= L ib era ls ,
C D s= C hristian  D em ocrats, C ons= C onservatives; full resu lts in A ppend ix  5.5; data  from  
L aver and  H un t (1992).
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Figure 5.11 Party positions by party family, CMP-extracted party positions
Note: M ean  and  95%  confidence  in terval fo r each  p a rty  fam ily  show n; 
C om s= C o m m u n ists , G m s= G reens, S D s=Social D em ocra ts , L ibs= L ibera ls ,
C D s= C h ris tian  D em ocrats , C ons= C onservatives; full resu lts  in A p pend ix  5.5; da ta  from  
B udge et al. (2001) and K lingem ann  et al. (2007).
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the results from the CMP dataset do not differ enough by party family to allow for clear 
interpretations.
First, distinguishing between party families makes it possible to provide a 
clearer interpretation of these left-right differences. Focussing the analysis on the main 
issues of political conflict, it is possible to confirm that a relatively well-ordered left 
confronts a more complex right. The Greens, Communists and Social Democrats have 
consistently negative scores in the expert surveys, with EU support and decentralisation 
as partial exceptions. Moreover, the Social Democrats are always the most centrist of 
the three families.30 As can be most easily seen from the Benoit and Laver results, the 
Greens tend to be the most ‘left-wing’ on liberal-authoritarianism and environmental 
issues and the Communists on economic topics. One party family occasionally joins the 
left: the Liberals have clear negative scores on liberal-authoritarianism, pro-/anti- 
clericalism and urban-rural relations in the expert surveys. The Liberals thus have a 
relatively unusual position in party competition.
The right is less clearly organised than the left: the ordering of the parties on the 
right is more complex. Nevertheless, a pattern can be identified. On economic issues 
(taxes vs. services, public ownership and the environment), the Christian Democrats are 
the most moderate, followed by the Liberals and the Conservatives. On more social 
issues (liberal-authoritarianism, pro/anti-clericalism, immigration and urban-rural 
relations) and also on foreign policy (USSR relations), the Liberals are the most 
centrist, with the Conservatives and the Christian Democrats to their right. Again, there 
is an obvious division on the right between social and economic issues.
The comparison of the policy positions of party families also shows that 
cohesion within families tends to be higher on some issues than on others. Here, I
30 With the exception o f urban-rural relations and immigration
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assess cohesion by comparing the standard deviations of party positions for each 
family; only the expert survey scores are considered as the mixture of salience and 
positional information in the manifesto dataset means such comparisons do not lend 
themselves to straightforward interpretation. The standard deviations can be found in 
Appendix 5.5, though the range of the confidence intervals in Figures 5.9 and 5.10 
provides a visual impression of the main differences. Across party families, cohesion is 
relatively high on economic and environment policy, and low overall on EU support 
and decentralisation (Appendix 5.5).31 Further, party families differ in their general 
level of cohesion across issue positions. For example, the Greens, the Christian 
Democrats and the Social Democrats very consistently exhibit low diversity in their 
positions compared to the other party families. For these families, there appears to be a 
relatively strong ideological core that its component parties adhere to. The Liberals are 
very diverse across all issues: on two of the main issues, economic and social policy, 
they have some of the highest internal variance among party families.
Static interconnections and families of nations
Finally, it is worth exploring whether static interconnections differ by country. Ideally,
it would be possible to take each country and consider the static interconnections
present in each, again using correlations and a series of linear regressions. However,
given that some countries (such as the United States) have as few as two parties, there is
little sense in doing so. As a result, it is necessary to group countries in order to achieve
the necessary sample size to produce valid results. I therefore analyse the differences
between ‘families of nations’ as defined by Castles (1993), whose division of countries
is similar to Esping-Andersen’s famous ‘worlds of welfare capitalism’ (Esping-
31 The mean standard deviations are not directly comparable due to the different sample sizes in each 
case.
168
Andersen, 1990). The four groups I use are thus Nordic, Continental European, 
Southern European and Anglo-Saxon countries. Dividing the entire sample of 23 states 
in this way takes account of some of the national differences in public policy and 
political culture but allows the application of the methods used above.
Expert surveys
The expert surveys are remarkable primarily because of the consistency of the linkages 
found, even across families of nations. Figures 5.12 and 5.13 present the results of 
bivariate correlations. These figures repeat Figure 5.1, but with separate matrices for 
each family of nations. Only significant associations are coloured in, with each box 
representing the correlation between two issues. The full results for the expert surveys 
can be found in Appendix 5.6. The results are shown separately for the Benoit and 
Laver (Figure 5.12) and Laver and Hunt (Figure 5.13) surveys, but the results for the 
four core issues are overwhelmingly stable, with clear differences only in the Central 
European family of nations.
Overall, issue interconnections appear to be strongest in the Southern European 
family and weakest in the Nordic family of nations. As in the cross-national analysis, 
most issues are consistently tightly interconnected with most other issues. This applies 
in particular to immigration, environment and USSR relations. However, two issues 
tend to vary across groups of countries: EU support and decentralisation. These are also 
the two issues that were found in the broader analysis to be weakly linked to the core 
policy areas. EU support is only interconnected with other issues in the Continental 
European group, with one link in Anglo-Saxon countries and none in the Nordic and 
Southern European countries.
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Figure 5.12 Static interconnections by family of nations, Benoit and Laver expert
survey
Note: B ivaria te  corre la tions b etw een  issues show n; each box  rep resen ts  the  assoc ia tion  
be tw een  one issue pair; * ind icates a negative association ; N ord ic  fam ily : D enm ark , 
N orw ay , S w eden, F in land , Iceland; C entral E uropean  fam ily: G erm any , F rance , 
A ustria , B elg ium , N etherlands, L uxem bourg , Italy; Southern  E uropean  fam ily : Spain , 
Portugal, G reece; A ng lo -S axon  fam ily: U K , Ireland, U SA , C anada, A ustra lia , N ew  
Z ealand; da ta  from  B enoit and L aver (2006); full resu lts in A ppend ix  5.6.
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Figure 5.13 Static interconnections by family of nations, Laver and Hunt expert
survey
Note: B ivaria te  co rre la tions betw een  issues show n; each box  rep resen ts  the a ssoc ia tion  
betw een  one  issue pair; * ind ica tes a negative  associa tion ; N ord ic  fam ily: D enm ark , 
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A ustria , B elg ium , N etherlands, L uxem bourg , Italy ; S ou thern  E uropean  fam ily: Spain , 
Portugal, G reece; A ng lo -S axon  fam ily: U K , Ireland, U SA , C anada, A ustra lia , N ew  
Z ealand; da ta  from  L aver and  H un t (1992); full resu lts in A pp en d ix  5.6.
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Decentralisation is closely linked to other issues only in the Southern European 
family of nations, though there is evidence of association in the Continental group in 
the 1989 survey. Interestingly, in the 2003 survey the association between 
decentralisation and economic policy is positive in the Southern group but negative in 
the Continental group. In other words, in the Southern European family economic 
liberalism is associated with centralisation and in the Continental family with 
decentralisation. This provides additional proof that decentralisation’s links with other 
topics may be based more on circumstance than on logic.
A further finding concerns the links between economic policy and liberal- 
authoritarianism. In 2003, liberal-authoritarianism and economic policy are most 
strongly linked in Anglo-Saxon and Southern European families but less tightly 
associated in Nordic and Continental countries. This pattern is also present, if weaker, 
in 1989. This corresponds with what we know about the development of party systems 
in these groups of nations: Nordic and Continental countries tend to have a more 
diverse party system, especially on the economic right. These countries are thus the 
main examples of a co-existence of Christian Democratic and Liberal parties and, more 
recently, of the emergence of an extreme right. These factors are likely to at least partly 
explain the increasing weakness of the ties between liberal-authoritarianism and 
economic policy in these two groups.
Party manifestos
Figure 5.14 presents the results of regression models for each of the issue pairs for each 
family of nations, thus replicating the above general analysis shown in Figure 5.2 at a 
lower level of aggregation (detailed results in Appendix 5.7). Each box again reflects 
the amount of added variance explained by including the position on the second issue in
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order to predict the position on the first issue. The regression models in Table 5.4 are 
thus rerun separately for each family of nations, with the results summarised in Figure 
5.14.
The results for the manifesto data are less clear-cut than for the expert surveys. 
A quick glance at the four figures shows that there is clearly less consistency across 
families than in the expert surveys. According to the party manifestos, the differences 
between families of nations are therefore quite large. However, these differences should 
not be over-interpreted. The manifesto data is less reliable and more volatile than that 
provided by the expert surveys. Moreover, the sample size for each family (between 30 
and 50, see Appendix 5.7) coupled with the number of independent variables (up to 
five) means that the results may mask relationships that do in fact exist.
Some of the differences between families in the party manifestos are similar to 
the expert surveys. For example, decentralisation is most strongly associated with other 
issues for Southern European countries. It is also interesting that this is the only group 
for which democracy is an interconnected issue, perhaps reflecting these nations’ 
relatively recent emergence from dictatorship. The Southern countries are also unique 
in that environmental policy is not integrated into other issue positions, unlike the other 
three families. This may be a consequence of the lower salience of this issue in 
Southern countries. Other differences between the families are less systematic. For 
example, we do not find the same result for the interconnections of EU support with 
other issues, nor is the liberal-authoritarianism-economic policy results as clear-cut.
For a summary overview of the consistency across countries, Table 5.5 presents 
the number of families in which static interconnections were found for each issue pair. 
The columns represent the number of families of nations that showed the association in
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Nordic family of countries
Urban-rural relations
Educationl 
Decentra Bzationl 
EUl
Environment!
Democracy |
Culture-ethnic matters!
Liberal-authoritarianism |
Foreign policy |
Economic policy I I
Southern European family o f countries
Urban-rural relations
Educationl 
Decentralization!
Environment!
Democracy |
Culture-ethnic matters H I  
Libera 1-authoritarianism 
Foreign policy 
Economic policy
Central European family o f countries
Urban-rural relations
Educationl 
Decentralization!
EUl
Environment!
Democracy|
Culture-ethnic matters!
Liberal-authoritarianisml 
Foreign policy |
Economic policy
Anglo-Saxon family o f countries
Urban-rural relations
Educationl 
Decentralization |
Environment 
Democracy!
Culture-ethnic matters |
Liberal-authoritarianisml 
Foreign policy|
Economic policy!
Amount of added | 
variance explained j 
(R2)
|  more than .05 
I between .02 to .05 
I less than .02
Figure 5.14 Static interconnections by family of nations, party manifestos
Note: S had ing  b ased  on the am ount o f  add itional variance  exp la in ed  b y  add ing  the 
position  on one issue to a reg ression  pred ic ting  ano ther issue  p o s itio n  (see also  F igure  
5.2); N ord ic  fam ily: D enm ark , N orw ay, Sw eden, F in land , Ice land ; C en tra l E uropean  
fam ily: G erm any , F rance, A ustria , B elgium , N etherlands, L u x em b o u rg , Italy; S outhern  
E uropean  fam ily: Spain, Portugal, G reece; A ng lo -S axon  fam ily: U K , Ireland , U S A , 
C anada, A ustra lia , N ew  Z ealand; data from  B udge et al. (20 0 1 ) and  K lingem ann  et al.
(2007); full resu lts in A ppend ix  5.7.
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28
21
cross-country
interconnection
strength
families of nations with 
interconnections 
0 1 2  3 4 row total
Strong 0 1 2 3 2 8
Medium 0 4 3 2 0 9
Weak 1 2 3 1 0 7
None 8 8 4 1 0 21
column total 9 15 12 7 2
Table 5.5 Strength of cross-country interconnection and number of families with
interconnections
Note: Based on results in Figure 5.2 (rows) and Appendix 5.7 (columns); data from 
Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2007)
question (ranging from none [0] to all [4]); the rows use the results from Figure 5.2 for 
each of the 45 issue pairs. It is clear (and unsurprising) that issue pairs that were found 
to have strong links in the aggregate analysis are also more likely to be interconnected 
in each family of nations. Most of the issue pairs without general static interconnections 
are never linked or just linked in one group of countries, though there are a few 
exceptions. Some issue pairs are very consistent across families of nations, for example 
economic policy on the one hand and foreign policy, liberal-authoritarianism and 
environmental policy on the other. More detailed results can be found in Figure 5.15, 
which disaggregates Table 5.5 so that aggregate connection strength and family of 
nation differences are visible. Overall, it is in any case necessary to be cautious with 
these results given the limitations of the data structure, research method and sample 
size. Nevertheless, there appear to be important differences between families of nations, 
though these are more pronounced in the manifesto than in the expert survey data.
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Urban-rural relations
Education
Decentralization
EU
Environment
Democracy
Culture-ethnic matters
Liberal-authoritarianism
Foreign policy 
Economic policy 4
Amount o f added more than .05
variance explained b ^ e n  .02 to .05
(R2)
less than .02
Figure 5.15 Strength of cross-country interconnections and number of families
with interconnections
Note: N um bers in boxes refer to the num ber o f  fam ilies w ith  in te rconnec tions; shad ing  
o f  boxes based  on  add itional variance explained  by  the  positio n  on the o th e r issue pa ir 
(see F igure  5.2); figure based  on resu lts in F igure  5.2 (row s) and  A p p en d ix  5.7 
(co lum ns); data  from  B udge et al. (2001) and K lingem ann  et al. (2007).
The patterns of static interconnections
T h e  d e sc r ip tio n  o f  th e  f in d in g s  so fa r has  go n e  in to  c o n s id e ra b le  d e ta il c o n c e rn in g  
th e  d if fe re n t s ta tic  in te rc o n n e c tio n s  p re se n t w ith in  p a r ty  id e o lo g ie s . T o  su m  u p  
th e se  re su lts  an d  to  p ro v id e  a m ore  g e n e ra l o v e rv ie w  o f  th e  g e n e ra l lin k a g e s  
b e tw e e n  th e  m a in  is su e  a reas , it is w o rth  ta k in g  a s tep  b a c k  an d  e x a m in in g  th e  
b ro a d e r  p a tte rn s  th a t can  be seen  to  u n d e rlie  s ta tic  in te rc o n n e c tio n s . B a s e d  o n  th e  
im p o rta n t d is tin c tio n  b e tw e e n  lin k s b a se d  on  lo g ic  an d  th o se  b a se d  o n  
c irc u m s ta n c e , it is p o s s ib le  to  d iv id e  th e  d if fe re n t p o lic y  a re a s  in to  th re e  ty p es .
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First, the relationship between two issues that fundamentally divide the 
political space, economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism, is characterised more by 
circumstantial than by logical ties. The division between economic and social issues is a 
frequent claim made by a priori analysts of political ideologies. Among others, Finer 
(1987) and Bobbio (1996) have argued that politics is characterised by two underlying 
dimensions of competition, economic liberalism/egalitarianism and social 
liberalism/authoritarianism, and this view has been taken up by, for example, Kitschelt 
(1994) and Marks and Wilson (2000). These two dimensions are theoretically separate, 
in that there is no logical reason why positions on each need to be connected to one 
another. However, in practice we know that parties may still forge a single dimension 
from these two fundamentally distinct issues. Indeed, this is the general pattern 
observed on the economic left. Overall, there may thus be a relationship between the 
economic and liberal-authoritarian dimensions of party competition. Individual party 
systems will of course differ in the extent to which the two fundamental dimensions are 
integrated or separate. Essentially, however, the static interconnections found for these 
two issues are a political choice rather than a logical necessity.
Second, some issues have strong interconnections with both economic policy 
and liberal-authoritarianism: for example, environmental protection and immigration. 
There are thus obvious strong logical ties between environmental and economic policy 
(Dalton, 2009). While liberal-authoritarianism and environmental policy might not have 
such strong logical links, voters tend to package environmental protectionism with 
social liberalism, as emphasised by Inglehart’s (1977) diagnosis of a value shift towards 
postmaterialism. Indeed some authors assume a priori that both issue areas are 
essentially synonymous (e.g. Kitschelt, 1994; Hooghe et al., 2002). Meanwhile, 
immigration policy is closely tied to both economic and liberal-authoritarian issue
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positions.32 This is a political issue that touches on both aspects, through the economic 
consequences of increased immigration as well as the liberal-authoritarian aspects of 
religious tolerance and multiculturalism.
Finally, the patterns in the two data sources indicate some issues are 
overwhelmingly flexible. These are policy areas which are not naturally tied to either 
the economic or the liberal-authoritarian dimension of competition. In both data 
sources, institutional policies -  decentralisation and European integration -  were largely 
weakly linked to other issues. In the manifesto data, democracy, urban-rural relations 
and education also showed low levels of interconnection. In the cases of 
decentralisation and European integration, the issues themselves do not have direct 
policy content, referring instead primarily to institutional arrangements. The positions 
that parties are likely to take on these issues are thus heavily context-dependent 
(Taggart, 1998; Hix, 2007): parties should favour integration and decentralisation if this 
furthers their broader policy goals in other areas. There is no predetermined logical 
connection between economic and social policy positions and views on institutional 
design. Arguably, this lack of substantive links to the main axes of competition also 
applies to topics such as education and democracy.
There is thus a threefold division among issues, with the first group consisting
of the circumstantially linked core issues of economics and liberalism, followed by
secondary issues such as the environment and immigration, and a third group
containing weakly interconnected issues such as EU support and decentralisation. A
uniting feature is the importance of the distinction between interconnections based on
logic and those based on circumstance. Following Converse (1964), it was suggested in
Chapter 3 that these are the two fundamental sources of interconnections. Thus, a priori
32 It is interesting to note that immigration policy is the best predictor o f overall left-right position in the 
Benoit-Laver survey; this is perhaps a reflection o f  its position at the intersection o f economic and social 
issues.
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the two core issues of economics and liberalism are not connected logically, which 
helps explain their variability across contexts. The secondary issues are tied through 
logic to both liberal-authoritarianism and economic policy, perhaps reinforced by 
circumstantial connections. An example would be environmental policy, strongly 
logically tied to economics but tied at least circumstantially to liberal-authoritarianism. 
Finally, the third group of issues is mainly circumstantial in its association: while logic 
certainly plays a role (for example in how EU support is linked to economic policy), 
this is more variable than for other issues. The logic/circumstance distinction will be 
addressed in more detail in the next chapter.
Conclusion
The main aim of this chapter was to explore the occurrence of static interconnections. 
The first approach to mapping the existence of such links across countries was simply 
to take the most basic form of interconnection, linear association, and measure this for 
all countries and parties analysed. In the expert surveys, most issues appeared to be very 
closely linked, with decentralisation and EU support the exceptions. The party 
manifestos presented a different result, with the various issues less strongly 
interconnected. Nevertheless, here too many of the core topics such as economic policy, 
liberal-authoritarianism and the environment were tightly linked and good positional 
predictors of each other.
These results were then nuanced by dividing the overall sample and comparing 
the resulting subgroups. Specifically, differences in static interconnections by left-right, 
party families and families of nations were considered. The left-right divisions were 
particularly striking concerning the relationship between economic policy and issues 
such as liberal-authoritarianism and environmental policy. The analysis of party family
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differences confirmed the picture of a well-ordered economic left compared with a 
more complexly structured economic right. However, no evidence of U-shaped 
interconnections was found. Country differences were more pronounced in the party 
manifestos than in the expert surveys, with variation most pronounced among weakly 
connected issues (such as EU support and decentralisation).
Overall, the pattern to be retained from this analysis is a threefold division of 
issues that underlines the importance of the key distinction between logic and 
circumstance as the basis of interconnections. First, economic policy and liberal- 
authoritarianism, the core issues of political competition, can but do not have to be 
interconnected in static terms, reflecting the fact that there is no logical link between the 
two policy areas. Second, a further group of issues is tied to both economics and liberal- 
authoritarianism, though the exact nature of the linkages is context-specific. Finally, a 
third group is generally independent: decentralisation and EU support are the main 
issues here.
In the next chapter, I return to a broader level of aggregation by examining the 
existence of dynamic interconnections across 23 countries. The findings presented in 
this chapter will provide an important foundation: first, it will be assessed whether and 
how dynamic linkages can be predicted by static interconnections; second, the 
logic/circumstance distinction will be a central factor in understanding the occurrence 
of dynamic interconnections.
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Appendix 5.1 Detailed results for Figure 5.2: Static interconnections, CMP- 
extracted positions
Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 2 —> Issue 1 Issue 1 —> Issue 2
b R2 added b R2 added
Economic policy Foreign policy 0 .8 8 0.1512 0 .2 0.1006
Foreign policy Culture-ethnic matters 0.34 0.0988 0.52 0.1297
Education EU support 0.26 0.0953 0.43 0.0961
Economic policy EU support -1.28 0.0825 -0.07 0.0745
Culture-ethnic matters EU support 0.8 0.0823 0.18 0.116
Economic policy Liberal-authoritari ani sm 0.33 0.075 0.24 0.067
Education Environment 0.08 0.0505 0 . 8 6 0.0547
Foreign policy Environment -0.14 0.0438 -0.55 0.0652
EU support Environment 0.07 0.0375 0.62 0.0374
Economic policy Environment -0.29 0.0366 -0.13 0.031
Economic policy Culture-ethnic matters 0.34 0.0324 0 .1 0.0247
Foreign policy Democracy 0.19 0.0271 0.23 0.0388
Liberal-authoritarianism Decentralization 0.42 0.0271 0.09 0.0259
Economic policy Urban-rural relations 0.28 0.0234
EU support Decentralization 0 .1 1 0.0228 0.25 0.0192
Democracy Decentralization -0.25 0.0226 -0 .1 1 0.0184
Democracy Culture-ethnic matters 0.14 0 . 0 2 2 2 0.18 0.0186
Liberal-authoritarianism Environment -0.15 0.0193
EU support Urban-rural relations -0 .1 0.0185
Culture-ethnic matters Environment -0 .1 2 0.0176 -0 .2 1 0.0216
Culture-ethnic matters Decentralization 0.24 0.0154 0.15 0.0228
Economic policy Decentralization -0.46 0 . 0 1 2 -0.04 0.0131
Liberal-authoritarianism Urban-rural relations -0 .1 0.0053
Liberal-authoritarianism Culture-ethnic matters 0.1 0.0178
• • 2Note: ‘b ’ refers to the value of the coefficient for the independent-variable position; ‘R 
added’ to the additional variance explained by adding that position to the model; 
regression set-up as in Table 5.3; values in italics significant at .1 level only; all others 
significant at .05 level; no values shown if coefficient not statistically significant; data 
from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2007).
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137
141
140
190
163
164
135
167
190
183
162
165
135
163
187
165
131
166
161
163
164
188
181
Benoit and Laver Laver and Hunt
Left Right Left R ight
r n r n r n r n
Economic policy Environment 0.43 94 0.63 67 0.27 83 0.57 6 6
Liberal-authoritarianism Environment 0.67 90 0.32 63 0.61 83 .06(x) 6 6
Economic policy Liberal-authoritarianism 0.46 90 ,01(x) 63 0.56 83 .0 2 (x) 6 6
Environment Decentralization .2 0 (x) 6 8  0.33 64 0.67 83 0.39 6 6
Economic policy Decentralization -.0 2 (x) 85 .23* 63 -,01(x) 83 0.31 6 6
Immigration Environment 0.76 85 0.56 64
Immigration Liberal-authoritarianism 0 . 8 81 0.62 60
Immigration Economic policy 0.58 85 0.3 64
nxVn
C
<n
EU support Economic policy -0 . 1 l(x ) 6 8 .20(x) 49
Urban-rural relations Economic policy 0.58 83 ,07(x) 6 6
Urban-rural relations Decentralization -.2 0 * 83 0.12(x) 6 6
USSR relations Economic policy 0.82 83 0.46 6 6
USSR relations Environment ■19(x) 83 0.39 6 6
USSR relations Decentralization ■•14(x) 83 0.31 6 6
Note: only issue relationship significant in multiple regression shown; 'r' refers to the r-value o f  the bivariate correlation; r-values marked with (x) 
are not significant at a .05 level.
ooN>
Appendix 
5.2 
Detailed 
results 
for 
Figure 
5.4: 
Left-right 
differences 
in 
static
Appendix 5.3 Detailed results for Figure 5.8: Left-right differences in static 
interconnections, expert surveys
Benoit and Laver
Issue 2~>  Issue 1 Issue 1 --> Issue 2
Issue 1 Issue 2 Left Right Left Right n
Economic policy Liberal-Authoritarianism 0 .2 1 0 .0 1 1 .0 1 0 . 0 2 153
Economic policy Environment 0.27 0.49 n.s. 161
Economic policy Decentralization -,0 1 (x) .17* n.s. 149
Economic policy Immigration 0.37 0.17 n.s. 149
Economic policy EU support -06(x) .09(x) -.23(x) .40* 117
Liberal-Authoritarianism Environment 0.94 0.53 0.48 0 .2 153
Liberal-Authoritarianism Immigration 1 .0 2 0.72 n.s. 141
Environment Immigration 0.76 0.41 n.s. 149
Note: the coefficient for right parties is calculated by adding the coefficient o f  the interaction term 
(right*policy position) to the coefficient for the policy position; the significance for right parties refers to the 
significance o f the interaction term. All coefficients significant at the .5 level or better, except those marked 
with a * ( .1  level o f significance ) or with (x) (not significant), n.s. stands for 'not significant'.
Laver and Hunt
Issue 2—> Issue 1 Issue 1 — > Issue 2
Issue 1 Issue 2 Left Right Left Right n
Economic policy Liberal-Authoritarianism 0.33 0 .0 1 0.96 0.04 149
Economic policy Environment 0.16 .44* n.s. 149
Liberal-Authoritarianism Environment 0.61 0 .1 0.61 0.03 149
Economic policy Decentralization -,0 1 (x) .2 0 * -,0 2 (x) .52* 149
Economic policy Urban-rural relations 0.41 0.04 0.79 0 . 1 2 149
Environment Decentralization 0.79 0.3 n.s. 149
Decentralization Urban-rural relations -,2 0 (x) 0 . 1 2 -,19(x) .13* 149
Economic policy USSR relations 0.77 0.31 n.s. 149
Environment USSR relations n.s. 0 .1 2 (x) .46* 149
Decentralization USSR relations -,19(x) 0.34 -0.1(x) 0.29 149
Note: the coefficient for right parties is calculated by adding the coefficient o f the interaction term 
(right*policy position) to the coefficient for the policy position; the significance for right parties refers to the 
significance o f the interaction term. All coefficients significant at the .5 level or better, except those marked 
with a * ( .1  level o f  significance ) or with (x) (not significant), n.s. stands for 'not significant'.
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Left Right Issue 2—> Issue 1 Issue 1 --> Issue 2
Issue 1 Issue 2 r n r n Left Right Left Right n
Economic policy Liberal-authorita 0.25 118 •02(x) 72 0.25 -0.17 ns 190
Economic policy Democracy .06(x) 120 -,04(x) 69 ns ,09(ns) -0.14 189
Economic policy Decentralization -.Ol(x) 102 •10(x) 62 -0.46 0.43 -0.06 0.08 163
Economic policy EU support -.52 90 -,15(x) 51 -1.33 -0.03 -0.17 0.01 141
Economic policy Education .03(x) 116 .33 70 -0.24 0.44 -.06(ns) 0.08 186
Economic policy Environment -.32 104 15(x) 63 -,08(ns) -0.64 -0.24 0.12 167
Foreign policy Decentralization .02(x) 100 -.37 61 -,03(ns) 0.32 0(ns) 0.36 160
Foreign policy Education -.03(x) 112 .45 68 -,43(ns) 0.37 -0.12 0.13 180
Foreign policy EU support -.25 89 .30 51 -0.36 0.27 -0.19 0.27 140
Foreign policy Environment -.34 101 -.53 63 -0.09 -0.49 ns 164
Foreign policy Urban-rural relat .26 101 -.22* 61 ,14(ns) -0.14 ns 162
Democracy Culture-ethnic m ,15(x) 119 ,05(x) 68 .20 0 ns 187
Democracy Education . 17* 116 -09(x) 67 -.43 0.41 -0.13 0.15 183
Liberal-authoritarianism Culture-ethnic m .21 117 .17 71 0.17 -0.02 ns 188
Culture-ethnic matters Education -.0 116 •18(x) 69 -.17(ns) 0.61 ns 185
Culture-ethnic matters EU support ,05(x) 80 .52 51 ,07(ns) 2.18 ns 140
Democracy Urban-rural relat -,07(x) 103 -,12(x) 62 0.23 -0.07 ns 165
EU support Environment .21 86 -.09(x) 49 0.06 -0.34 0.87 -0.05 135
Education Urban-rural relat -,04(x) 103 -.24* 60 -0.22 0 ns 163
Education Environment -.09(x) 101 -.27 62 0.1 -0.19 1.38 0.24 163
Decentralization Environment -,08(x) 96 -.38 59 -0.04(ns) -0.61 ns 154
Environment Urban-rural relat -,08(x) 95 .49 58 -.34(ns) 0.11 -.03(ns) 0.91 153
n
3
aw
»->-p<*>
fD
Note: the coefficient for right parties is calculated by adding the coefficient of the interaction term (right*policy position) to the coefficient for the policy position; the 
significance for right parties refers to the significance o f the interaction term. All coefficients significant at the .5 level or better, except those in italics (.1 level of 
significance ) or with (ns) (not significant), n.s. stands for 'not significant'.
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Note: the sample size for clericalism for Social Democrats is 23, for Conservatives 15.
Party manifestos
Communist Green Social Democrat Liberal Christian Democrat Conservative
mean st.d. n mean st.d. n mean st.d. n me an st.d. n mean st.d. n mean st.d. n
Economic policy -11.62 6.53 28 -8.39 5.45 14 -8.43 5.53 42 3.69 7.13 26 0.46 3.86 23 7.47 7.66 24
Foreign policy -8.09 7.16 28 -6.91 4.95 14 -4.74 4.90 40 -2.71 2.90 24 -3.52 4.59 23 -0.96 3.58 24
Libe ral-autho ritarianis m 5.42 6.79 28 7.30 9.03 13 5.35 7.03 41 6.57 6.80 26 15.98 13.83 23 8.30 5.05 24
Culture-ethnic matters -5.83 4.85 28 -5.96 3.64 13 -4.35 4.51 41 -3.89 3.61 26 -5.49 5.12 23 -2.45 3.70 24
Democracy -8.41 5.72 28 -7.86 3.36 14 -7.80 6.52 42 -7.30 3.85 25 -5.60 2.51 22 -5.79 2.98 24
EU support 0.62 2.03 23 -0.17 3.04 13 -1.68 1.19 25 -2.04 1.11 19 -2.09 1.46 19 -1.69 1.04 14
Decentralization -1.30 1.02 25 -2.32 2.22 12 -1.87 1.46 33 -1.62 1.15 20 -1.90 1.22 20 -3.30 3.97 22
Education -3.11 1.88 27 -2.82 1.48 12 -4.58 2.14 41 -4.53 3.22 25 -3.58 1.23 23 -3.99 2.23 24
Environment 4.37 3.38 26 24.52 10.48 14 3.72 2.70 34 3.52 2.70 20 4.28 2.48 18 2.78 1.34 23
Urban-rural relations 2.32 1.73 24 1.83 1.10 11 3.77 3.67 36 4.17 6.17 21 2.99 1.65 21 3.85 2.10 21
reX
*an•i
Benoit and Laver survey
Communist Green Social Democrat Liberal Christian Democrat Conservative
mean st.d. n mean st.d. n mean st.d. n mean st.d. n mean st.d. n mean st.d. n
Economic policy -5.91 1.60 18 -5.02 1.87 15 -2.30 2.49 28 2.69 3.81 18 1.35 2.55 14 4.24 2.28 22
Libe ral-autho ritarianis m -4.77 2.84 18 -7.24 1.08 14 -4.53 2.57 26 -3.12 3.34 15 5.36 2.42 14 2.84 2.78 20
Environment -3.82 2.72 18 -8.09 0.75 15 -0.99 2.22 28 2.07 3.93 18 0.90 2.33 14 4.23 1.81 22
Decentralization -1.33 3.17 18 -6.93 1.29 15 -0.06 2.38 28 -1.76 2.43 18 -1.22 2.53 14 -0.86 3.10 22
Immigration -5.37 2.31 18 -2.70 2.79 15 -3.33 1.90 28 -0.98 4.27 18 0.82 2.56 14 2.18 2.36 22
EU support 1.59 4.75 17 -1.14 4.09 12 -2.33 2.30 20 -1.71 3.59 13 -0.60 2.92 13 0.09 4.69 13
Laver and Hunt survey
Communist Green Social Democrats Liberal Christian Democrat Conservative
mean st.d. mean st.d. mean std . mean st.d. mean st.d. mean st.d.
Economic policy -5.97 2.87 -4.47 2.27 -3.02 2.12 3.01 3.27 2.06 1.62 4.54 1.63
Liberal-Authoritarianis m -6.38 1.98 -6.71 2.00 -4.15 2.11 -2.78 2.10 5.90 2.22 1.81 3.40
Environment -3.22 3.66 -8.30 1.09 -0.52 2.65 -0.11 4.19 0.68 2.16 3.18 1.85
Decentralization -1.29 4.15 -5.49 2.14 0.32 2.40 -0.64 3.27 -0.05 3.33 0.74 2.88
Urban-rural relations -5.30 2.09 -2.13 3.49 -3.20 2.48 -1.22 2.13 2.97 1.30 0.22 3.43
USSR -6.53 2.60 -3.98 2.30 -3.43 2.06 -0.77 2.75 0.21 2.02 -0.04 2.82
Public ownership -6.80 3.24 -3.24 2.53 -1.80 2.08 4.32 3.00 3.71 1.99 4.98 2.40
Clericalism -5.89 3.65 -3.79 2.96 -2.29 1.39 -1.40 2.63 6.24 2.06 3.47 2.43
18 14 25 16 15 16
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Appendix 5.6 Detailed results for Figure 5.12 and 5.13: bivariate correlations in 
the expert surveys by family of nations
Benoit and Laver expert survey
Nordic family of countries Southern European family of nations
Econ Envi Lib-Auth Decent Immig Econ Envi Lib-Auth Decent Immig
Envi 0.76 Envi 0.90
P 0.00 P 0.00
n 38 n 15
Lib-Auth 0.43 0.47 Lib-Auth 0.90 0.95
P 0.01 0.00 P 0.00 0.00
n 38 38 n 15 15
Decent 0.07 0.40 -0.02 Decent 0.57 0.57 0.56
P 0.70 0.01 0.91 P 0.03 0.03 0.03
n 38 38 38 n 15 15 15
Immig 0.58 0.74 0.68 0.27 Immig 0.93 0.97 0.97 0.53
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
n 38 38 38 38 n 15 15 15 15
EU -0.12 -0.07 0.10 0.15 0.22 EU -0.19 -0.02 0.11 0.35 -0.02
P 0.53 0.68 0.59 0.41 0.23 P 0.51 0.93 0.69 0.20 0.96
n 32 32 32 32 32 n 15 15 15 15 15
Central European family of nations Anglo-Saxon family of nations
Econ Envi Lib-Auth Decent Immig Econ Envi Lib-Auth Decent Immig
Envi 0.80 Envi 0.83
P 0.00 P 0.00
n 54 n 37
Lib-Auth 0.56 0.61 Lib-Auth 0.65 0.83
P 0.00 0.00 P 0.00 0.00
n 54 54 n 29 29
Decent -0.34 -0.03 -0.08 Decent 0.14 0.18 0.07
P 0.01 0.82 0.58 P 0.40 0.28 0.70
n 54 54 54 n 37 37 29
Immig 0.78 0.83 0.80 -0.14 Immig 0.62 0.80 0.83 0.14
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39
n 54 54 54 54 n 37 37 29 37
EU 0.23 0.34 0.33 -0.17 0.45 EU 0.17 0.25 0.42 0.38 0.46
P 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.23 0.00 P 0.52 0.35 0.11 0.14 0.07
n 54 54 54 54 54 n 16 16 16 16 16
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Laver and Hunt survey
Nordic family of countries Southern European family of nations
Econ Envi Lib-Auth Decent Urb-rur Econ Envi Lib-Auth Decent Urb-rur
Envi 0.64 Envi 0.85
P 0.00 P 0.00
n 43 n 19
Lib-Auth 0.67 0.47 Lib-Auth 0.96 0.88
P 0.00 0.00 P 0.00 0.00
n 43 43 n 19 19
Decent 0.08 0.63 0.12 Decent 0.41 0.42 0.44
P 0.63 0.00 0.44 P 0.08 0.07 0.06
n 43 43 43 n 19 19 19
Urb-rur 0.30 -0.16 0.55 -0.41 Urb-rur 0.83 0.75 0.85 0.41
P 0.05 0.29 0.00 0.01 P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08
n 43 43 43 43 n 19 19 19 19
USSR 0.82 0.46 0.59 -0.03 0.30 USSR 0.88 0.79 0.91 0.27 0.67
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.05 P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.00
n 43 43 43 43 43 n 19 19 19 19 19
Central European family of nations Anglo-Saxon family of nations
Econ Envi Lib-Auth Decent Urb-rur Econ Envi Lib-Auth Decent Urb-rur
Envi 0.61 Envi 0.71
P 0.00 P 0.00
n 51 n 24
Lib-Auth 0.66 0.54 Lib-Auth 0.81 0.86
P 0.00 0.00 P 0.00 0.00
n 51 51 n 24 24
Decent 0.35 0.68 0.42 Decent 0.22 0.25 0.14
P 0.01 0.00 0.00 P 0.31 0.25 0.53
n 51 51 51 n 24 24 24
Urb-rur 0.67 0.27 0.84 0.19 Urb-rur 0.65 0.59 0.85 -0.04
P 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.19 P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.84
n 51 51 51 51 n 24 24 24 24
USSR 0.85 0.48 0.74 0.30 0.66 USSR 0.92 0.63 0.81 0.10 0.81
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.00
n 51 51 51 51 51 n 24 24 24 24 24
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Nordic Central Europe an Southern European Anglo-Saxon
Issue 1 Issue 2 R2 added 
2—>1 1—>2 n
R2 added 
2—>1 1—>2 n
R2 added 
2—>1 1—>2 n
R2 added 
2—>1 1—>2 n
Economic policy Foreign policy 0.2145 0.1422 45 0.0898 0.073 57 0.1407 0.1128 30 0.3057 0.2797 31
Economic policy Liberal-authoritarianism 0.078 0.0808 44 0.0928 0.0742 57 0.0482 35
Economic policy Democracy 0.3962 0.3283 32
Economic policy Culture-ethnic relations 0.0813 0.0352 57
Economic policy Education 0.0776 0.07 44
Economic policy EU 0.2617 0.1685 31 0.3415 0.3098 11
Economic policy Environment 0.0663 0.0472 45 0.0304 52 0.0634 0.0589 32
Economic policy Urban-rural relations 0.0953 0.0691 55 0.0754 33
Foreign policy Liberal-authoritarianism 0.0681 57 0.176 0.1636 31
Foreign policy Democracy 0.0839 0.102 30
Foreign policy Culture-ethnic relations 0.0192 0.0491 45 0.1919 0.1401 57 0.055 0.0318 31
Foreign policy Decentralization 0.049 0.0665 30
Foreign policy Environment 0.0614 0.0922 44 0.0308 0.0359 52 0.0576 30 0.0437 0.0469 31
Liberal-authoritarianism Democracy 0.1209 57
Liberal-authoritarianism Culture-ethnic relations 0.1192 57 0.0599 30
Liberal-authoritarianism Decentralization 0.077 0.1307 32 0.2694 0.2374 27
Liberal-authoritarianism Environment 0.0457 43 0.0319 52 0.1264 32
Liberal-authoritarianism Urban-rural relations 0.048 33
Democracy Culture-ethnic relations 0.0257 46 0.0404 30 0.0759 34
Democracy EU 0.1524 0.1158 31
Democracy Decentralization 0.0757 0.0819 41
Democracy Environment 0.0653 52 0.0357 31
Democracy Urban-rural relations 0.05 33
Culture-ethnic relations Education 0.0538 0.0402 44
Culture-ethnic relations EU 0.0375 0.0333 43 0.0344 30
Culture-ethnic relations Decentralization 0.036 0.052 56 0.0218 30
Culture-ethnic relations Environment 0.0291 45 0.0151 52
Education EU 0.0204 41 0.034 55 0.2581 0.1868 30
Education Decentralization 0.1237 0.1516 41 0.0698 31
Education Environment 0.1251 0.0895 51 0.0692 0.1142 32
Education Urban-rural relations 0.0599 0.0522 38 0.0988 0.076 55 0.1854 0.1416 28
EU Decentralization 0.0429 0.044 55 0.0549 0.0671 31
EU Environment 0.1316 11
Decentralization Environment 0.013 0.0158 51 0.0464 26
Decentralization Urban-rural relations 0.431 0.3346 36 0.0971 51
Urban-rural EU 0.0689 28
Urban-rural Environment 0.1042 51 0.0291 28
3
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Note: only added level o f variance for models with significant coefficients shown.
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Chapter 6
Issue interconnections and party policy change
Policy movement is at the core of party competition. Even journalistic analyses of 
elections, employing the common spatial metaphor, explain the success and defeat of 
parties through their strategic move to the centre or their foolhardy shift to the 
extremes. To use an example from the UK: Labour’s disastrous performance in the 
1983 general election is often linked to its leftward shift, including an election 
programme dubbed ‘the longest suicide note in history’, while its success in 1997 under 
Tony Blair is often credited to the decision to move decisively to the political centre. 
Going beyond such simplified interpretations of electoral dynamics, academic studies 
of party competition in the rational choice tradition have tried to examine the balance 
between ideology and strategy for political parties.
Two main debates concerning party policy change have emerged. First, the 
existence of strong strategic incentives to converge on the median voter has been 
contrasted with the fact that parties nevertheless continue to differ significantly in their 
policy prescriptions. Second, while it would be rational for parties to shadow large 
shifts in public opinion, there also remains a need for ideological consistency and 
coherence. In sum, parties should move if this promises political success, but their 
ability to do so is limited by factors such as their supporters, activists and donors, their 
ideology and their organisational constraints.
This chapter proposes an additional constraint to party policy change: issue
interconnections constitute a further rational limitation on the freedom of movement of
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political parties. In the previous chapter, I presented the strength of static 
interconnections within party programmes, distinguishing between the economic left 
and right, party families and countries. Here, these findings are used to explain the 
existence of dynamic interconnections, that is, whether there are links between various 
issue areas in terms of parties’ ideological change. In general, parties should arguably 
exhibit associated policy change on issue pairs that also showed static interconnections. 
Policy change should also be less pronounced if the issue is generally strongly 
connected to others and thus a tightly-linked part of the issue system.
Static interconnections can thus help predict the existence of dynamic 
interconnections, but there are two ways in which they may do so. In the first approach, 
all static interconnections are equally likely to also be mirrored by dynamic 
interconnections. The overall empirical regularities found in the previous chapter would 
then be reproduced for party policy change as well. A second approach distinguishes 
between static interconnections based on logic and those based on circumstance. Here, 
the pattern of issues described in the previous chapter takes on importance, as it 
provides a guide to those issues that are logically linked. The results indeed indicate 
that the second approach, in which only logic-based static interconnections are mirrored 
by dynamic linkages, is a more accurate predictor of the ties between the two 
phenomena.
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I consider existing explanations of 
party policy change: why do parties move? Then, I present the way in which static issue 
interconnections could influence dynamic interconnections. After describing the 
empirical results, I conclude with a brief discussion of my findings.
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Explanations of party policy change
Why do parties move? The simplest answer to this question was given by Downs 
(1957): parties should be seen as vote-maximisers. They position themselves in the 
ideological space, in his view a left-right continuum, in such a way as to gain as many 
votes as possible. The aim underlying vote maximisation is winning and staying in 
public office. In Downs’ description, leaders ‘act solely in order to attain the income, 
prestige and political power which come from being in office’ (Downs, 1957, p. 27). 
This led to his prediction that parties will converge towards the median voter in a two- 
party system. In the most basic model of Downsian political competition, there are no 
limits to the types of movement a party may undertake in order to maximise its votes. 
Since parties fashion their policies in order to win elections instead of winning elections 
in order to implement their political programme (1957, p. 28), they will take up any 
position that promises electoral success. If we assume vote maximisation and 
unrestrained median convergence, there are two scenarios that will make a party move: 
first, a party will shift its position if it can move closer to the median voter; second, it 
will shadow changes in the position of the median voter. In the first scenario, parties are 
located at a certain distance from the median voter, and they shift their position in order 
to increase their electoral success. The second scenario describes a change in the make­
up of voter preferences, so parties as vote-maximisers are expected to follow public 
opinion shifts. Evidence that this is indeed the case has been found for the US (Stimson 
et al., 1995; Erikson et al., 2002) and for Europe (Adams et al., 2004; McDonald and 
Budge, 2005; Adams et al., 2006). In sum, parties are predicted to move towards the 
preference of the median voter, with no limits on their freedom to pursue electoral 
success through policy movement.
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However, if the assumptions of this ‘comic-book version of Downs’ (Grofman, 
2004, p. 40) are relaxed, then complete median voter convergence is not predicted. In 
general, it is rare for all the requirements for full convergence to be in place, so 
divergence should in fact be the norm in party competition (Grofman, 2004). While 
predicting divergence does not always mean that parties will fail to follow shifts in 
public opinion, this is nevertheless the clear implication of some of the work in this 
area. Thus, the influence of party activists (Aldrich, 1983; Laver, 1997; Schofield, 
2003) and of campaign donors (Miller and Schofield, 2003) means that parties have an 
incentive to present non-centrist platforms, but for reasons only indirectly related to 
vote-maximising ambitions: instead, party positions are partly the result of the need for 
scarce campaign resources (Adams et al., 2005, p. 8). In this view, parties will move if 
the preferences of activists or donors -  and not those of voters -  make this a sensible 
strategy. Similarly, if we adopt Budge and Laver’s (1986) and Strom’s (1990) argument 
that parties may not just seek votes but also policy or office, parties might not always 
track public opinion (Schofield and Sened, 2006, p. 3). If parties and candidates care 
only about policy, they would indeed generally not be expected to change at all due to 
electoral incentives.34 Meanwhile, parties that primarily seek office can decide to take 
up a less popular stance that nevertheless guarantees inclusion in a government 
coalition. For both policy- and office-seeking parties, the pursuit of votes and thus the 
freedom of party movement are limited by other rational motivations.
Downs himself realised that parties’ freedom of movement is not without limits. 
Parties, he argued, constrain their movements because they need to prove to citizens 
that they are credible and reliable: they need to be ‘rationally immobile’ (1957, p. 110).
33 See Grofman (2004) for a full account o f the explicit and implicit assumptions o f  the pure Downsian 
model.
34 The three motivations are clearly difficult to separate: for example, it helps if  a party is in office i f  it 
wants to realise policy goals. Indeed, Laver and Shepsle (1995) have argued that parties would always 
behave as if  they were pursuing policy aims, even if  their actual goal was office or votes.
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The means through which parties achieve this is ideology, which he defines as ‘a verbal 
image of the good society and of the chief means of constructing such a society’ (1957, 
p. 96). To attract votes, parties need to be ‘responsible and reliable’ (1957, p. 109). By 
presenting themselves as ideological actors capable of credible commitments, parties 
can reassure voters that they will in fact implement the promised policies. As a result, it 
is rational for parties to exhibit a certain consistency in their policies: ‘Any party which 
is both responsible and reliable will probably have an ideology which is relatively 
coherent and immobile’ (1957, p. 109; see also Knight, 1992, p. 80). Once a reasonably 
constant set of policies has been established, it is rational to modify it only slowly. 
Parties benefit from having a strong brand name (Snyder and Ting, 2002) and are 
conservative and risk-averse due to the potential costs of losing the support of certain 
social groups and power bases (Janda et al., 1995, p. 174; Adams and Somer-Topcu, 
forthcoming). Moreover, voters only adapt their beliefs of political parties slowly since 
they suffer from ‘perceptual inertia’ (Ordeshook, 1976, p. 295). Thus, the importance of 
ideology means that parties will find it ‘difficult or impossible to move’ (Munger and 
Hinich, 1993, p. 42).
Related to ideological movement are explanations of how parties incorporate 
new issues -  such as environmental protection or the ‘war on terror’ -  into their existing 
policy profile. The pure Downsian explanation would be for parties to choose that 
policy position that promises the greatest political success. However, parties may also 
be limited in their flexibility in choosing positions on newly salient issues. First, parties 
will exhibit the path-dependent immobility characteristic of all actors and organisations. 
Parties can be seen as ‘boundedly rational’: they react to political change based on the 
ideologies they have constructed over time (Marks and Wilson, 2000, p. 434; Pierson, 
2000, p. 260; Kriesi et al., 2006). As Greif and Laitin write: ‘Hence, past behaviour
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would reign ... because institutionalized rules enable individuals with limited 
knowledge and information to choose behaviour. And thus, behavioural rules learned in 
the past are the best predictor of future behaviour’ (2004, p. 638). Party ideology thus 
provides the basis for responses to current events and changes in public opinion and 
therefore constrains the party’s strategic freedom (Budge, 1994, p. 446; Beeler Asay, 
2008, p. 115). Second, activists and campaign donors not only entice parties away from 
the median voter (Aldrich, 1983): they may also limit party flexibility when reacting to 
newly salient political topics by encouraging parties to adopt a position that they agree 
with. When choosing positions on emerging issues, parties will thus nevertheless 
respond to the same activists and donors who supported them in the past.
Policy interconnections and party movement
Political ideologies thus create limits that constrain parties from picking those positions 
that promise the greatest electoral gain. An ideology is an internally coherent set of 
beliefs and preferences. As we have seen, this coherence can stem from multiple 
sources: it may be the result of logic and quasi-logic or simply reflect the aggregate 
consistency of voters, supporters and politicians. In any case, the internal coherence of 
party programmes will have consequences for how parties move.
Again, it is possible to extrapolate from the nature of preference change among 
individuals. At this level, ideological constraints can be ‘dynamic’ and not just ‘static’ 
(Converse, 1964, p. 208). This means that a change in views on one issue will lead to a 
similar adjustment on the strongly linked second issue. For example, we can imagine a 
situation in which there is a budget constraint between two distinct issue areas, guns 
and butter. If an individual wants to spend more on butter, then his or her views on 
spending on guns should also change. Conversely, there is unlikely to be great change
194
on views on spending on guns without some complementary movement on butter 
expenditure: the independent range of preference change on linked issues is limited. 
Here, the issue constraint is dynamic because it is also visible in the nature of 
preference change.
This conception of the change in individual political beliefs can also be applied 
to the policy movements of political parties. I have already argued that a party ideology 
can be described as a bundle of issues whose components are interconnected, albeit 
with varying strength. The focus of the previous chapter was the static interconnections 
that exist within party programmes: in other words, the extent to which the position on 
one issue is able to predict the position on a second issue. Now, I turn to the 
examination of dynamic interconnections.
Where the components of the issue system are interconnected dynamically, the 
policy movements on pairs of issues reflect these constraints. If the dynamic 
interconnection is ‘perfect’, then a movement on issue A leads to an equal and 
immediate adjustment on issue B. However, as Budge (1994) argues, all ideologies 
provide a certain level of ambiguity which allows parties to move within a limited area, 
and the same applies to strongly interconnected issues. Realistically, even with a 
dynamic interconnection, a certain level of freedom of movement exists on both issues: 
a certain position on issue A can be combined with a limited range of positions on issue 
B. However, at the very least parties will not move independently on two tightly 
interconnected issues. In sum: the stronger the dynamic links between two issues, the 
more policy movement on one issue predicts a similar adjustment on the second issue.
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The sources o f  dynamic interconnections
What are the causal sources of dynamic interconnections? I have suggested that the two 
main origins of issue constraints can be summarised as logic and circumstance, where 
‘logic’ refers to innate characteristics linking the issue pair and ‘circumstance’ to 
historically and socially produced associations. Some interconnections may thus be 
based on an inherent and intrinsic linkage between two issue areas that is based on a 
joint value or constraint that underlies both topics. Other interconnections may result 
from the regularities present in aggregate voter preferences and the historical 
development of political parties. As argued in Chapter 3, such interconnections will 
develop when elites spread values and opinions among one social group or if certain 
social strata happen to share specific views without there being any logical need for a 
correlation between them. This distinction between logic and circumstance as the basis 
of interconnections is also applicable to dynamic interconnections.
In theory, dynamic policy interconnections could be based on both types of 
origins of issue interconnections. If two issues are connected through logic and 
coherence, then this tight association should also be reflected in the fact that parties will 
tend to modify their positions on both issues at the same time and in a similar manner. 
This can be due to both electoral incentives and sincere ideological behaviour. First, 
independent movement on logically linked issues may open the party up to charges that 
its policy package is inconsistent. Other parties will point out their opponents’ 
incoherence, and voters may punish parties for inconsistent promises. There is therefore 
a strong electoral incentive to maintain coherence: the observable consequences of this 
incentive are dynamic interconnections between issue areas.
Logic-based dynamic interconnections may also be the result of ideological 
behaviour on the part of elites. In many cases, the associated policy shifts that
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characterise dynamic interconnections may thus simply occur automatically as the two 
issues are very closely linked, also in the minds of politicians. This can be illustrated by 
taking one mechanism through which party policy change can occur: factional 
replacement. For example, in a social democratic party, a centrist faction may wrest 
power from a left-leaning subgroup. This change in party leadership could lead to 
policy modification on an issue pair because it is characterised by strong logical links: a 
party may thus become more in favour of deregulation and more pro-European at the 
same time. Dynamic interconnections are thus likely to exist for issue pairs linked 
through underlying inherent logical ties.
Second, dynamic interconnections could also occur on issue pairs linked 
through circumstance. This means that there is an association of policy change simply 
due to the fact that the positions tend to co-occur, for example within certain segments 
of society or among groups of activists. This co-occurrence of views can be purely 
coincidental or due to the fact that two issue positions are seen as associated despite the 
absence of logical links. If policy positions on economics and law and order are linked, 
then this would be mostly coincidental, as these two issues are not generally seen as 
associated within party programmes or social strata. On the other hand, positions on 
social liberalism and pro-environmentalism have been seen as associated issues that are 
part of one dimension, liberal-authoritarianism or gal/tan (Kitschelt, 1994; Hooghe et 
al., 2002). In either case, joint policy change on both issues would not be due to 
underlying logical ties. Looking again at the example based on factional replacement, 
the argument here would be that policy change will co-occur because the leaders and 
activists in the newly dominant faction have systematically different preferences to the 
old faction. Tony Blair’s pre-election repositioning of Labour included both a move to 
the economic centre as well as a toughening up of the party’s stance on law and order.
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These two policy preferences are not directly linked through logic but may well have 
reflected a co-occurrence of these views among the newly dominant group within the 
party.
While it is possible for dynamic interconnections to have logic or circumstance 
as their underlying basis, the preceding discussion also indicates that logic may provide 
the more solid foundation for interconnected policy change. The hypothesised 
mechanisms leading to logic-based dynamic interconnections are arguably stronger: the 
two explanations highlighted were the electoral incentives towards coherence as well as 
the ideological behaviour -  possibly almost unconscious -  of elite politicians. The 
mechanism leading to circumstance-based dynamic interconnections relied on a weaker 
explanation, namely the co-occurrence and association of certain policy positions 
among voters or groups of politicians.
This has consequences for the expectations one should have concerning the 
number and nature of dynamic interconnections. The previous chapter examined the 
static interconnections in party programmes. These can be used as a basis for 
predictions on policy change: the simplest expectation would then be that the static 
interconnections found should be replicated at the dynamic level. However, it is more 
likely that only some interconnections will be dynamic as well as static: as argued 
above, it is logic-based static linkages that are more likely to occur over time. 
Politicians, activists and voters will see such issue pairs as naturally bound, and policy 
change will co-occur without the more complicated mechanisms required by 
circumstance-based interconnections. The second consequence of this is that there will 
be fewer dynamic than static interconnections. If only the logic-based portion of static 
interconnections is likely to be replicated dynamically, then the overall number of 
dynamic linkages should be lower than that of static linkages. In addition, there should
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also be few issue pairs that have dynamic ties without an equivalent static linkage. In 
sum, it is expected, first, that logic-based static interconnections are more likely to also 
exhibit dynamic interconnections than circumstance-based static interconnections and, 
second, that there are fewer dynamic than static interconnections.
Two approaches to predicting dynamic interconnections using knowledge of 
static interconnections are therefore possible. First, the static interconnections found in 
the previous chapter can be seen as the links also expected in dynamic terms. However, 
only static interconnections deemed to be based on logical foundations should be seen 
as a likely basis for dynamic interconnections. The second approach is therefore 
differentiate between static interconnections based on logic and those based on 
circumstance, with only the former providing a likely basis for dynamic 
interconnections. I thus expect that this second understanding of issue systems is more 
likely to depict accurately the strength of dynamic interconnections. I will therefore use 
an a priori division of static interconnections in ties based on logic or circumstance as a 
basis for developing detailed expectations concerning the predictive capacity of static 
interconnections.
Predicting the extent o f  policy change
Finally, static interconnections may also help predict the extent to which parties move 
on each issue. The more tightly a policy area is tied to others, the less likely a party is to 
carry out significant policy change on that issue. Such policy movement would require 
a broader refashioning of party ideology, which should only occur rarely. Since (as 
noted above) parties are usually conservative and risk-averse organisations, such 
wholesale change would presumably be a step that parties would be less likely to 
undertake quickly. Conversely, it should be easier for parties to move on issues that are
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in general characterised by loose static connections to other issues. In such policy areas, 
parties can choose their position relatively freely as they will feel less pressure to 
modify other positions as a consequence of this one ideological adjustment.35 In the 
analysis of policy change, I will thus also examine the total extent of movement on each 
issue and compare this to the static interconnections found in the previous chapter.
Data sources and measurement of policy change
There are very few datasets that provide information on change in party positions on 
separate issues over time. As in the previous chapter, I will make use of the Laver-Hunt 
and Benoit-Laver expert surveys as well as the CMP dataset. Here, I will briefly 
describe the issues and parties included in each dataset as well as the measurement 
issues associated with each data source.
The two expert surveys were not expressly designed to provide information on 
party policy change. The issues assessed in each expert survey are not identical, with 
the Laver-Hunt version providing positions on eight issues for almost all countries and 
the Benoit-Laver survey allowing the issues included to vary by country. This means 
that, in total, we only have information on four issues for a wide range of parties: 
economic policy, liberal-authoritarianism, environmental policy and decentralisation. 
Moreover, the restriction imposed by the existence of only two time points that are 
fourteen years apart is of course quite severe. Nevertheless, the expert surveys can 
successfully be used to show how party systems have changed between 1989 and 2003 
(e.g. Laver and Benoit, 2006). This is because these data sources also have some
35 Other factors are clearly also important in the extent to which parties will move on a given issue. For 
example, parties will be less likely to move strongly on an issue that is at the core o f  their identity: Green 
parties will rarely take a stance that opposes environmental protection, and (economically) liberal parties 
are unlikely to give up their support for ffee-market capitalism. This may reflect, among other factors, a 
brand-name consciousness and a need to retain the support o f party activists. The following chapter 
addresses the place o f salience in party movements on interconnected issues.
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undeniable advantages. Apart from the general reliability of these surveys, the identical 
scoring system and the consistent question wording (at least on four issues) means that 
the party positions in 1989 and 2003 can be easily compared. In this chapter, I therefore 
examine correlated policy change on four core issues for 118 parties in 23 countries.36
The most frequently used data source for longitudinal, cross-national estimates 
on party positions is the CMP dataset. In this chapter, I will again use the division into 
ten distinct issue areas introduced in the previous chapters. The obvious advantages of 
the CMP data lie in the large amount of policy information included as well as the 
relatively complete coverage of elections in advanced democracies since 1945. The data 
structure is not as straightforward as in the expert surveys, so positional information 
(and thus policy movements) cannot be directly assessed. As noted in the previous 
chapter, it is nevertheless possible to derive positional information from the CMP’s 
salience information by subtracting positive from negative references to a topic. Using 
these raw ‘positions’ it is possible to assess the extent of policy change; the exact model 
specification is discussed further below. In total, this chapter examines party 
movements for 243 parties in 24 countries.37
As noted in Chapter 4, both data sources face particular limitations when used to 
analyse the existence and nature of policy change. The expert surveys tend to see 
parties as programmatically extremely stable. Arguably, then, experts take a long-term 
approach to estimating party positions, downplaying short-term changes in party views. 
It is therefore likely that experts underestimate the actual level of ideological movement 
in an effort to provide a generally applicable estimate of a party’s position. In contrast, 
manifesto coding presents parties as erratic, changeable actors. Some of this election-to-
36 These countries are (with number o f parties in parentheses): Canada (4), Japan (4), Norway (7), UK 
(4), US(2), Australia(4), Austria (4), Belgium (10), Denmark (8 ), Finland (7), France (6 ), Germany (4), 
Greece (4), Iceland (3), Ireland (5), Israel (6 ), Italy (5), Luxembourg (5), Netherlands (7), New Zealand 
(2), Portugal (5), Spain (5), Sweden (7).
37 As above, with Switzerland added.
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election movement may be down to actual party movements, but an unknown 
proportion will be ‘noise’. In other words, and in marked contrast to the expert surveys, 
the CMP approach overestimates the level of party policy change. In sum, each measure 
is plagued by its own measurement error problems. This makes it difficult to assess 
correlations among policy change within party programmes, as this measurement error 
will in both cases lead a researcher to commit a Type-II error, that is, fail to reject the 
null hypothesis of no association when in fact there is an association. This problem will 
need to be kept in mind during the empirical analysis that follows.
From static to dynamic interconnections: detailed expectations
The findings from the previous chapter are used to formulate predictions concerning the 
existence of dynamic interconnections. The predictions relate, first, to the amount 
parties move on each issue and, second, to the extent that policy change on two issues is 
similar and thus interconnected. Turning first to the amount of policy movement, the 
extent to which an issue is statically interconnected should indicate how much a party 
will tend to move. In the expert surveys, it is only possible to look at four issues, and of 
these four, only one -  decentralisation -  was clearly different from the other in terms of 
the overall strength of interconnections. I therefore expect greater movement on 
decentralisation than on the other three issues. For the manifestos, ten issues are 
available, and the differences in terms of the overall strength of static interconnections 
were greater. Figure 6.1 presents again the main summary of results from the previous 
chapter. The numbers to the right of the pyramid indicate the overall number of other 
policy areas linked to that one issue; for example, positions on education are statically 
connected to two other areas, EU and environment. The most weakly interconnected 
issues are urban-rural relations, education and democracy, while economic policy and
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culture-ethnic relations appear to be the most strongly linked. The other five issues are 
all moderately strongly linked: they are either weakly connected to most issues or 
strongly connected to a few. The former group is made up of liberal-authoritarianism 
and decentralisation, while the latter consists of foreign policy, environmental policy 
and EU integration.
Second, the results for the static interconnections can be used to predict the 
existence of dynamic interconnections. In the expert survey, only one of the relevant 
issue pairs (liberal-authoritarianism and decentralisation) appeared to be entirely 
unconnected, though the other five pairs did vary in the strength of their linkage. A 
ranking of this interconnection strength can be found in the third column of Table 6.1. 
For the manifestos, Figure 6.1 also presents the precise issue pairs for which static 
interconnections were found. A first and most simple approach would be to expect all 
static interconnections to be reproduced as dynamic linkages.
Yet it might be necessary to develop a more nuanced set of expectations. As 
already explored in the previous chapter, it is possible to divide static interconnections 
into those based on logic and those based on circumstance, and this distinction may 
help to improve the prediction of dynamic interconnections. A summary of the 
distinction between logic- and circumstance-based interconnections can be found in 
Table 6.1 for the expert surveys and in Figure 6.2 for the manifestos. Table 6.2 
summarises the reasons why the different issue pairs were assigned to either logic or 
circumstance. The distinctions between logic and circumstance are based, where 
possible, on previous discussions in the literature but are completed based on my own 
decisions. The disadvantage of this method is that it depends on a researcher-led 
identification of the sources of static interconnections. However, the other option would
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U rban-rural relations 
Education 
Decentralization 
EU
Environment 
Democracy 
Culture-ethnic matters 
Liberal-authoritarianism 
Foreign policy 
Economic policy
Amount o f added 
variance explained (R ‘
| more than .05 
between .02 to .05 
less than .02
Figure 6.1 Static policy interconnections in party manifestos
Note: T he n u m b er at the end o f  each row  rep resen ts  th e  to ta l nu m b er o f  
in te rconnec tions for each issue (e.g. 7 for econom ic po licy , 4 fo r fo re ign  p o licy  and  so 
on); each box  represen ts the sum m ary  o f  tw o  m ultip le  reg ressio n  m o d els  (e.g . the  box  at 
the bo tto m  left con ta ins the in form ation  on the reg ression , w ith  econom ic  po licy  as the 
dependen t, and  foreign  po licy  as the added  independen t v ariab le , as w ell as the 
reg ression  w ith  foreign  po licy  as the  dependent, and eco n o m ic  p o licy  as the added  
independen t variab le); boxes are on ly  shaded  w here th e  co e ffic ien t o f  the added  
v ariab le  is s ta tis tica lly  sign ifican t a t .1 or b e tte r (as in M odel 2, T ab le  5.4); the shad ings 
are b ased  on  the am ount o f  added variance  explained  by  the  ad d itio n a l v ariab le  (e.g. 
m ore  than  .05 fo r econom ic po licy  and  foreign policy , see  T ab le  5 .4); m ore  de ta iled  
resu lts in A p pend ix  5.1; data from  B udge et al. (2001) and  K lin g em an n  et al. (2007).
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be to discard the importance of this distinction altogether. I present the assumed basis 
for each connection openly in the table and figures below so that the reader can draw 
his or her own conclusions as to the plausibility of these claims. Finally, it is also 
necessary to note that only those issue pairs where a static interconnection was found 
are considered. While it would be possible to hypothesise either logic- or circumstance- 
based connections for issue pairs without static interconnections, this serves little 
purpose if the aim is to predict dynamic from static linkages.
Analysis and results: extent of policy change
The first hypothesis concerns the extent to which parties move on each distinct issue. 
Here, the level of policy change is presented for the expert surveys (Tables 6.3 and 6.4) 
and the manifesto data (Table 6.5). For the expert surveys, the mean absolute level of
“j o
change for each of the four issues available is shown. Given the findings for static 
interconnections in the previous chapter, I expected decentralisation to exhibit the most 
movement, as it was only weakly connected to the remaining issues. The other three 
issues are all strongly statically interconnected, so movement on these should be 
similarly low.
However, the differences between the levels of change are not clear-cut. The 
average change for liberal-authoritarianism was 1.28 points, 1.79 for environmental
on
policy, 1.81 for economic policy and 2.02 for decentralization. One issue -  liberal- 
authoritarianism -  thus sees the least policy movement overall; the difference in means 
is statistically significant at a .05 level compared to the other three issues. The other 
three issues are not statistically different from each other in their total movement, 
though decentralisation is, as predicted, the issue with the most policy change.
38 This was calculated as the absolute difference between the 2003 and 1989 positions.
39 All means are statistically different from 0 at a .05 significance level (one-sample t-test).
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Strength ranking, Logic or 
Issue 1 Issue 2 exp survey circumstance?
Economic policy Environment 1 L
Liberal-authoritarianism Environment 2 C
Economic policy Liberal-authoritarianism 3 C
Environment Decentralization 4 L
Economic policy Decentralization 5 C
Liberal-authoritarianism Decentralization 6 C
Table 6.1 Summary of expert survey findings and probable interconnection basis
Urban-rural relations 
Education 
Decentralization 
EU
Economic policy
Environment 
Democracy 
Culture-ethnic matters 
Liberal-authoritarianism 
Foreign policy
L L L
L C
L L C
C C C L L
C
L
C
C
C
L Logic-based static interconnection 
C Circumstance-based static interconnection
Figure 6.2 Probable interconnection basis for CMP issues
Note: L or C only indicated for issue pairs found to be statistically associated as static 
interconnections
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Issue 1 Issue 2 Logic or cirumstance?
Foreign policy 
Liberal-
authoritarianism
Culture-ethnic 
matters
Economic policy Environment 
EU
Decentralization
Urban-rural
relations
Culture-ethnic
matters
Foreign policy Democracy
Environment
Culture-ethnic
matters
Liberal-
Environment
authoritarianism
Decentralization
Urban-rural 
relations
Democracy
Culture-ethnic
Environment
matters
EU
Decentralization
Democracy Decentralization
EU
Environment Decentralization
Education
EU
Decentralization
Education
Urban-rural
relations
C No necessary economic implications
Distinct areas o f  political debate: Bobbio (1996), Finer (1987), Kitschelt (1994),
Kriesi et al. (2008)
Distinct areas ofpolitical debate: Bobbio (1996), Finer (1987), Kitschelt (1994), 
Kriesi et al. (2008)
L Environmental policy can have economic consequences (and vice versa)
The EU is partly an economic project (Kriesi et al. 2008, Marks and Hooghe 
2009)
C No necessary economic connection: Hix(2007)
L Support for fanners has economic implications
L Both policy areas can be influenced by (internationalism and multiculturalism 
L Foreign policy can be linked with a desire to spread democracy
C No necessary mutual implications
These two issues are part o f the underlying value o f  community and fraternity 
(Kitschelt 1994)
C No necessary implications 
C No necessary implications 
C No necessary implications
^  A concern for improved democracy is linked to a concern with nationalism 
and minority protection (Kitschelt 1994)
These two issues are part o f  the underlying value o f  community and fraternity 
(Kitschelt 1994)
^ The EU is an international project, often opposed on national sovereignty 
grounds (Marks and Hooghe 2009)
L Decentralization can be supported due to ethnic/national motivations 
C No necessary link between democracy and decentralization
C No necessary implications
A desire to protect the environment is often linked with a desire for 
decentralization o f decision-making (community involvement) (Kitschelt 1994)
C No necessary implications
L Both issues affect governance structures o f  the state 
C No necessary implications
L The EUhas implications for farmer due to large support for agriculture
Table 6.2 Interconnection basis of CMP issues
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All parties
mean st.d. n
Economic policy 1.81 1.57 118
Liberal-authoritarianism 1.28 1.44 116
Environment 1.79 1.61 118
Decentralization 2.02 1.99 112
Table 6.3 Absolute change in policy positions between 1989 and 2003
Note: Data from Laver and Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006).
Table 6.4 shows the differences between party families.40 The levels of change 
on liberal-authoritarianism (low) and decentralisation (high) is constant across families. 
Issues that are core features of that family tend to be those that exhibit the least change. 
For example, Green parties change least on environmental policy: the mean change 
between 1989 and 2003 was less than one point, with a low standard deviation. 
Similarly, Liberal parties are most stable on economic policy, though the mean absolute 
change is not statistically significant from the other issues. An interesting exception to 
this is the level of change on economic policy among social democratic parties, which
Communists Greens Social Democrats
mean st.d. n mean st.d. n mean st.d. n
Economic policy 1.31 1.82 14 2.48 2.00 10 1.77 1.59 26
Liberal-authoritarianism 1.09 0.93 14 1.32 1.51 10 0.82 0.56 25
Environment 1.63 1.62 14 0.76 0.75 10 1.58 1.11 26
Decentralization 2.19 1.88 14 3.12 3.48 10 1.22 1.29 26
Liberals Christian Democrats Conservatives
mean st.d. n mean st.d. n mean st.d. n
Economic policy 1.79 1.09 14 2.33 1.83 14 1.50 1.58 16
Liberal-authoritarianism 2.10 1.50 14 1.65 1.27 14 1.57 2.59 16
Environment 2.48 2.02 14 1.65 1.24 14 1.42 1.56 16
Decentralization 2.22 2.45 14 2.56 2.16 14 1.83 1.15 16
Table 6.4 Absolute change in party positions between 1989 and 2003 by party
family
Note: Data from Laver and Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006).
40 Again, all means were different from 0, using a .05 significance level.
208
probably reflects this party family’s general move to the economic centre in the years in 
question.
The evidence from the manifesto data is potentially more useful than the expert surveys, 
which only cover change between two time points.41 Table 6.5 shows the level of 
absolute change for the manifesto data. First, it is worth briefly describing how this 
information is presented in this table. Total policy movement is measured as the level of 
absolute change proportional to the total salience of the issue at t-1. This way of 
measuring change is calculated because the raw level of change may not give an 
accurate picture of the extent of policy movement. For example, a party may use 30 per 
cent of its t-1 manifesto to state its economic policy and 5 per cent to state its position 
on decentralisation. A 5 per cent change to the left or right between t-1 and t on 
economic policy is therefore not as large a change as it is for decentralisation. Medians 
are also shown, as the means may be skewed by large outliers. Change is only shown 
for parties where the salience of the topic was greater than 1 per cent in both 
manifestos(at t-1 and t).
In the manifesto data, two issues were found to be particularly strongly 
interconnected in static terms, economic policy and culture/ethnic matters. On the other 
hand, three issues showed low levels of static interconnection overall: democracy, 
urban-rural relations and education. I therefore expect movement to be relatively low on 
the first two issues and relatively high on the second three. The remaining five issues 
were expected to exhibit medium levels of policy change.
41 In addition, the expert surveys contain information on three issues that exhibited strong static 
interconnections and only one with weak static interconnections (decentralisation), making generalizable 
conclusions difficult.
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all p arties  
m ean st. dev. m ed ian  n
D ecen tra liza tion 0.91 1.50 0.55 1078
E U 1.14 2.47 0.53 810
U rb an -ru ra l relations 0.93 2.16 0.52 1234
L ib era l-au th oritarian ism 1.17 3.45 0.51 1468
E n v iron m en t 1.02 2.13 0.50 1048
D em ocracy 0.89 1.79 0.47 1635
E d u cation 0.83 1.80 0.47 1350
C u ltu re/eth n ic  m atters 0.80 1.46 0.46 1602
F oreign  p olicy 0.71 1.95 0.36 1586
E con om ic p olicy 0.52 1.60 0.30 1796
Table 6.5 Absolute change in party positions using CMP-extracted data
Note: Ordered in descending order by median value; change measured as proportional 
change relative to party position at t-1; data from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann 
et al. (2007).
The median level of policy change is indeed lowest for economic policy, closely 
followed by foreign policy. These two issues are also identified as characterised by 
strong interconnections. However, the other eight issues do not differ greatly in their 
median level of policy change. As expected, policy change is relatively large in policy 
areas such as decentralisation and urban-rural relations. However, two issues that were 
expected to be relatively average in their extent of change -  EU integration and 
environmental policy -  actually exhibit relatively high levels of change. A striking 
difference to the expert survey data is the position of liberal-authoritarianism. While the 
expert survey showed this to be particularly stable (somewhat contrary to expectations), 
here the issue is relatively flexible.42
42 The differences may stem from the different source o f information or the longer time frame used in the 
manifesto data.
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Overall, the manifesto data thus shows support, albeit relatively weak, for the 
hypothesis that policy change is lower for issues that are strongly statically 
interconnected. Two issues that are strongly interconnected -  economic and, to a lesser 
extent, foreign policy -  tend to exhibit relatively low levels of policy change, while 
some weakly connected issues -  primarily decentralisation and urban-rural relations -  
are characterised by particularly high levels of such change. For other issues, the 
findings are less clear, perhaps due the difficulty of measuring this indicator.
Analysis and results: dynamic interconnections
I now move on to the analysis of dynamic interconnections. For each data source, I 
begin by mapping the existence of such interconnections before comparing the results 
with the findings for static interconnections.
Expert surveys
For the expert surveys, the key variable is policy change on each of the four issues. This 
was calculated by subtracting the 1989 position from the 2003 position. Positive values 
thus signify a move to the right by the party, negative values a shift to the left. The 
results are presented in two different ways: as a principal components analysis and as 
separate regressions for change in each issue. The PCA results serve a mainly des 
criptive and presentational purpose: they give a quick overall understanding of the 
relationship between changes on each issue (Table 6.6). The regressions (with change 
on one issue as the dependent and change on the other three issues as independent 
variables) indicate the level o f statistical significance and the magnitude of the
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Comp 1 Comp 2 Unexplained
E con om ic p olicy 0.57 0.19 0.51
L ib era l-au th oritarian ism -0.01 0 .97 0.04
E n viron m en t 0.67 -0.14 0.37
D ecen tra liza tion 0.47 -0.01 0.70
E igen va lu e 1.36 1.01
V arian ce  exp lain ed 0.3399 0.2541
n 110
Table 6.6 Principal component analysis of policy change between 1989 and 2003
Note: components with Eigenvalues over 1 extracted; varimax rotation used and rotated 
components shown; data from Laver and Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006).
relationship (Table 6.7).43
Policy change tends to be correlated on only one of the six issue pairs: economic 
and environmental policy. The PCA table presents the results for all 110 parties for 
which data on positional change is available. Here, we see that economic policy and 
environmental policy load strongly onto the first component. Liberal-authoritarianism 
loads onto a separate component in the PCA. The results for decentralisation are a little 
unclear, as it seems to load onto the first component; however, the unexplained variance 
is very high, so it is safer to conclude that this issue, like liberal-authoritarianism, is 
independent of the others.
These results are confirmed by the regression results. Holding movement on 
liberal-authoritarianism and decentralisation constant, a one-point move to the right 
on environmental policy is predicted to be mirrored by a 0.28 point move to the right 
on economic policy. While these two issues are thus dynamically interconnected, 
liberal-authoritarianism tends to be independent across the board. This means that 
party movement on this issue between 1989 and 2003 did not tend to correlate with
43 Regressions were run using robust standard errors clustered by country.
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DV:Economic policy DV: Environment
b std.err. b std.err.
Liberal-authoritarianism 0.08 0.19 Economic policy 0.23*** 0.08
Environment 0.28*** 0.08 Liberal-authoritarianism -0.06 0 .1 0
Decentralization 0 .0 2 0 .1 2 Decentralization 0.13** 0.05
Constant -0.19 0.24 Constant 0.55** 0.23
R2 0.07 R2 0 .1 0
n 1 1 0 n 1 1 0
DV: Liberal- DV: Decentralization
authoritarianism b std.err. b std.err.
Economic policy 0.06 0.14 Liberal-authoritarianism 0.04 0 .1 2
Environment -0.05 0.09 Economic policy 0.03 0.17
Decentralization 0 .0 2 0.06 Environment 0.24 0.15
Constant -0.24 0.26 Constant 0.60** 0.23
R2 0 .0 1 R2 0.04
n 1 1 0 n 1 1 0
Table 6.7 Regression results, policy change between 1989 and 2003
Note: *: p<.l, **: p<.05, ***: p<.01; data from Laver and Hunt (1992) and Benoit and 
Laver (2006).
movement on other issues. Decentralisation movement is not tied to economic policy or 
liberal-authoritarianism, but there is some evidence of a weak link to environmental 
policy.
This pattern is illustrated in Figure 6.3, which presents the predicted regression lines for 
change on liberal-authoritarianism, environmental policy and decentralisation, with 
economic policy change as the dependent variable. The results are taken from Table 
6.7. It is clear that there is little association between change on either liberal- 
authoritarianism or decentralisation on the one hand, and change on economic policy on 
the other. For environmental policy change, there is a definite link to economic policy 
change. However, the strength of this dynamic interconnection is not very impressive: 
a five-point move to the right on environmental policy -  quite an extreme shift -  would 
lead to a rightward adjustment on economic policy of little over one point.
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Economic Policy: 
Change
in
o
in
CNI
in
i
-2.5■5 0 2.5 5
Change on independent variable issue
Li beral-Authoritarianism
------------Environment
.............. Decentral izaton
Figure 6.3 Predicted change in economic policy positions based on change in three
other policy positions
Note: Predictions drawn from regression shown in Table 6.7; data from Laver and Hunt 
(1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006).
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Strength ranking, Logic or Dynamic
Issue 1 Issue 2 exp survey circumstance interconnection
Economic policy Environment 1 L Y
Liberal-authoritarianism Environment 2 C N
Economic policy Liberal-authoritarianism 3 C N
Environment Decentralization 4 L Y
Economic policy Decentralization 5 C N
Liberal-authoritarianism Decentralization 6  C N
Table 6.8 Comparison of results for static and dynamic interconnections, expert
surveys
Note: Information drawn from Table 6.1 and Table 6.7; data from Laver and Hunt 
(1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006).
These results are compared to the expectations in Table 6.8. The issue pair with 
the strongest static interconnections is the one that is the most clearly associated in 
dynamic terms as well: economic policy and the environment. This was also seen as an 
issue with logical linkages. The second issue pair with dynamic interconnections, albeit 
far weaker, was environment and decentralisation, which was also characterised by 
weak, logical static interconnections. Overall, no interconnection identified as logical 
was reproduced in dynamic terms. Interestingly, while the cross-sectional results on 
static interconnections indicated that liberal-authoritarianism and economic policy were 
strongly linked, this does not seem to have an effect on party movement. This may 
confirm that the strong static interconnection is in fact mostly due to circumstance.
A final finding that is common to both the PCA and the regressions is that 
dynamic interconnections are weaker than static interconnections. Just two issue pairs 
are dynamically linked, compared to the five that were connected in static terms. 
Moreover, the Eigenvalues for the two components in the PCA are far lower (1.36 and 
1.01, respectively) than for the static interconnections, where the first component had 
an Eigenvalue close to 3 for both surveys. Looking at the regressions, the explained
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variance is always very low (at .10 or less). The explained variance for the static 
interconnections was far higher, to the extent that multicollinearity presented problems 
of interpretation. It appears that dynamic interconnections are relatively rare and weak 
overall, reflecting the fact that this is a far more demanding type of linkage between 
issues.
Overall, the findings from the expert survey are twofold. First, issue pairs differ 
in the extent to which parties move together on them. While policy change on some 
issues is largely independent, on other issues there is clear evidence of an association. 
Second, the nature of these differences between issue pairs is systematic. The static 
interconnections found in the previous chapter are a relatively good predictor of the 
extent of joint policy movement, but only if logic and circumstance-based static 
interconnections are distinguished. For example, the weaker-than-expected links 
between movement on economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism may reflect the 
logical independence of these two issues.
Manifesto data
The extent to which policy movement on different issues is linked was also examined 
for the manifesto data. Here, the model used requires somewhat more elaboration. 
Separate regressions were run for policy change for each issue pair, with each of the 
two issues once used as the dependent variable.44 The dependent variable in each 
regression is the raw change in the party’s policy position on the first issue (A), that is, 
the percentage of positive (‘left’) statements subtracted from the percentage of negative 
(‘right’) statements. The main independent variable is the raw change in the policy 
position on the other issue of the pair (B). While this set-up was sufficient for the expert
44 A PCA could have been run for the manifesto data, but due to the different sample sizes for each issue 
pair because o f  the salience requirement, this would not have provided useful results.
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survey, the analysis of the manifesto data requires further controls due to the unique 
nature of the positional information; some of these are similar to the controls required in 
the previous chapter.
First, it is worth controlling for changes in position within the whole party 
system. In the expert surveys, we can assume that party positions are usually assessed at 
least partly in comparison to a system-specific median position. This means that broad 
changes in policy positions across all parties are already controlled for. In manifestos, 
however, the balance of positive and negative statements made by a party may change 
due to a systemic shift in the content of party competition. This does not mean that the 
party has really ‘moved’ on that issue, as its relative position to other parties has stayed 
the same. In the regressions I will therefore control for the systemic change in party 
positions. This is calculated as the average raw change for all parties in that party 
system, excluding the party in question.45 So, two further variables are included: 
systemic position change between t-1 and t for A and B.
Second, the observations for the manifesto data are not completely independent, 
a characteristic that already needed to be taken into account in the previous chapter. 
Issue salience (that is, the percentage of sentences devoted to a topic) varies strongly 
and will influence the level of change that is possible and likely. As a result, it is 
necessary to control for the salience of each issue analysed. So, four further variables 
are included as controls: the total salience of issues A and B at t-1 and the change in 
salience between t-1 and t for A and B.
However, including salience as a control is not possible for all issues, so that the 
specification of the model had to be adapted for certain regressions, as was already 
necessary in the previous chapter. First, the change in the salience of environment and
45 All parties included in the dataset and scoring more than 1 per cent o f  the vote are taken into account.
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urban-rural relations had to be dropped due to the lack of negative mentions in the CMP 
coding scheme. On four further issues, one side of the argument is not used by parties 
even though positive and negative mentions exist; this applies to liberal- 
authoritarianism, democracy, education and decentralisation. For these issues, salience 
change could thus also not be included. For liberal-authoritarianism, the correlation 
reaches r=.98; for decentralisation, it is still r=.77.46 All other issues have correlations 
with raw salience change under .7, so this additional variable was included for these 
issues.
Finally, it is important to exclude issues that are not salient within the political 
system. In other words, only issues that are salient at both t-1 and t are worth examining 
if one is to assess the correlation among policy movements: otherwise, it makes little 
sense to speak of a policy movement.41 I therefore exclude from my analyses cases 
where the total salience is lower than 1 per cent of the manifesto at t-1 and t for issues 
A and B. The number of cases excluded depends on the issue pair: while almost all 
parties address economic policy, fewer than half consider EU integration. A final 
concern are elections-specific factors that may affect party policy shifts; this is 
addressed by using robust standard errors clustered by election (as is done in Adams 
and Somer-Topcu, forthcoming). Country-specific factors were taken into account by 
adding country dummies to the regression model.
Before moving on to the results for all issue pairs, I will briefly describe in more 
detail the regression results for one issue pair, economic policy and foreign policy, as 
an example of my general methodological approach (Table 6.9). Model 1 contains the 
results, without the key independent variable, for change in the foreign policy position;
46 For democracy, the correlation is r=.8 6 ; for education, it is r=.93.
47 Of course, this is not to say that the case of a change from not salient to salient is not worth studying as 
well.
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Dependent variable: Model 1 Model 2
economic policy (change) b std. err. b std. err.
Foreign policy: change, t-1 to t 0.12** 0.05
Previous position
Economic policy, t-1 -0.30*** 0.03 -0.31*** 0.03
Foreign policy, t-1 0.18*** 0.04 0.23*** 0.04
Systemic change
Economic policy: systemic change 0.18*** 0.05 0.18*** 0.05
Foreign policy: systemic change 0.02 0.06 -0.00 0.06
Salience variables
Economic policy: Salience, t-1 0.11** 0.04 0 i |*** 0.04
Foreign policy: Salience, t-1 -0.05 0.05 -0.08* 0.05
Economic policy: Salience change -0.07 0.05 -0.07 0.05
Foreign policy: Salience change 0.02 0.04 0.08** 0.04
Constant -0.12 0.66 -0.19 0.66
R2 0.187 0.1908
n 1347 1347
Table 6.9 Example of a multiple linear regression using CMP-extracted party
positions
Note: Model 1 includes all controls for previous position, systemic change and salience 
for both the dependent-variable and the independent-variable issue; Model 2 adds the 
raw position change on the independent variable issue; *: p<.l, **: p<.05, ***: p<.01; 
standard errors clustered by election; data from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et 
al. (2007).
this is added in Model 2. The controls are the previous policy position, the level of 
systemic change, and the previous salience and change in salience. These three types of 
controls are included for both issues. Most of them do not change with the inclusion of 
the change in foreign policy position, both in terms of significance or magnitude. No 
specific expectations were linked to these controls, but it is interesting to note that 
economic policy change tends to be similar to more general systemic changes in 
position. Foreign policy change itself is clearly significant. For each percentage move to 
the right on foreign policy, parties are expected to move .12 percentage points to the
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right on economic policy. The level of variance explained only increases marginally 
here, rising from 18.7% to 19.08%.
Similar regressions were run for all issue pairs. A summary version of the 
results of these regressions is presented in Figure 6.4, which is based on the added 
variance explained by Model 2 compared to Model 1. In other words, each issue pair is 
shaded in to the extent to which policy change on one of the two issues helps explain 
policy change on the other issue, that is, whether including policy change on the 
independent variable issue adds anything in terms of the explanatory power of the 
statistical model. To take the models described above, the additional explained variance 
for economic and foreign policy is less than one per cent.48 The relevant area is thus 
shaded in as the relationship is significant, but the shading is a light colour as the added 
variance explained is low. Appendix 6.1 presents more detailed results for those issue 
pairs where a statistically significant relationship was found, together with the relevant 
coefficient of change of the independent-variable issue and the added amount of 
explained variance (measured by the R2-value).
Even a quick glance at Figure 6.4 shows that issues clearly vary in the extent to 
which they are dynamically interconnected with others. Liberal-authoritarianism and 
culture-ethnic matters are significantly linked with six other issues, out of nine possible 
interconnections. Four issues are only interconnected with two others (education, EU, 
decentralisation and democracy). Economic policy is linked with just three other topics. 
Foreign policy, the environment and urban-rural relations are connected with four other 
issues each. The three issue pairs with the strongest dynamic interconnections are 
economic policy and EU; liberal-authoritarianism and the environment; and liberal- 
authoritarianism and urban-rural relations.
48 The added variance explained is equally low if  the dependent and independent variables (i.e. economic 
and foreign policy) are reversed.
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Urban-rural relations 4 
Education 
Decentralization 
EU
Environment 
Dem ocracy 
Culture-ethnic matters 
Liberal-authoritarianism 
Foreign policy 
Economic policy
Amount of added >02
variance explained >.0 l and<. 02
<.01
(R2)
Figure 6.4 Dynamic interconnections using CMP-extracted policy positions
Note: T he num ber at the end o f  each row  rep resen ts the to ta l n u m b er o f  
in te rconnec tions fo r each issue (e.g. 3 for econom ic  po licy , 4 fo r foreign  po licy  an d  so 
on); each  b o x  represen ts the sum m ary  o f  tw o  m ultip le  reg ression  m odels (e.g. the  b o x  at 
the  bo tto m  left con tains the in fo rm ation  on the regression  w ith  econom ic  p o licy  as the 
d ependen t, and  foreign  po licy  as the added  in dependen t v ariab le , as w ell as the 
reg ressio n  w ith  foreign po licy  as the dependen t, and econom ic  p o licy  as the  added  
in d ep en d en t variab le); boxes are on ly  shaded  w here the  coeffic ien t o f  the  added  
v ariab le  is s ta tis tica lly  sign ifican t a t .1 or b e tte r (as in M odel 2, T ab le  6 .9); the shad ings 
a re  b ased  on the am ount o f  added variance  explained  b y  the  add itional v ariab le  (e.g. 
less than  .01 for econom ic po licy  and foreign  policy , see T ab le  6 .9); m ore  de ta iled  
resu lts  in A ppend ix  6.1; data from  B udge et al. (2001) and  K lingem ann  et al. (2007).
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Figure 6.5 compares these results to the findings for static interconnections 
using the manifesto data. Issue pairs with both static and dynamic interconnections are 
marked in grey, with static-only pairs highlighted by an ‘S’ and dynamic-only pairs 
with ‘D’. For example, economic policy is linked statically and dynamically to foreign 
policy, the environment and the EU, but only statically to liberal-authoritarianism, 
culture-ethnic matters, decentralisation and urban-rural relations.
A first conclusion from this comparison is that some issues tend to be far less 
connected to other issues in dynamic terms than in static terms. Economic policy has 
seven static and three dynamic interconnections; EU integration, six and one; 
decentralisation, five and two; and environment, six and four. The other issues do not 
differ as strongly between the two types of linkages. This means that the New Politics 
issues -  culture/ethnic matters, environment, liberal-authoritarianism and democracy -  
appear to be similarly strongly connected in both static and dynamic terms, while other 
issues are less frequently dynamically interconnected. But this broad comparison only 
provides a first impression of the differences between static and dynamic 
interconnections.
Second, it is possible to assess whether static interconnections in general predict 
dynamic linkages. Overall, the predictive power appears rather limited. Out of a total of 
45 issues, both types of interconnections are found on only 10 issue pairs and neither 
type on 14. This means that 24 of the 45 issue pairs are correctly classified: about 
50 per cent. Counted differently: 10 issue pairs with static interconnections exhibit 
dynamic interconnections, compared to 14 pairs with static linkages that do not. In 
other words, there appears to be a less than 50 per cent chance that a static 
interconnection will also be mirrored by a dynamic interconnection. This is a less than 
impressive result. Overall, it therefore seems that static interconnections (that is, the
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Urban-rural relations
Education D
Decentralization D
EU S S S
Environment S S
Democracy D S
Culture-ethnic matters S ■ S ! D D
Liberal-authoritarianism H H S D
Foreign policy » ■ s
Economic policy S S S S
f f f p j J I  both static and dynamic interconnections 
S static interconnection only 
D dynamic interconnection only
Figure 6.5 Comparison of results for static and dynamic interconnections, CMP-
extracted party positions
Note: S haded  boxes are  issue pairs w ith both  static an d  dynam ic in terconnections; 
b o x es m arked  respec tive ly  w ith ‘S ’ and ‘D ’ have sta tic  o r dynam ic  in terconnections 
only; in fo rm ation  d raw n from  F igure  6.1 and F igure 6.4.
em pirica l reg u la rity  o f  p ositional association) do  no t p ro v id e  a usefu l gu ide to the 
ex istence  o f  jo in t m ovem ent.
D istin gu ish ing  betw een  log ic- and c ircu m stan ce-b ased  static in terconnections 
im proves the  ab ility  to p red ic t the ex istence o f  dynam ic  in terconnections. O f  the tw elv e  
issue pairs  w ith  static  linkages that I iden tified  as c ircu m stan ce-b ased , on ly  th ree  
exh ib it dynam ic  in terconnections. O n the o ther hand, seven  o f  the tw elve  issue p a irs  
id en tified  as h av ing  log ical static in terconnections also h av e  dynam ic  linkages. In to tal, 
16 out o f  24 issues, o r abou t 67 p e r cent, are c lassified  co rrec tly . T his is obv io u sly  no t a
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perfect record. However, it is reasonable to conclude that circumstance-based static 
interconnections are unlikely to be replicated in dynamic terms. The evidence is weaker 
for the inverse conclusion for logic-based static interconnections: it is less clear that 
these are always replicated as dynamic linkages. Overall, this approach clearly 
improves on the approach using the simple existence of a static interconnection as a 
means of predicting dynamic interconnections, so distinguishing between logic and 
circumstance as sources of linkages is clearly worthwhile. Of course, the drawback of 
this method is that it depends on the prior identification of these sources of static 
interconnections, which in this case was a researcher-led process.
Looking at the actual issue pairs that exhibit dynamic interconnections, there is 
support for the understanding of issue connections that sees a fundamental division 
between economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism, as outlined in the previous 
chapter. Movement on economic policy is relatively independent from change on other 
issues. While its position was statically connected with six issues, economic policy 
change is associated only with similar change on foreign policy, environmental policy 
and EU integration. Conversely, there is a clear grouping of issues on which parties 
tend to move together: liberal-authoritarianism, culture/ethnic matters, education and 
urban-rural relations. This group of issues can be seen as a variant of the New Politics 
dimension, with an emphasis on the Hooghe et al.’s (2002) traditional/ 
authoritarian/nationalist elements of this ideological divide.49 This impression is 
strengthened by the fact that parties move on all of these issues independently of 
economic policy. While decentralisation is relatively independent as an issue, it is 
weakly linked to culture/ethnic relations and urban-rural relations, so it could be said to 
form part of this group, at least at the margins.
49 Education is not usually seen as a New Politics issue. That said, its place in party competition is only 
rarely addressed in any case.
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In addition, the two other issues -  decentralisation and EU integration, which 
are far more independent in terms of movement than expected -  were identified as 
issues whose interconnections are largely context-dependent. Finally, I suggested that 
some issues may be associated with both economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism. 
Here, this applies to environmental policy. While movement on the environment is 
predicted to occur jointly with movement on liberal-authoritarianism and culture/ethnic 
relations, its links to economic policy change are also significant.50
A final conclusion is that dynamic interconnections are again weaker than static 
interconnections. There are fewer significant linkages overall (17 compared to 23), 
despite the far larger dataset used to examine dynamic links. Moreover, the amount of 
variance explained by the variable for policy change added to each basic regression 
model is also lower. Of course, given the different datasets, it is not possible to directly 
compare the R2 values, but the overall impression is that dynamic linkages are less 
frequent. This confirms the initial finding from the expert surveys.
A look at the six main issue pairs present in both data sources provides a useful 
summary of the core findings (Table 6.10). First, all three issue pairs identified as 
having only circumstance-based static interconnections fail to exhibit dynamic linkages. 
Therefore, the above conclusion that a static connection based on circumstance is 
unlikely to be replicated in dynamic terms applies to both data sources. Logic is less 
clear a guide. The issue pair with the strongest logical static interconnection -  economic 
policy and environment -  is indeed consistently also dynamically linked. Two other 
issue pairs, liberal-authoritarianism and environment and environment and 
decentralisation should be logically connected and exhibit static links, albeit slightly 
weaker than for economic policy and environment. However, the static links between
50 A similar pattern also applies to foreign policy, which is clearly linked to economic policy, but also 
significantly associated with liberal-authoritarianism, culture/ethnic matters and democracy.
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Issue 1 Issue 2
Strength of static interconnection Logic or 
circumstance
Dynamic
interconnection
ES (ranking) CMP (0-3) ES CMP
Economic policy Environment 1 2 L Y Y
Liberal-authoritarianism Environment 2 1 C N Y
Economic policy Liberal-authoritarianism 3 2 C N N
Environment Decentralization 4 0 L Y N
Economic policy Decentralization 5 1 C N N
Liberal-authoritarianism Decentralization 6 2 C N N
Table 6.10 Summary of findings for four core issues, expert surveys and CMP
Note: Information drawn from Figures 6.1 and 6.4 and Table 6.8.
these two pairs are not clearly mirrored at the dynamic level. Nevertheless, logic seems 
to be at least a precondition for dynamic interconnections, even if not all logic-based 
static linkages are also associated in terms of policy change.
Conclusion
This chapter has considered the existence of dynamic interconnections within party 
ideologies, that is, the extent to which issue pairs are linked to one another in terms of 
party policy change. Such interconnections should be seen as an additional limitation on 
the complete freedom of movement predicted by the pure Downsian model of party 
competition. Vote-maximising parties cannot pick and choose a policy mix as they 
wish, but instead are constrained by the fact that policy areas are not independent of one 
another. Ideological adjustment on one issue can require a similar change on another 
issue within the party’s policy profile. One consequence of this is that parties might be 
less willing to move on issues that are characterised by tight static interconnections, 
since such a policy change would need to lead to a broader ideological repositioning of 
the party. In this chapter, some evidence was found -  albeit relatively weak -  that
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parties do indeed move less on issues that were found to be tightly interconnected in 
static terms.
There are important differences between static and dynamic interconnections. 
First, static interconnections occur more frequently and are stronger than dynamic 
interconnections. This result was found for both expert surveys and party manifestos. 
Of course, some of this result may be due to the problems with measurement error 
described above. Nevertheless, the findings are likely to reflect the fact that the 
requirements for dynamic interconnections to exist are probably higher than for static 
interconnections. A distinction should be made between logic- and circumstance-based 
static interconnections. While the former are likely to be reproduced in dynamic terms, 
there is much less of a reason for circumstantial linkages to lead to dynamic linkages. 
This was also found when considering the precise issue pairs for which policy change is 
interconnected. Static linkages based on circumstance were not in general mirrored by 
dynamic linkages. Conversely, logic-based static linkages were frequently also present 
in dynamic terms. A logical association between policy areas is an important 
precondition for the existence of dynamic interconnections. For example, static 
interconnections were present for economic policy on the one hand and environment 
and liberal-authoritarianism on the other. Economics and the environment are logically 
linked, and, as expected, dynamic interconnections were also found for this issue pair in 
both datasets. Economics and liberal-authoritarianism, on the other hand, are more 
circumstantially associated, and here no dynamic interconnections were found. The 
constraints for party movement therefore occur when distinct issue pairs are linked 
through an underlying logic.
Parties compete on various issues and change their policies in the course of this 
electoral competition. However, movement on one policy area is not independent of
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changes on other topics. Thus, dynamic interconnections do exist in party ideologies. 
However, these interconnections are weaker than static interconnections, and static 
linkages are only reproduced dynamically if they are based on logic. Given these 
findings, dynamic interconnections are a constraint on the policy choices of political 
parties. Ideological adjustments reflect the logical connections between issue areas, so 
parties are not free to move on each policy separately since they care about ideological 
coherence. Instead, the links between issues are taken into account by parties seeking to 
change their ideological package. As a result, it is not possible for parties to combine 
positions on different issues at will in order to maximise votes, thus limiting the 
applicability of pure Downsian approaches to party competition.
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Appendix 6.1 Detailed results, dynamic interconnections using CMP-extracted 
party positions
Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 2 —> Issue 1 Issue 1 —> Issue 2 n
b R2 increase b R2 increase
Economic policy Foreign policy 0.12 0.38 0.04 0.22 1347
Economic policy EU -0.78 4.62 -0.08 3.32 551
Economic policy Environment -0.15 0.55 -.05* 0.51 799
Foreign policy Liberal-authoritarianism 0.06 0.8 0.17 0.9 974
Foreign policy Democracy 0.13 1.03 0.18 1.43 1146
Foreign policy Culture-ethnic matters .13* 1.05 0.12 0.85 1135
Liberal-authoritarianism Culture-ethnic matters 0.14 0.97 0.09 0.74 1051
Liberal-authoritarianism EU 0.21 0.42 .03* 0.24 440
Liberal-authoritarianism Education 0.21 0.84 0.05 0.73 826
Liberal-authoritarianism Environment -0.24 2.06 -0.11 2.05 645
Li beral-authoritarianism Urban-rural relations -0.28 2.57 -0.11 2.64 675
Culture-ethnic matters Decentralization 0.15 0.23 .07* 0.42 676
Culture-ethnic matters Education 0.21 1.1 0.1 1.53 932
Culture-ethnic matters Environment -0.1 0.36 -0.11 0.85 719
Culture-ethnic matters Urban-rural relations -0.8 0.29 not significant 800
Decentralization Urban-rural relations .06* 0.47 0.11 0.49 479
Democracy Environment 0.1 0.5 0.08 0.66 695
Education Urban-rural relations -0.07 0.41 -0.09 0.43 623
All coefficients significant at less than p<.05 unless marked by * (p<.l).
Issue 2--> Issue 1: Issue 2 change regressed onto Issue 1 change (and vice versa).
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Chapter 7
Issue salience and policy interconnections
In the seventh season of the TV show The West Wing, campaign manager Josh Lyman 
argues that winning elections is not about policies at all: ‘People think that campaigns 
are about two competing answers to the same question. They're not. They're a fight over 
the question itself.’51 Like Lyman, some political scientists have suggested that politics is 
actually about the importance or salience of each conflict rather than the actual content 
of parties’ positions (Schattschneider, 1960; Budge and Farlie, 1983). While we do not 
have to go as far as Lyman (or Budge and Farlie), who argue that electoral competition is 
all about differences in salience, it is nevertheless sensible to see issue importance as a 
key attribute of party programmes and another influential strategic tool that can be used 
to affect electoral success.
The focus in most party competition literature, and indeed in the thesis so far, has 
been on the ideological content of each party stance -  how liberal the party is, how 
environmental or how pro-European -  and how these views are linked to one another. 
Yet, parties compete on different policy areas not just by taking up different and 
opposing positions: they also distinguish themselves in terms of the importance and 
emphasis they place on different issues. Parties differ in the extent to which they decide 
to emphasise or avoid certain topics. An issue can be given prominence in campaign 
literature, manifestos and speeches -  but a party could also decide to cut certain topics
51 From Season 7, Episode 2 o f The West Wing,
h ttp://www.westwingtranscripts.com/search.php?flag=getTranscript&id= 136. Accessed 11 February 2009.
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out of their electoral appeals. Following Budge and Farlie (1983), this attribute of 
parties’ policy packages is generally termed ‘issue salience’ and is the second main 
feature of the components that make up issue systems.
Like choosing and altering policy positions, salience manipulation is a strategic 
element of competitive behaviour: parties try to modify issue salience in order to achieve 
political gains (Riker, 1986; Meguid, 2005). Issue salience is important because it 
influences individual voting decisions (Netjes and Binnema, 2007; Tavits, 2008). For 
example, voters change their evaluation of a political party depending on whether that 
party shares their personal priorities (van der Brug, 2004). Since voters at least partly 
make up their mind based on issue salience, elections are also decided by issue 
importance and not just issue positions. As a result, parties have a strong incentive to 
compete in terms of salience as well as position. Issue salience has thus been suggested 
as a central feature of the strategic behaviour of political parties.
Like Josh Lyman in The West Wing, some even argue that it is the only important 
feature of party competition (Budge and Farlie, 1983). Schattschneider (1960) thus 
reduces politics to a ‘conflict of conflicts’, where electoral campaigns are battles to 
decide which are the key issues facing the country. This is encapsulated by political 
statements in the vein of ‘what this election is really about is x \  The importance of 
salience may lie in its relative flexibility: it has been argued that parties can modify issue 
importance more easily than issue positions, increasing its influence on party strategies 
(Petrocik, 1996). Yet to completely neglect positions in favour of salience is perhaps too 
strong a view and just as flawed as only considering issue positions. More recently, 
spatial approaches to party competition have thus favoured the integration of both issue 
attributes as complementary aspects of political strategies (Meguid, 2005; Benoit and 
Laver, 2006; Tavits, 2008). This is also the approach taken here.
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In this chapter, salience interconnections are examined and compared to 
positional interconnections. Three core questions are at the centre of this chapter. First, 
to what extent do issues exhibit static interconnections in terms of salience? Second, to 
what extent are issues dynamically interconnected in their salience levels, and are these 
patterns related to static salience interconnections? Finally, what is the relationship 
between positional interconnections and salience interconnections? In approach and 
research design, this chapter is therefore closely based on Chapters 3 and 4 and will cite 
the relevant results as the basis for comparison.
This chapter is structured as follows. In the first section I describe existing 
salience theories of party competition before considering the potential nature of salience 
interconnections and the extent to which they should mirror positional interconnections. I 
then detail the measurement approach before presenting the results of the empirical 
analysis of static and dynamic salience interconnections. Before concluding, I compare 
my findings to the results on positional interconnections.
Issue salience and party competition
While salience theories form an important sub-group of the vast literature on party 
competition, they also constitute a field that has remained relatively under-developed, 
with few major extensions to the original research. I introduce the main claims of the key 
theories below and then consider how the relative level of issue salience might be 
interconnected within the policy profiles of political parties.
Salience theories o f  party competition
The idea that issue salience could complement or even replace issue positions as an 
explanation of party politics was first suggested in reaction to Downs’ (1957)
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unidimensional, Euclidean view of party competition. Since then, a series of approaches 
suggest that party competition is based on issue importance. The most commonly known 
are valence theory (Stokes, 1963), salience theory (Budge and Farlie, 1983) and issue 
ownership (Petrocik, 1996). While there are important differences between these 
approaches, the challengers’ claim is that political parties differ at least as much in the 
importance they give to various issues as in the positions they take on them, and these 
differences have substantial consequences for the behaviour of both parties and voters.
The difference between valence and salience theory lies in the nature of the 
issues that parties emphasise and avoid. In valence theory, the political issues addressed 
by parties are non-positional: they are goals that (almost) all voters would endorse, but 
parties differ in the extent to which they are seen as being able to realise that goal. The 
concept of valence issues was first suggested in Stokes’ (1963) early critical review of 
Downsian theory, in which he argues that party competition takes place neither 
exclusively nor even primarily on position issues. Instead, there are also ‘valence’ issues, 
which are goals that are generally desired and endorsed by voters. Examples of such 
issues are low unemployment, a clean environment or a low crime rate. Voters will 
choose the party they think is more able to deliver the desired goal. This perceived 
ability has been called a party’s ‘handling advantage’ (Petrocik, 1996, p. 826). On 
valence issues, parties do not differ in terms of position: they differ in terms of which 
issues they choose to emphasise. In Stokes’ summary: ‘When the parties manoeuvre for 
support on a position-dimension, they choose policies from an ordered set of alternatives 
belonging to the same problem or issue. But when the parties manoeuvre in terms of 
valence-issues, they choose one or more issues from a set of distinct issue domains’ 
(1963, p. 374).
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Salience theory (Budge and Farlie, 1983) takes a different approach to the nature 
of party competition. The main argument of this theory is that parties fail to confront 
each other on specific topics and thus do not compete directly at all. Instead, parties talk 
past each other, emphasising those issues where they are popular and de-emphasising 
those where they are unpopular (Netjes and Binnema, 2007). In the long run, parties will 
then end up ‘owning’ some issues as certain issues become associated with them (Budge 
and Hofferbert, 1990). Issue ownership, which is based on a party’s record and 
constituency, builds up over time but can also be lost through social change or party 
actions in office or opposition (Petrocik, 1996). The difference to valence theory lies in 
the fact that parties try to exploit their positional advantage on certain issues by 
focussing the campaign on those topics and by steering attention away from issues where 
they have a positional disadvantage. This means that the issues discussed are not 
universally endorsed goals. Instead, parties choose to emphasise those positions that will 
bring them votes and de-emphasise those that will not.
In this chapter, I build mainly on Budge and Farlie’s salience theory’s approach 
to issue importance and will disregard performance-oriented valence issues. This is 
because the focus of this chapter is on comparing the interconnections within issue 
salience with the findings in the previous chapters concerning positional 
interconnections. However, unlike Budge and Farlie, I consider position and salience to 
be complementary (and not alternative) attributes of issues. Thus, each component 
within the issue systems that make up party profiles has two characteristics, a position 
and a given salience. This chapter considers the interconnections in terms of salience and 
how these compare with positional interconnections. Before proceeding to the empirical 
analysis, it is nevertheless necessary to examine the theoretical differences between 
position and salience interconnections.
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Salience and issue interconnections
As with positions, the salience attributes of the components of issue systems may also be 
interconnected in static and dynamic terms. While parties can thus vary the level of 
salience they give to each topic, such decisions are not without consequence for the party 
profile as a whole, depending on how strongly that issue component is linked to other 
elements of the issue system. Static salience interconnections refer to the predictive 
power of one issue’s importance: does knowing the salience a party gives to one topic 
help us predict the salience of other issues within its profile? Dynamic salience 
interconnections are the links that become apparent when change occurs: if a party 
changes the issue salience of one area, does this affect the salience of other issue areas?
There is some evidence that such salience linkages should exist. The New 
Politics literature, for example, suggests that Green and far-right parties stress ‘their’ 
group of topics -  liberal-authoritarianism, environment policy and immigration -  while 
de-emphasising economic ideology (Flanagan, 1987). In fact, Inglehart (1997) argues 
that ‘post-modem’ parties do not take any meaningful position on economic policy at all 
and should not be placed on such a dimension. His argument exaggerates the separation 
of the modem and post-modem politics but illustrates well the possible interconnections 
between the salience of political issues. In terms of static salience interconnections, one 
could expect, for example, that the importance a party gives to immigration policy 
should be correlated with the salience of liberal-authoritarianism to that party; both 
Green and far-right parties stress these two topics. Furthermore, both liberal- 
authoritarianism and immigration may be negatively correlated with economic policy in 
terms of salience.
Dynamic salience interconnections concern changes within political parties and 
the issues they decide to emphasise. If a party chooses to increase its stress on a specific
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policy area, this may lead it to emphasise related issues as well. It may also mean that a 
party decides to focus less on other issues. An example of this can be found in 
Kitschelt’s (1994) analysis of social democratic policy change. Among these parties, he 
argues, there was an increased focus on both environmental policy and social liberalism 
in response to the change in social structure during the 1960s and 1970s. For Kitschelt, 
both issues are part of the liberal-authoritarian dimension that encompasses 
communitarian ideals and concerns. Thus, parties should in his view tend to increase 
jointly their emphasis on issues that form part of that dimension.
Comparing position and salience interconnections
Though the theoretical background underlying positional and salience interconnections is 
similar, there are two important differences between the two attributes of issues: first, the 
strength of interconnections should be lower for salience levels, and second, the nature 
of salience interconnections is influenced by the existence of an overall limit to the 
amount of emphasis that parties can devote to each possible issue.
In general, salience interconnections are likely to be weaker overall than the links 
between policy positions. This is mainly because internal programmatic logic and past 
reputation creates less of a restriction for salience, so that variation of salience levels is 
more likely than variation of positions. The lower restrictions created by programmatic 
logic can be illustrated by considering the relationship between economic policy and 
environmental protection in terms of position and salience. While economic and 
environmental policy positions are likely to be similar, due to their inherent logical ties, 
this does not mean that a party that emphasises economics need also emphasise the 
environment. Put differently, a party would find it difficult to espouse regulatory 
environmental policies and liberal economic policies. Nevertheless, it could quite easily
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decide to stress one topic and neglect the other. The need for a coherent programme thus 
has a weaker effect on salience interconnections. Unlike positional variation, the salience 
levels of policies do not create strong consequences in terms of the overall coherence of 
a party’s policy package.
The restrictions to party freedom should also be weaker in terms of party 
movement on salience. I have argued, following Downs (1957), that the need to appear 
responsible and reliable means that a party is unlikely to change its position frequently. 
This applies far less to salience, as changes in issue emphasis will tend to have fewer 
consequences for voter judgements on party reliability. Indeed, parties might use the 
relative flexibility of salience to make up for the need for positional rigidity 
(Steenbergen and Scott, 2004, p. 167). The strength of dynamic salience interconnections 
should thus also be lower than for positional interconnections. A key difference between 
salience and positional interconnections is thus that the former should be weaker due to 
the lower restrictions created by the requirements of logic and a reputation for 
ideological stability.
However, even though issues are likely to be less strongly interconnected in 
terms of salience, this does not mean that there will be a complete lack of linkages. Static 
and dynamic interconnections will still exist for some policy areas. If this is the case, this 
is likely to be due to logic rather than circumstance. Parties will raise and lower salience 
levels on two issues together if they perceive these as part of the same basic group of 
topics. While the restrictions of logic are lower for salience interconnections, they 
nevertheless provide the basis for such linkages, if they do occur. Circumstance, on the 
other hand, is unlikely to have much of an influence on the existence of interconnections, 
as parties are much freer in choosing salience levels than they are in choosing positions.
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The general weakness of salience interconnections is not the only difference to 
position interconnections. Importantly, there is an inherent relationship between issue 
salience levels that does not exist between issue positions. The latter are independent of 
one another in one important respect: the extent to which a party is extreme on one issue 
does not limit how extreme it can be on a second issue. Even the statement itself appears 
somewhat nonsensical. However, such a restriction may well apply to the salience of 
issues. Parties have a limited amount of time and resources they can devote to each 
political topic (Meguid, 2005). Therefore, the extent to which a party stresses one issue 
may well limit how much it can emphasise a second issue. Parties have to select the 
topics on which they wish to ‘spend’ their available time and resources. If they decide to 
devote 80 per cent to immigration, this is will necessarily limit the salience they can give 
to other topics such as the economy or foreign policy. This type of mutual 
interdependence is quite different from that found among positions.
The extent to which this limit applies may depend on the party examined. While 
large, mainstream parties may have substantial resources to devote to all manner of 
topics, smaller, niche competitors may have to concentrate their limited hinds and public 
attention on one issue of paramount concern to them (Meguid, 2005). While large parties 
could thus spread their issue emphases quite broadly and still have an impact on each, 
small parties may have to focus their time and resources on one key topic. Nevertheless, 
no party is likely to be able to convince voters that all issues are of equally high concern 
to it, especially since its competitors will try to contest that claim. This finite amount of 
salience that can be distributed among issues is an important difference to positional 
interconnections.
The limitation on the distribution of salience means that there are three different 
types of empirical observation: positive, negative and no correlation. This can be
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illustrated if we take a situation in which a party stresses issue A more than other parties. 
Two situations are familiar from position interconnections. First, if  a party also 
emphasises issue B more than other parties, there is a positive correlation of salience 
levels. The two topics are interconnected in terms of importance. Second, if the emphasis 
on issue B is no greater than the average for the party system, there is no correlation of 
salience levels. The two topics are independent in terms of importance.
Finally, and this is where salience differs from position, issue importance can be 
negatively correlated. This indicates a salience interconnection, but one that underlines 
the opposition rather than the similarity of the two topics. Such an interconnection means 
that greater emphasis on one topic will sap resources from another issue. For example, 
one party may spend 30 per cent of its resources on economic policy and 30 per cent on 
New Politics issues. If the party increases its focus on economic policy to 50 per cent, it 
needs to divert the necessary salience resources from another issue area. New Politics 
would be the obvious source, especially as the two topics in question arguably reflect 
opposing concerns, that is, materialism and postmaterialism. In this way, a negative 
correlation can also indicate a strong interconnection: the two issue areas are 
thematically opposite. Such an opposition of salience levels is different from an absence 
of correlation, as the two opposed policy areas are seen as contradictory or conflicting 
rather than completely unrelated.
Measuring salience
The most important new measure in this chapter is the salience level of each issue. As in 
the preceding chapters, the main data sources are the two expert surveys carried out 
respectively by Laver and Hunt in 1989 and Benoit and Laver in 2003 as well as the
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CMP dataset (Klingemann et al., 2007). As in the previous chapters, 23 countries, all
9^EU/OECD members, are included in the analyses.
As outlined in Chapter 3, the two data sources differ in their measurement of 
salience. The expert surveys assess salience by simply asking participants for the 
‘relative importance’ of each policy area for each party (Laver and Hunt, 1992; Benoit 
and Laver, 2006). The scale ranges from 1 to 20. We do not know on what the experts 
base their assessment of the salience of an issue for a particular party, but the score they 
assign is likely to reflect its involvement in debates on that topic and the focus of its 
electoral campaigns. Another unknown factor is the extent to which experts assess issue 
salience relative to the other topics addressed by the party or relative to the other parties 
that address the topic. Thus, it is not clear whether the measurement is based on a 
comparison to the rest of the party profile or the rest of the party system. If the answer is 
both, the weight the experts give to each is not made explicit. Nevertheless, the expert 
surveys provide a reasonably clear, easily-employed measurement of salience on a series 
of issues.53
For the CMP data, the separate ten issues identified in the previous chapters were 
retained. To establish party positions, ‘left’ statements had been subtracted from ‘right’ 
statements. Here, I am merely interested in the total percentage of each manifesto 
devoted to each of the ten topics, so the sum of all mentions was used instead (i.e. ‘left’ 
plus ‘right’ statements). It is worth underlining that, unlike the expert surveys, the values
52 The 23 countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US. I excluded parties scoring less than 1% at the most recent election 
from my analysis.
53 For two topics, different questions from the Benoit and Laver survey were combined. The salience of 
EU integration was measured using the same questions as for positions (EU: Authority, EU: Larger and 
Stronger and EU: Stronger; see Chapter 4 for details). For the salience o f foreign policy, three topics were 
used: EU: peacekeeping (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK), NATO (Norway), and US involvement in 
world affairs (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, US). Foreign policy salience is thus not available 
for France, Iceland and Israel.
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provided by the CMP are percentages of the manifesto as a whole. The salience of each 
of the ten issues I identified is thus the total percentage of each manifesto devoted to that 
topic, as coded by the project. In the CMP coding, the importance of each issue therefore 
depends on the importance of all other issues. This expresses the fact that parties have a 
finite amount of resources -  captured by manifesto space -  to devote to each political 
issue.54 Such a limit may also exist and be captured by the expert surveys, but in that 
data source there is nothing intrinsic within the measurement approach that constrains 
the level of salience given to each topic. The measurement of issue salience as relative 
percentages will have to be taken into account in the empirical analysis.
In the descriptive analysis and the principal components analysis, I also took into 
account the systemic salience of each issue, thus controlling to a certain extent for 
external agenda-setting as well as country- and issue-specific variation in issue emphasis 
(Steenbergen and Scott, 2004, p. 173). Systemic salience is the average salience for each 
issue for all parties in a given country; the party under consideration was excluded in 
order to avoid endogeneity problems. For example, if there are three parties (A, B and C) 
then the systemic salience for party A is the mean salience for parties B and C. Like 
Steenbergen and Scott (2004), I use an unweighted measure of systemic salience.
Results and analysis
The results are discussed in three parts. First, I present the salience levels across issues 
and party families using descriptive statistics. I then examine the patterns of static 
salience interconnections in expert surveys and manifestos using correlation, principal 
component and regression analysis. These patterns are compared to the results of the 
analysis of issue positions in Chapter 5. Finally, I consider dynamic salience
54 In other words, the manifesto data is compositional in nature (Aitchison, 1986).
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interconnections, comparing the results to the static salience interconnections and 
dynamic positional interconnections.
Levels o f  salience across issues and party families
I first consider whether the salience of issues differs by issue and party family. Figures 
7.1 to 7.3 present the mean salience level of the key topics under consideration for the 
three datasets used. Each figure also shows the 95% confidence interval for the mean 
salience of each issue as well as a line at the mean overall salience level. There is one 
immediately obvious result: economic policy is consistently one of the most salient 
issues. In manifestos, economic policy is indeed the clearly dominant issue. The topics of 
liberal-authoritarianism and ethnic relations/immigration are also generally highly 
salient. The issues that are generally stressed less include urban-rural relations, 
decentralisation, European integration and environmental policy. The range bars in 
Figure 7.4, which present the 1 standard deviation range rather than the confidence 
interval, show that in the manifesto data there is a lot of variation in terms of the 
emphasis placed on the various issues.55 Thus, while issues do differ in terms of their 
general level of salience, the extent of the overlap between issues is perhaps even more 
striking.
Next, I compare the differences between party families in terms of issue 
emphasis. Here, only the Benoit-Laver expert survey (Figures 7.5-7.12) is examined. The 
values presented are the salience levels relative to systemic salience, calculated by 
subtracting systemic salience from party salience (i.e. salienceparty - salienceC0Untry, for 
each issue). Positive values mean that the party stresses the issue more than its political
55 The equivalent standard deviations for the expert surveys are not as large, so only the figure for the 
manifestos is shown here.
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Figure 7.1 Mean salience by issue, Benoit and Laver expert survey
Note: Dotted line at mean salience across all issues (12.61); range bars show 95% confidence interval; EU  
combines measurements of different issues: EU: Authority (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK), EU: Joining 
(Norway), EU: Larger and Stronger (France) and EU: Strengthening (Ireland); Foreign Policy combines 
the following issues: NATO (Norway), EU: Peacekeeping (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK), US 
(Australia, Canada, Japan, NZL, US); sample sizes: economic policy (161 parties in 23 countries); liberal- 
authoritarianism (153; 22); deregulation (118; 17); immigration (149; 22); EU (117; 16); foreign policy 
(135; 20); decentralization (149; 22); environment (161; 23); data from Benoit and Laver (2006).
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Figure 7.2 Mean salience by issue, Laver and Hunt expert survey
Note: Dotted line at mean salience across all issues (11.20); range bars show 95% confidence interval; 
sample sizes: 149 parties in 23 countries, except clericalism (143; 22); data from Laver and Hunt (1992).
243
o
CM
O -
o
oQ.
O
'c
£
LU
E
CO
'c
ro
>O
oCL
> .o
ro
oo
co
roo
C
0
Ec
ro
3
°f
co
CO
N
o
E
~0
3 1
c
O ) Eo
3
T JLU
o
>
C
co
-Q
"to
o
co
o
"5
O
o
x :
3
0
oLL
Q cLU 3
C
0
O
0
LU < Q
~r
3
LU
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confidence  in terval; sam ple  size: 2192 party*election  cases in 24  coun tries excep t E U  
(1423 party*elec tion  cases in 15 countries); data from  B udge et al. (2001) and  
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Figure 7.4 Mean salience by issue, CMP-extracted salience
Note: D o tted  line at m ean  salience across all issues (6 .3 ); ran g e  bars are based  on 1 
standard  dev iation ; sam ple size: 2192 party*election  cases in 24  cou n tries  excep t E U  
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competitors; negative values mean that it stresses the topic less. Many of the differences 
visible in these graphs follow normal expectations. For example, economic policy is 
particularly salient for Liberal, Conservative and Communist parties, while Green parties 
are clearly distinguishable as the party family that stresses environmental policy the 
most. On decentralisation, there is little differentiation between party families, though 
ethnic-regionalists stress this topic more than most and nationalists tend to de-emphasise 
it. Overall, there is a great overlap between party families: the differences between them 
are not clear-cut. Instead, the dominant impression is one of significant intra-family 
variation.
Static salience interconnections
I now turn to the cross-sectional analysis of the static salience interconnections between 
issues. The two data sources, expert surveys and party manifestos, are considered in turn.
Results: Expert surveys
The bivariate correlations for salience levels in the expert surveys are shown in Figure 
7.13, which presents the results as a matrix using different shadings of grey (with full 
results in Appendix 7.1). The darker the shading, the stronger the correlation; non­
significant associations are left blank. In this analysis, systemic salience was taken into 
account by subtracting the measure for systemic salience from the raw salience score. 
However, the results do not differ greatly if the raw measure of salience is used.
The first finding that emerges from the bivariate correlations is that salience 
levels are relatively weakly interconnected, with the r values over .6 for only two issue 
pairs. There are also a large number of issue pairs where no association is found at all, as 
seen in the large amount of non-shaded squares. However, even though the associations
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Deregulation 
F o re ig n  P o licy  I
EU support Urban-rural relations
Immigration USSR Relations
Environment
Decentralization
Environment
Decentralization
Liberal-authoritarianism Liberal-authoritarianism
*Economic policy Economic policy * 
2003 survey 1989 survey
■>.*
r-value .3 to .6
smaller than .3
Figure 7.13 Summary of bivariate correlations for salience in 1989 and 2003 expert
Note: S hadings re fe r to the  streng th  o f  the b ivaria te  association ; each  b o x  sum m arises 
the  co rre la tion  betw een  one  issue pair; signifies a negative  associa tion , i.e. the 
econom ic  p o licy -en v iro n m en t and econom ic p o licy -decen tra lisa tion  a sso c ia tions are 
negative; full resu lts in A ppend ix  7.1; data  from  B enoit and L aver (2006) and  L aver and  
H unt (1992).
are  w eaker, there  are very  few  instances o f  negative and sign ifican t associa tions. A t least 
in the eyes o f  the su rvey  responden ts, issues do not seem  to  d isp lace  one ano ther, so a 
h igh  sa lience level on one issue does not au tom atica lly  reduce the sa lience  g iven  to  o th e r 
topics.
Second, a g roup ing  o f  issues accord ing  to sa lience asso c ia tio n  is v isib le . 
E conom ic  and  fo reign  p o licy  issues tend  to vary  together, as do N ew  P olitics issues 
(env ironm ent, libera l-au th o ritarian ism  and  im m igration). D ecen tra lisa tio n  and  EU  
in tegra tion  are linked, p o ssib ly  p rov id in g  a th ird  group  o f  top ics that re fe r to  m u lti-leve l
surveys
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all parties (n=74)
Issue 1
Components
2 3
unexplained
variance
Economic Policy .55 - .0 1 -.13 .15
Deregulation .55 -.05 -.13 .14
Foreign Policy .5 .03 .2 .26
EU .18 . 6 8 0 .3
Decen tral ization - .2 . 6 8 -.05 .24
Liberal-A uthoritarianism -.17 - .1 . 6 8 .28
Environment .17 -.06 .46 .61
Immigration .14 .24 .5 .55
Eigenvalue 2.77 
Proportion o f total variance explained .35
1.44
.17
1.28
.17
Table 7.1 Principal components analysis of issue salience, Benoit and Laver expert
survey
Note: Rotated component loadings shown; varimax rotation used; components with 
Eigenvalues over 1 extracted; loadings above .4 and lower than -.4 in bold; data from 
Benoit and Laver (2006).
governance. However, decentralisation and EU views are also associated with the 
environment and foreign policy, respectively, making this group somewhat less clear.
In order to substantiate these first impressions concerning the underlying 
dimensions that summarise the relationship between the salience of different issues, a 
PCA was carried out. Again, the salience values relative to systemic issue salience were 
used. Table 7.1 shows the results of the principal components analysis for the eight main 
issues in the Benoit-Laver expert survey.56 The equivalent analysis for the Laver-Hunt 
survey can be found in Appendix 7.2. Three principal components have an Eigenvalue 
above 1 and are thus extracted. The first component contains economic and foreign 
policy topics, while the second refers to issues of multi-level governance (the EU and 
decentralisation). The third component can be seen as summarising New Politics as it 
contains environmental policy, immigration and liberal-authoritarianism.
56 Including all eight issues substantially reduces the sample size (and the countries included). However, 
the results do not differ meaningfully if  issues are removed to increase the number o f  parties.
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To illustrate the findings of the PCA, Figures 7.14 and 7.15 present the mean 
component scores for each of the main party families together with their respective 95 
per cent confidence intervals (full results in Appendix 7.3). The first figure plots the 
mean party family positions on the first and second summary dimensions of salience: 
economic/foreign policy and EU/decentralisation. The second plots economic/foreign 
policy and the third dimension, New Politics. The figures show that party families tend 
to give moderate salience to two of the dimensions and stress the third. Greens, for 
example, emphasise New Politics but do not particularly emphasise the other two 
dimensions. Communists, Conservatives and Liberals focus on economic and foreign 
policy, while Agrarian and Ethno-regionalist parties stress topics of multi-level 
governance. The Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, which are the most 
centrist and mainstream party families, are noteworthy in their general moderate salience 
levels across dimensions.
Results: Party manifestos
Next, I consider static salience interconnections using the manifesto dataset, which was 
analysed as follows. As presented in Chapter 4, the salience levels were averaged across 
all manifestos for each party, which should capture the long-run issue importance of the 
ten issues for each case. These values were then used as the main independent and 
dependent variables in a multiple regression analysis.
An example for economic and foreign policy is presented in Table 7.2. The 
strength of the association between the salience levels is assessed by looking at the 
variance explained by adding the long-run salience of a second issue as an independent 
variable. That is, I compare the R values for the basic model and the full model. The 
basic model has the long-run salience level of economic policy as its dependent variable,
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Dependent variable: Model 1 Model 2
economic policy salience b std. err. b std. err.
Foreign policy salience .13 0.13
Economic policy: Systemic salience .11 0.22 .08 0.23
Foreign policy: Systemic salience .31 0.26 .37 0.29
Constant 16.97 5.50 16.53 5.49
R2 0.3651 0.3704
n 185 185
Table 7.2 Example of a multiple linear regression using CMP-extracted issue
salience
Note: Model 1 includes systemic salience on the dependent-variable and independent- 
variable issues; Model 2 adds the issue salience on the independent variable issue; 
salience values used here are economic policy and foreign policy; *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, 
***: p<0.01; data from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2007).
with two independent variables: the long-run systemic salience of economic and foreign 
policy for those elections in which the party competed. In the frill model, the key 
independent variable is added: the long-run salience level for foreign policy. A 
comparison of the variance explained allows an assessment of the strength of the 
association between the salience levels for the two issues.57 In this example, the 
coefficient for foreign policy salience is not significant and the added variance explained 
is miniscule (at .0053).
Figure 7.16 presents the results of this regression analysis for all issue pairs, 
summarised in the added variance explained (full results in Appendix 7.4). Again, the 
results are presented graphically in the form of a matrix, with each box presenting the 
added variance explained (as measured by the R2 value). Darker shades of grey indicate
57 Only parties that emphasised both economic and foreign policy at some point in their existence are 
included, meaning that parties that never devoted more than one per cent o f their manifesto to either topic 
are excluded. Robust standard errors were used.
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Figure 7.16 Static salience interconnections using CMP-extracted party positions
Note: N u m b er at the end  o f  each row  represen ts the total n u m b er o f  in te rconnec tions for 
each  issue (e.g. 4 for econom ic  po licy , 3 for foreign p o licy  and  so on); each box  
rep resen ts  the sum m ary  o f  tw o  m ultip le  regression  m odels (e.g. the  bo x  at the  bo tto m  left 
con ta ins the  in fo rm ation  on the reg ression  w ith  econom ic  po licy  sa lience as the  
dependen t and  fo reign  p o licy  sa lience as the added in dependen t v ariab le , as w ell as the 
reg ression  w ith  foreign  p o licy  sa lience as the dependent and eco n o m ic  p o licy  sa lience as 
the  added  indep en d en t variab le); boxes are only shaded  w h ere  the  coeffic ien t o f  the 
added  v ariab le  is s ta tis tica lly  sign ifican t at .1 or better; the  shad ings are based  on  the 
am o u n t o f  added  v ariance  exp la ined  by  the additional v ariab le  (e.g. m ore  than  .05 fo r 
econom ic  p o licy  and  libera l-au tho ritarian ism ; all coeffic ien ts  n eg a tiv e  u n less the box  is 
m arked  b y  *; m ore  deta iled  resu lts in A ppendix  7.4; da ta  from  B udge et al. (2001) and 
K lingem ann  et al. (2007).
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a larger additional amount of explained variance. Non-significant associations in the 
regression model (as in the example in Table 7.2) are left blank. The total number of 
significant associations for each issue is given at the end of each line. For example, 
economic policy salience is statically interconnected with four issues: liberal- 
authoritarianism, culture-ethnic matters, environment and decentralisation.
The first finding is that the signs of the coefficients are mostly negative, 
reflecting the fact that the manifesto coding is based on the percentage of sentences per 
document and is thus compositional in nature. This means that an increased mention of 
one topic will often result in a reduced mention of other topics. As noted above, this 
negative correlation can indicate that the topics are instead opposites, leading to linked 
salience levels.
The issues that have the most significant coefficients and add the most in 
explained variance are liberal-authoritarianism (significant for five issues), economic 
policy (four), culture/ethnic matters (four). Generally weakly correlated, as shown either 
by a low number of significant coefficients or by little added variance explained, are: EU 
support, democracy, education and decentralisation. Looking at specific issue pairs, the 
added variance explained is largest for economic policy on the one hand and 
environmental protection, liberal-authoritarianism and cultural/ethnic topics on the other. 
Other relatively strong pairings are liberal-authoritarianism with foreign policy, and 
environment with education.
A closer examination of the issue pairs that are strongly significant in their 
association indicates that negative correlation indeed occurs when topics are opposed or 
unrelated to one another in terms of content. It is not the similar and related topics that 
are linked in the findings: for example, liberal-authoritarianism is not associated in terms 
of salience with culture/ethnic matters, democracy or the environment; the same applies
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for economic and foreign policy. Instead, topics that are opposites or unrelated tend to 
feature more strongly in the list of significant results: e.g. liberal-authoritarianism on the 
one hand, and foreign policy and economic policy on the other.
However, the dominance of negative association does not apply to all pairs of 
political issues: for a small number of topics, the association is positive. Increased 
mention of foreign policy is positively associated with increased mention of the 
environment, and parties that talk more about decentralisation also devote more space to 
the culture/ethnic matters. These two issue pairs are also issues that are often associated, 
in particular of course decentralisation and culture. In addition, increased mentions of
C O
urban-rural relations co-occur, with a greater focus on education and EU integration. 
Discussion: comparing manifesto and expert survey results
It is obvious from the results described above that the empirical results differ depending 
on the data source used. On the one hand, the analysis of expert survey data shows that 
there is a relatively distinct link between the salience of certain issues. The importance 
parties give to three types of policy areas (economic/foreign policy, New Politics and 
multi-level governance) tend to be associated, at least according to the evaluations of 
expert party observers. On the other hand, the manifestos do not present such a clear 
picture, a difference that can partly be attributed to the compositional nature of the data 
source.
Interestingly, those areas that are linked in the expert surveys are independent in 
the manifestos. Thus, economic policy and foreign policy are not significantly associated
58 A PCA was also carried out for the manifesto dataset. A PCA is ‘best described as a structure detection 
method’ (Netjes and Binnema, 2007, p. 45), with the aim being to find the main patterns among the 
correlations between a set o f variables. The PCA confirms the general finding that there is very little 
commonality between the different topics, as the extracted components largely reflect one issue only. It is 
therefore not useful to extract component scores from the PCA.
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in the party documents, nor are EU support and decentralisation. The same broadly 
applies to New Politics issues such as liberal-authoritarianism, the environment, culture- 
ethnic matters and democracy. This may be due to the strong constraint imposed by the 
measurement approach taken by the CMP. In other words, a lack of negative association 
could then indicate that the issues are strongly linked: if resources are devoted more 
strongly to one topic in the issue group in question, the party will not take those 
resources from the related policy area. The empirical finding that shows up in the 
manifesto is then a lack of association, but this in fact reflects a relatively strong positive 
link.
Of course, part of the differences between the two datasets may be due to the 
nature of what is measured. The manifesto data simply provides a percentage of the 
coverage of a single topic, which I have averaged over time. The expert surveys take into 
account the overall image and programme of a political party, as well as its actions in 
government and opposition. It is not surprising that there should be differences between 
the two data sources given the fact that they do not measure exactly the same thing. 
Overall, we should not necessarily dismiss the differences between the two data sources 
as a sign that either approach is limited or faulty. Instead, the different findings are the 
natural consequence of the different methodological assumptions underlying each 
approach (Netjes and Binnema, 2007). As a result, the differences between the two data 
sources will in part be due to the inherent limitations of each approach and the difficulty 
of measuring issue salience.
Discussion: comparing salience and positional profiles
A comparison of the salience patterns of issue association with the positional links found 
in the previous chapter is instructive. There are two ways in which salience
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interconnections may be different from positional ties: the general strength of the 
interconnections may differ as may the actual issue pairs for which interconnections are 
found. First, both data sources show that the overall level of association is weaker for 
salience than for position. This is expected, given the weaker logical ties that exist 
between salience levels. The weaker level of association is especially true for the expert 
survey dataset. The r-values for the bivariate correlations are lower across the board for 
the salience issue pairs. Moreover, the PCAs for the association of salience levels 
produced weaker results than the PCAs for positional links. In the 2003 survey, the 
Eigenvalue for the first component is over three for positional interconnections, but only 
1.47 for salience linkages. Thus, for the expert surveys the variance explained by the 
extracted components in the PCA is far smaller when considering salience. Turning to 
the manifesto results, the number of issue pairs where a significant association was found 
is smaller (18 for salience, compared to 24 for positions). When an association was 
found, this was weaker in terms of the added variance explained. There is thus evidence 
that the links in terms of salience are, on the whole, weaker than positional 
interconnections.
Beyond broad comparisons of association strength, it is also possible to see 
which issue pairs are strongly linked to one another. I will consider the expert survey 
findings first. Here, the salience interconnections appear to be more complex, in that 
more dimensions are needed to summarise how parties emphasise the various political 
issues. In particular, the aggregate analysis of all parties in terms of positions tended to 
indicate that there was one underlying dimension that captured a large part of the 
distribution of parties. This dimension contained economic and non-economic New 
Politics issues. A second, weaker dimension concerned multi-level governance issues: 
EU and decentralisation. In terms of salience, there is a clear separation between New
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s*
Urban-rural relations 
Education 
Decentralization 
EU
Environment 
Democracy 
Culture-ethnic matters! 
Liberal-authoritarianism 
Foreign policy 
Economic policy
Association found for position and salience 
P Association found for position only 
S Association found for salience only 
* positive coefficient
Figure 7.17 Comparison of static interconnections and static salience 
interconnections, CMP-extracted data
Note: In fo rm ation  d raw n from  Figure 7.16 (salience) and F igure  5.2 (position); shaded 
b oxes ind ica te  that an  in terconnection  w as found fo r bo th  position  and  salience; boxes 
m ark ed  w ith  resp ec tiv e ly  ‘P ’ and ‘S ’ indicate an in terconnection  fo r on ly  positio n  or 
o n ly  sa lience; all positio n  coeffic ien ts positive; all sa lience coeffic ien ts  negative  un less 
m ark ed  b y  *.
P o litics  and  econom ic policy , a d istinction  that w as no t consisten tly  found  in the  analysis 
o f  positio n s as recorded  by  experts. It therefore  appears that, as expected , s ta tic  sa lience 
in te rconnec tions are m o stly  due to logic ra ther than  circum stance.
A  sim ila r conc lusion  is also reached  for the m an ifesto  dataset. A  su m m ary  o f  the 
find ings fo r the tw o types o f  issue in terconnections is p resen ted  in F igu re  7.17. B oxes 
th a t are shaded  rep resen t issue pairs w ith positional and  salience linkages, w hile  the  
p resence  o f  ju s t  one type o f  in terconnection  is ind icated  b y  ‘P ’ for positio n a l and  ‘S ’ for
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Position-Salience comparison
Both present and positive 
Both present, salience negative 
Position only 
Salience only 
Neither
Basis for interconnection
Logic
Circumstance or strong logic 
Logic
Logic, but opposites 
No interconnection
number of 
issue pairs
3
8
12
8
14
Table 7.3 Summary of position-salience comparison and basis for interconnections
Note: Information drawn from Figure 7.17 and Table 6.2.
salience. In order to understand the pattern that Figure 7.17 uncovers, it is necessary to 
refer again to the nature of the interconnection between the issue pairs, that is, whether it 
is based on logic or circumstance. The relevant framework for interpretation is 
summarised in Table 7.3 and is described in the following framework, with reference to 
the findings in Figure 7.17:
■ If both associations are present and positive, this signals a logical tie between the 
issues: this case is straightforward, but quite rare (three issue pairs, shaded and 
marked by an asterisk).59
■ Second, if both associations are present but a negative salience coefficient exists
(shaded areas without an asterisk), this usually reflects the fact that the basis for
the interconnection is merely circumstance. There is some positional connection
between the two issues, but the salience findings demonstrate that parties see the
two issues in terms of a trade-off when it comes to strategic emphasis. Eight issue
pairs fall into this category. One way of examining whether these eight issue
pairs are those where the positional interconnection is based on circumstance is to
refer back to the findings of the previous chapter. There, the existence of static
interconnections together with the absence of dynamic interconnections was seen
59 One issue pair, education and urban-rural relations, has a positive coefficient for salience but is not 
interconnected in terms o f positions.
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as an indicator of a circumstance- (and not logic-) based linkage. In fact, of the 
eight position-negative salience issue pairs found here, fully six were such static- 
only pairs in the previous chapter. This further supports the assertion that these 
pairs are mainly based on circumstance.
■ Third, if there is only a positional linkage, then this is a sign of ‘normal’, logic- 
based interconnections (twelve pairs, marked by ‘P’ in Figure 7.17). The position
interconnection means that the ideological content of the two topics is related,
while the lack of a salience interconnection means that parties will not reduce 
coverage of one of the two issues to raise emphasis on the other. For example, 
economic and foreign policy, the New Politics issues, and EU and
decentralisation are all issue groups that are strongly associated in positional 
terms but have no salience interconnections.
■ Fourth, the inverse -  an interconnection for salience but not for position -  was
found for eight issue pairs (marked with ‘S’ in Figure 7.17). This should reflect
the fact that the two issues are opposites. Positions are not related, and instead the 
two policy areas cut into each other’s salience level.
■ Finally, no interconnection at all was found for 14 issue pairs.
Using this framework of interpretation, the salience analysis therefore supports 
and supplements rather than contradicts the findings for static positional
interconnections. Overall, the analysis of static salience interconnections in expert 
surveys and manifestos thus provides further confirmation that there is a separation of 
topics related to economic policy and topics related to the organisation of society, which 
I call ‘New Politics’ issues. In addition, it provides further confirmation that the source
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all parties
Raw salience n mean (s.d.)
Economic policy 118 2.13 (2.05)
Liberal-authoritarianism 116 2.86(1.97)
Environmental policy 118 2 .1 0 (2 .1 1 )
Decentralization 1 1 2 1.87(1.98)
Controlled salience n mean (s.d.)
Economic policy 116 1.90(1.59)
Liberal-authoritarianism 114 2.98 (2.35)
Environmental policy 116 2.02 (1.76)
Decentralization 1 1 0 1.46(1.53)
Table 7.4 Mean salience change by expert survey issue between 1989 and 2003
Note: ‘Raw salience’ presents the mean raw change between 1989 and 2003 scores; 
‘controlled salience’ presents the mean change between 1989 and 2003 scores relative to 
the systemic salience of each issue; see text for details on calculation; data from Laver 
and Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006).
of interconnection -  logic or circumstance -  provides an important guide to the presence 
and nature of interconnections.
Dynamic salience interconnections
The previous section considered cross-sectional differences in salience profiles between 
parties; the following section moves on to consider the interconnections between levels 
of salience in dynamic terms. I will first briefly describe which issues changed most 
overall before establishing the extent of salience interconnections within political parties.
Levels o f  salience change
Before considering these interconnections, I briefly present some descriptive information 
on the level of change in terms of salience for some key issues. I begin with the expert 
surveys. Four issues were measured in both the 1989 and the 2003: economic policy,
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Issue n
all parties 
mean (s.d) median
European integration 969 1.18(2.79) .59
Environmental policy 1251 .88(1.57) .53
Decen traliza tion 1253 .81 (1.85) .53
Urban-rural relations 1359 .90 (2.07) .51
Liberal-authoritarianism 1561 1.14(3.87) .50
Education 1453 .80(1.74) .46
Democracy 1713 .87(1.77) .45
Culture/Ethnic relations 1666 .81 (1.74) .42
Foreign policy 1670 .85 (2.84) .39
Economic policy 1858 .59 (2.36) .29
Table 7.5 Proportional change in salience levels, CMP-extracted measure
Note: Change in salience between t-1 and t relative to level of salience at t-1; sorted in 
descending order by median value; data from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al.
(2007).
liberal-authoritarianism, environmental policy and decentralisation. Table 7.4 presents 
the level of absolute change for the four issues included in the two expert surveys by 
Laver/Hunt (1989) and Benoit/Laver (2003); both the raw and system-controlled salience 
levels are shown. The issue with the largest changes in salience is liberal- 
authoritarianism, with a mean raw change of 2.86 points. The other three issues follow 
with raw changes of around 2 points. One-sample t-tests show that all the means are 
different from 0. Comparing the four issues, however, only the change on liberal- 
authoritarianism is significantly different from the other issues. The results using 
salience scores that control for systemic salience are not substantively different.
Table 7.5 shows the levels of absolute change for the manifesto data, presented 
here as the change proportional to the salience in the preceding election.60 The issue on 
which parties modify their emphasis the most is European integration (mean 1.18,
60 I present proportional and not absolute change level as the level o f absolute change may depend on the 
overall importance o f the issue. A three per cent reduction on a topic that formed 30 per cent o f the 
manifesto at t-1 is clearly different from a three per cent increase on a topic that formed merely two per 
cent o f the manifesto at t-1. This notwithstanding, measuring the proportional level o f  change also has 
limitations, as increases from a small base may be exaggerated. I report the median as well as the mean to 
take this into account.
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median 0.59).61 Parties also tend to change the salience of liberal-authoritarianism and 
environmental policy more than other issues. The lowest level of change is on economic 
policy (mean 0.59, median 0.29), with all other issues at mean levels of change between 
0.80 and 0.89. Overall, there are few great differences between the proportional changes 
on the ten issues measured in the manifesto dataset, though the relatively large value for 
liberal-authoritarianism does match the finding for the expert surveys.
Dynamic salience interconnections (1): expert surveys
After presenting this descriptive overview of the data, I now turn to the analysis of 
dynamic salience interconnections. A first look at these linkages across time is provided 
by the expert surveys. Of course, these surveys contain only two time points, 1989 and 
2003, so it is necessary to be careful in drawing broader conclusions from this limited 
evidence. For longer-term trends and changes, the manifesto data is examined in detail 
below.
Table 7.6 presents the bivariate correlations for the four issues that were included 
in both expert surveys. The upper section of the table presents the results for the raw 
scores and the lower section for those controlling for systemic salience (following the 
simple method used above).62 The correlation strength is generally weak, with no r-value 
over .35. The clearest evidence of an association for change is on environmental policy 
and liberal-authoritarianism. A party that increased its emphasis on one of these issues 
also increased its emphasis on the other. Somewhat weaker evidence is found for 
economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism as well as for environmental policy and
61 If the level o f manifesto salience was below 1 per cent of the document at both t and t-1, these 
manifestos were not included in the analysis. As a result, the sample size is different for each o f the issues 
considered.
62 I also tried more complicated regression models, for example including the systemic salience levels as 
separate independent variables. The results do not differ, and the bivariate correlations are presented here 
for the sake o f simplicity.
263
raw salience
Decentralization 
Environment .09 (112) 
Liberal-authoritarianism .31*** (116) .09(110)
Economic policy .27*** (116) .05 (118) .03 (112)
controlled salience
Decentralization 
Environment .22** (110) 
Liberal-authoritarianism .32*** (114) .14(108)
Economic policy .18* (114) -.04(116) .10(110)
Table 7.6 Bivariate correlations for salience change between 1989 and 2003, expert
surveys
Note: ‘Raw salience’ presents the correlation for mean raw change between 1989 and 
2003 scores; ‘controlled salience’ presents the correlation for mean change between 
1989 and 2003 scores relative to the systemic salience of each issue; see text for details 
on calculation; data from Laver and Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006).
decentralisation. A PCA for the expert survey was carried out, but due to the low levels 
of correlations, no clear results emerge. Overall, then, dynamic salience interconnections 
are relatively weak, though there is some evidence of correlation of salience change for 
three of the six issue pairs.
If we compare the results for salience change to static salience interconnections, 
the similarity is definite (Table 7.7). The two strongest static salience interconnections 
were found for liberal-authoritarianism and environment, and decentralisation and 
environment. Both these issue pairs are also clearly linked in terms of dynamic salience 
interconnections. In addition, there are no interconnections, either static or dynamic, for 
liberal-authoritarianism and decentralisation. However, findings for salience links with 
economic policy are less clear. For example, findings for the static salience 
interconnections between economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism were
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Economic policy 
Economic policy 
Economic policy
Issue 1
Liberal-authoritarianism
Environment
Decentralization
Issue 2 Static interconnection
no
Dynamic interconnection
yes, positive
no
no
yes, positive 
no
yes, positive____________Environment
Liberal-authoritarianism Environment 
Liberal-auth ori tari anism Decentralizati on
Decentralization
positive (2003), negative (1989) 
no (2003), negative (1989) 
yes, positive 
no
yes, positive_________________
Table 7.7 Summary of findings for salience interconnections in expert surveys
Note: Information drawn from Appendix 7.1 (static interconnections) and Table 7.6 
(dynamic interconnections).
mixed: a negative association was found in the 1989 survey and a positive association in 
2003. No dynamic interconnections were found for this issue pair, perhaps reflecting this 
uncertain position. A similar finding exists for economic policy and decentralisation. 
Finally, for the weakest issue pair for dynamic interconnections, economic policy and 
liberal-authoritarianism, no static interconnection was found. Thus, there is a relationship 
between static and dynamic salience interconnections, but this is clearly visible only for 
the two strongest and clearest issue pairs.
Dynamic salience interconnections (2): manifesto data
The analysis of the expert survey data was limited by the existence of only two time 
points and the small number of issues included. For a broader picture of dynamic 
salience interconnections, I now turn to the manifesto data and examine salience levels 
since 1945 for ten distinct issues.
As in Chapter 6, I use separate regressions to estimate the added variance 
explained by changes in the independent variable issue, but focus here on changes in 
salience. An example of the regression is presented in Table 7.8, again for economic and 
foreign policy. The dependent variable is the change in the total salience of economic
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Dependent variable: Model 1 Model 2
economic policy salience (change) b std. err. b std. err.
Foreign policy salience: Change _ i g * * * 0.03
Economic policy salience, t-1 -.56*** .03 _  ^ 2* * * 0.03
Foreign policy salience, t-1 .08** .03 -.06 0.04
Economic policy: Systemic salience change •^*** .05 .35*** 0.05
Foreign policy: Systemic salience change _ 12** .05 -.05 0.06
Economic policy: Systemic salience, t-1 23*** .05 23*** 0.05
Foreign policy: Systemic salience, t-1 -.15** .06 -.09 0.06
Constant 8.57*** 1.61 £ 12*** 1.58
R2 0.3158 0.3289
n 1590 1590
Note: *:p<0.1, **:p<.05, ***:p<.01
Table 7.8 Example of a multiple linear regression using CMP-extracted issue
salience
Note: Model 1 includes all controls for previous salience, systemic salience and systemic 
salience change for both the dependent-variable and the independent-variable issue; 
Model 2 adds the raw salience change on the independent variable issue; *: p<.l, **: 
p<.05, ***: p<.01; standard errors clustered by election; data from Budge et al. (2001) 
and Klingemann et al. (2007).
policy compared to the previous manifesto. The main independent variable is the change 
in the total salience of foreign policy, again compared to the previous manifesto. Three 
types of independent variables are also included: the level of salience on economic and 
foreign policy in the previous manifesto; the level of systemic salience in the previous 
election; and the level of systemic salience change, compared to the previous manifestos. 
The added variance (R2) is determined by comparing the full model to the one without 
the key independent variable, here the change in foreign policy salience. In the example, 
the coefficient for foreign policy salience change is negative and significant, indicating
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that increased coverage of foreign policy will reduce coverage of economic policy, 
holding the other variables constant. An increase in one per cent of coverage of foreign 
policy reduces economic policy coverage by . 18 per cent. The added variance explained, 
0.013, is relatively low.
The summary results of all these regressions analyses are presented in Figure 
7.18 (with full results in Appendix 7.5). Economic policy clearly has the greatest number 
of dynamic interconnections, with only change in the salience of EU integration not 
significant. Foreign policy, liberal-authoritarianism and culture-ethnic matters are also 
often significantly linked in terms of salience change (six each). Significant associations 
are relatively rare for democracy, EU integration, decentralisation and urban-rural 
relations (four each). Again, most issue pairs are negatively associated. The only 
significant positive links are: culture-ethnic relations and decentralisation; foreign policy 
and environment; and decentralisation and environment.
Discussion: comparing static and dynamic interconnections
Figure 7.19 compares these results with those found for the static salience 
interconnections. First, it is worth stressing that the data source was not exactly the same 
for the two analyses: static interconnections were determined using long-run salience 
levels, while dynamic interconnections used each election manifesto. This substantially 
increased the sample size used to consider dynamic interconnections, so it is 
unsurprising that a number of dynamic interconnections were found where no static links 
were detected (marked with ‘D’). It is more important that there are eleven issue pairs 
with both static and dynamic interconnections (shaded boxes). Of the five issue pairs 
with the strongest static interconnections, four also exhibit dynamic salience
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Urban-rural relations 
Education 
Decentralization 
EU
Environment 
Democracy! 
Culture-ethnic matters! 
Liberal-authoritarianism |
Foreign policy |
Economic policy
Amount o f added 
variance explained (R2)
I more than .02
between .01 to .02
less than .01 
* positive association
Figure 7.18 Dynamic salience interconnections, CMP-extracted measure
Note: T he n u m b er at the end  o f  each row  represen ts the total n u m b er o f  in terconnections 
fo r each issue (e.g. 8 for econom ic  po licy , 6 for foreign p o licy  and  so on); each box  
rep resen ts  th e  sum m ary  o f  tw o m ultip le  regression  m odels (e.g. the  box  at the b o ttom  left 
con ta in s the in fo rm ation  on the reg ression  w ith econom ic p o licy  as the dependen t and  
fo re ign  p o licy  as the  added  independen t variab le , as w ell as the reg ressio n  w ith  fo reign  
p o licy  as the dependen t and  econom ic p o licy  as the added  indep en d en t variab le); boxes 
are on ly  shad ed  w here  the coeffic ien t o f  the added variab le  is s ta tis tica lly  sig n ifican t at 
.1 o r b e tte r (as in M odel 2, T able  7.8); the shadings are b ased  on th e  am o u n t o f  added  
v ariance  exp la in ed  b y  the add itional variab le  (e.g. be tw een  .01 and  .02 for econom ic 
p o licy  and  fo reign  po licy , see  T able  7.8); all coeffic ien ts nega tive  un less  m arked  b y  *; 
m ore  de ta iled  resu lts  in A ppend ix  7.5; data  from  B udge et al. (2001) and K lingem ann  et 
al. (2007).
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Urban-rural relations
Education S
Decentralization
EU s
Environment D D* s
Democracy
Culture-ethnic matters D * s
Liberal-authoritarianism D D S S D
Foreign policy D * S D D
Economic policy D D D
Static and dynamic association found
S Association found for static only 
^  Association found for dynamic only 
* positive coefficient
Figure 7.19 Comparison of results for static and dynamic interconnections, CMP-
extracted issue salience
Note: S haded  boxes are issue pairs w ith both  static and dynam ic  in terconnections; boxes 
m ark ed  resp ec tiv e ly  w ith  ‘S ’ and ‘D ’ have static or dynam ic  in te rco n n ec tio n s only; all 
coeffic ien ts  neg a tiv e  un less m arked  by  *; in form ation d raw n  from  F igure  7.16 and 
F igure  7.18.
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♦ . interconnections. The two issue pairs where the strongest positive association for static
interconnections was found (culture-ethnic relations and decentralisation; environment
and foreign policy) are also the two strongest cases for positive dynamic
interconnections. While the similar cases are thus those where the strength of
interconnections is strong, the seven cases where static interconnections are not mirrored
in the dynamic analysis are concentrated among issue pairs where the added explained
variance was low. In other words, I find dissimilar results for static and dynamic links
mainly for issue pairs with weak static interconnections.
An interpretation of this comparison leads to the following conclusions:
■ First, if both static and dynamic associations are found for salience, then the two 
issues are likely only connected in that they are seen as political opposites. If a party 
gives one of the two issues more emphasis, it will reduce its focus on the other. The 
strength and regularity of the connection reflects an oppositional relationship 
replacement between policy areas, so increased mention of one topic leads to a 
decrease in salience in another. Looking at Figure 7.19, the issue pairs that are 
statically and dynamically interconnected for salience are mainly topics that do not 
appear to share inherent ties, for example economic policy and liberal- 
authoritarianism. This supports the conclusion that these are opposed or unrelated 
topics. In two cases the association was positive: culture-ethnic matters and 
decentralisation; and environment and foreign policy. These are cases of close logical 
ties rather than of opposition.
■ Second, if a salience but no dynamic interconnection is detected, then this will 
represent a case where there is a weak level of issue opposition. The precise
63 The sole exception is environment and education.
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interpretation is difficult, but such issue pairs are in any case relatively rare (seven 
issue pairs).
■ Finally, if a dynamic association is found without evidence of a static salience 
interconnection, then this could in fact be evidence of logical ties. The number of 
issue pairs with only dynamic interconnections may partly be due to the much larger 
sample size used to examine the latter type of issue linkage. However, the absence of 
a static interconnection indicates that there is no strong evidence that parties see the 
two policy areas as clear opposites. The fact that there is some dynamic association 
may thus reflect the fact that the two issues are nevertheless in some way connected 
for political parties. Thus, while the original approach to the manifestos stated that 
negative associations are generally a sign that topic areas are opposed or unrelated, 
the boxes marked with ‘D’ may be cases where the issues are in fact closely linked. 
Salience levels may be therefore be interconnected (and show up as negative) because 
parties see the topics as belonging to one larger area of concern. This is supported by 
the fact that the issue pairs which only have dynamic interconnections are also those 
with particularly strong ties as identified in Chapters 5 and 6 . Thus, this group 
contains links between New Politics issues (environment, liberal-authoritarianism, 
culture-ethnic relations) and between economic and foreign policy.
A comparison of the dynamic interconnection results with the findings for the 
expert surveys is presented in Table 7.9. The results are completely consistent for two of 
the six issue pairs that can be analysed in both datasets (E and F: decentralisation and 
liberal-authoritarianism, decentralisation and environment). For two further issue pairs, 
a significant association is found in the manifestos but not in the surveys (B and C: 
economic policy and environment, economic policy and decentralization). Economic 
policy, which is usually the main topic in manifestos, is one of the issues in both pairs,
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Dynamic interconnection  
Issue 1 Issue 2 ES CM P Conclusion
A Economic policy Liberal-authoritarianism yes, positive yes, negative independent
B Economic policy Environment no yes, negative independent
C Economic policy Decentralization no yes, negative independent
D Liberal-authoritarianism Environment yes, positive yes, negative interconnected
E Liberal-authoritarianism Decentralization no no independent
F Environment_____________Decentralization_________ yes, positive yes, positive interconnected
Table 7.9 Summary of findings for four core issues, expert surveys and CMP
Note: Information drawn from Figures 7.18 and Table 7.6.
and the manifesto finding may thus reflect the fact that increased consideration of 
environment or decentralisation has to come at the expense of some other topic (due to 
the measurement approach used to analyse the manifestos). These two issue pairs 
therefore are likely to be examples of associations that result from a weak 
interconnection.
Such conclusions are more difficult to draw for the remaining two issue pairs (A 
and D: economic policy and environment, liberal-authoritarianism and environment). 
The ties between liberal-authoritarianism and the environment were particularly strong in 
the expert surveys, but the association is negative in the manifestos. The clarity of the 
expert survey finding however suggests that this may be the result of a strong 
interconnection rather than independence. Moreover, no static salience interconnection 
was found for this issue pair in the party manifestos, further supporting the assertion that 
the ties between liberal-authoritarianism and the environment are based on strong 
connection, though nevertheless perhaps a circumstantial rather than a logical one.
In contrast, the finding for the final issue pair, economic policy and liberal- 
authoritarianism, was far weaker in the expert surveys. In addition, a static salience 
interconnection was also found for this pair in the manifestos. The negative association
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in the party manifestos will thus probably have been caused by independence rather than 
interconnection in this case.
Discussion: comparing positional and salience interconnections
Finally, it is useful to compare the findings for position and salience interconnections. 
The first point of comparison is the extent to which static interconnections help predict 
dynamic interconnections. For positional links, the conclusion reached was that static 
ties only act as a guide if they are based on the constraints of logic and not of 
circumstance. Thus, static interconnections predict dynamic interconnections, but only 
for certain types of linkages. Turning to salience interconnections, it is clear that static 
interconnections act as a much better predictor here. The static links found for salience 
tend to predict well the occurrence of dynamic interconnections, especially if only the 
stronger static links are considered. Of course, many more dynamic interconnections 
were found than static interconnections, but this is (as I have argued) likely to be the 
result of the increased sample size. Static interconnections are better predictors for 
dynamic linkages in terms of salience than in terms of positions.
A second point of comparison is between the precise issue pairs for which 
dynamic interconnections are found. This is summarised in Figure 7.20. It is clear that 
dynamic salience linkages are far more frequent than the equivalent interconnections for 
positions. In nine cases, a positional but no salience interconnection was found, but for 
17 pairs I only detected a salience interconnection. The findings are identical for only 19 
of the 45 issue pairs. Partly, this is likely to be the result o f the nature of the manifesto 
data with its inherent upper limit on issue coverage. This means that dynamic 
interconnections are found even when (and indeed because) the two issues are in fact 
independent. This is particularly clear for the issue pairs that include economic policy.
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Urban-rural relations
Education P
Decentralization P
EU S S
Environment S S
Democracy p S S
Culture-ethnic matters S p S P P
Liberal-authoritarianism P
Foreign policy P s S S
Economic policy S S s P S S S
Association found for position and salience
P Association found for position only
S Association found for salience only
Figure 7.20 Comparison of results for position and salience interconnections, CMP-
extracted measures
Note: Shaded  boxes are issue  pairs w ith  bo th  position  and sa lience in terconnections; 
boxes m ark ed  resp ec tiv e ly  w ith  ‘P ’ and ‘S ’ have position  or sa lience in terconnections 
on ly ; in fo rm ation  d raw n from  F igure  7 .16 (salience) and  F igure 6 .4  (position).
2 7 4
The salience links found with liberal-authoritarianism and decentralization, for example, 
are likely to reflect independence rather than interconnection. On the other hand, the nine 
cases where an association was found for both salience and position indicate that these 
are strongly linked issue pairs. Again, this clearly applies to economic policy, which is 
consistently strongly tied to foreign policy and the environment.
Conclusion
This chapter builds on and extends the work on position interconnections by applying the 
same ideas and framework to issue salience. The key difference between the two types of 
linkages is that salience interconnections are weaker overall than position 
interconnections. This is because the incentives that support the establishment and 
maintenance of position interconnections have less force where issue salience is 
concerned. Put simply, raising or lowering the salience of one topic has fewer inherent 
logical consequences for the coverage of other topics: issue importance has less of an 
impact on the overall coherence of a party programme. Parties are thus more flexible 
when it comes to deciding on the importance they attach to each issue. This does not 
mean that parties do not exhibit internal interconnections for the salience of issues, but 
that these are relatively rare. Moreover, if they do occur, they are likely to be due to 
strong logical links between the policy areas concerned.
The way this difference of interconnection strength is expressed varies between 
the two datasets. The weaker interconnection finding is particular clear for expert 
surveys, where static interconnections are clearly divided into basic issue groups. In 
addition, dynamic interconnections only exist within each of these issue groups and for 
those issue pairs that have particularly strong static interconnections. In the party 
manifestos the measurement approach itself creates a strong restriction on the freedom of
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parties. This captures an important difference between positions and salience: unlike for 
positions, there is an inherent upper limit in the amount of emphasis a party can put on 
each issue. The consequence of this scarcity of salience resources means that issues that 
are unrelated are negatively associated in terms of salience: parties reduce coverage of 
one topic to make way for another. In contrast to the analysis of positions, the existence 
of ‘opposing’ issues is important to the examination of salience interconnections.
Moving beyond interconnection strength, systematic differences were found 
between static and dynamic as well as between salience and position interconnections. 
Importantly, these differences again led back to the source of interconnections: when 
considering the links between salience levels, it is again necessary to know whether two 
issues are connected due to circumstance or merely due to logic. With this knowledge, it 
is possible to build solid predictions for dynamic from static salience interconnections 
and for salience from position interconnections. In many ways, salience interconnections 
are more clearly structured than position interconnections once the particularities of 
salience in both theory and measurement have been understood.
Salience is an important political tool for political parties and deserves as much 
attention as positional choices. In particular, the analysis in this chapter confirms that 
salience manipulation may be an attractive strategy for parties because interconnections 
are weaker. In other words, parties can (and do) change the salience of different issues 
without necessarily affecting the level of emphasis they are seen as putting on other 
topics. This is strongly underlined by the expert survey findings. While the manifestos 
presented a slightly different picture, partly because of the mechanical effects created by 
the compositional nature of that data source, even here the number of static 
interconnections was lower than for positions. While salience and position are the two 
key characteristics of the issues that make up policy bundles, they differ strongly in the
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way interconnections are realised. Understanding these differences illuminates the place 
of each characteristic in party strategies.
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Benoit and Laver survey (2003)
Foreign Policy  
EU support .40*** (104)
Immigration .11 (117) .03 (13)
Decentralization -.05 (149) .28*** (117) -.08 (130)
Environment .17** (149) .07 (149) -.01 (117) .33*** (130)
Liberal-authoritarianism .29*** (153) -.06(141) .28*** (141) -.05 (117) - . 0 1  ( 1 2 2 )
Economic p o lic y -.13 (153) .15* (161) -.04 (149) .04(149) .10(117) .56*** (130)
Note: sample size in brackets.
Laver and Hunt survey (1989)
Urban-rural relations 
USSR relations .06
Decentralization -.07 .26***
Environment .42*** .08 .15*
Liberal-authoritarianism 3Q*** - .0 1 .06
Economic policy .04 -.2 2 *** 1 to o * * ^2 *** .05
Note: n=149 for all issue pairs, 
p-values: *<.1, ** <.05, *** < .01
Deregulation 
.68*** ( 100) 
.16 (74)
.09(106)  
-.06 (106) 
.26*** (118) 
- .1 2 ( 110) 
.87*** (118)
to
00
A
ppendix 
7.1 
Bivariate 
correlations of salience 
levels, expert surveys
Appendix 7.2 PCA, static interconnections, Laver and Hunt expert survey
all parties (n=143) Components unexplained
Issue 1 2 3 variance
Economic Policy 0.53 -0.19 0.06 0.28
Public Ownership 0.57 -0 .0 1 -0.05 0 .2 1
Foreign Policy 0.53 0.07 -0 .0 1 0.34
Environment -0 . 0 2 0.65 -0.03 0.24
Decentralization -0.09 0.55 0 . 1 2 0.41
Clericalism -0.14 -0.35 0.62 0.17
Urban-Rural 0.07 0.17 0.75 0.16
Liberal-Authoritarianism 0.27 0.28 0.16 0.67
Eigenvalue 2.37 1.79 1.36
Proportion o f total variance explained 0.30 0 .2 2  0.17
Note: Rotated component loadings shown; varimax rotation used; components with 
Eigenvalues over 1 extracted; loadings above .4 and lower than -.4 in bold.
Appendix 7.3 Component scores, PCA, Benoit and Laver expert survey
Component scores of the main party families (BL survey)
Components
Party family (n)
Communist (10)
Green (7)
Social Democratic(13) 
Liberals (8)
Christian Democrats (8) 
Conservatives (8)
Ethn ic-Regionalists (6)
Economic and Foreign 
Policy
mean s.d.
1.40 1 .0 0 -.03
.19 .94 - .1 1
.09 .82 -.33
.79 1.62 -.25
-1.44 1.63 - . 8 6
1.41 1.41 -.05
-2.36 . 8 6 1 .0 1
New Politics
mean s.d.
.93 .44 1.62
1.06 1.76 .26
.69 -.28 .71
.76 .03 .78
1.03 .16 .62
.85 -.82 .83
.82 -.69 1 .2 1
EU/Decentralization
mean s.d.
Note: 10 countries included (Belgium, Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, UK)
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Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 2 --> Issue 1 Issue 1 —> Issue 2
b R 2 added b R 2 added
Economic policy Environment -0.31 0.0993 -0.53 0.1369
Econom ic policy Liberal-authoritarianism -0.29 0.0987 -0.54 0.1178
Economic policy Culture-ethnic matters -0.5 0.0894 -0.27 0.0652
Foreign policy Liberal-authoritarianism -0 . 2 2 0.0657 -0.79 0.1317
Education Environment -0.07 0.0472 -1.05 0.0618
Liberal-authoritarianism EU support - 1 .1 0.0415 -0.06 0.0424
Urban-rural relations Education .35 0.0288
Econom ic policy Decentralization -0.43 0.0263 -0 .1 0.0227
Liberal-authoritarianism Decentralization -0.38 0.0173 -0 .1 0.0195
Culture-ethnic matters Decentralization 0.27 0.0165 0.14 0.0192
EU support Urban-rural relations 0.07* 0.0157
Liberal-authoritarianism Urban-rural relations -0.17* 0.0141 -0 .1 2 * 0.0156
Foreign policy Decentralization -0.16* 0 . 0 1 0 1
Foreign policy Environment .06* 0.0095 .33* 0.0331
Dem ocracy Education -0.24* 0.0093 -0.06* 0 . 0 1 0 2
Culture-ethnic matters Urban-rural relations -0.09 0.0091
Culture-ethnic matters Democracy -0 . 1 2 * 0.0083 -0.14* 0.0113
Only significant coefficients shown; p-values lower than .05 except i f  marked by *: sig  at .1 only
167
190
190
184
163
140
163
164
163
162
131
164
161
164
183
165
187
Appendix 
7.4 
Detailed 
results: static 
interconnections, CM
P 
dataset
Issue I Issue 2 Issue 2 —> Issue 1 Issue 1 —> Issue 2 n
b R2 increase b R2 increase
Foreign policy Liberal-authoritarianism -0.16 0.0333 -0.3 0.0357 1281
Economic policy Liberal-authoritarianism -0 .2 1 0.0326 -0.23 0.0354 1443
Liberal-authoritarianism Education -0.47 0.0283 -0.08 0.0257 1108
Liberal-authoritarianism Environment -0.31 0.026 -0.13 0.0283 862
Liberal-authoritarianism Urban-rural relations -0.28 0.026 -0 . 1 2 0.0294 988
Economic policy Environment -0.32 0.0215 -0 .1 0.023 1016
Economic policy Culture-ethnic matters -0.25 0.0193 -0 .1 1 0.0176 1598
Economic policy Foreign policy -0.18 0.0131 -0 .1 1 0.0114 1590
Foreign policy Culture-ethnic matters -0.15 0 .0 1 1 -0 .1 1 0.0116 1427
Economic policy Democracy -0.16 0.0092 -0.08 0.0079 1634
Foreign policy Urban-rural relations -0.14 0.009 -0 .1 0.0117 1057
Economic policy Decentralization -0.27 0.0088 -0.05 0.0097 1028
Economic policy Education -0.26 0.0086 -0.05 0.0079 1324
Culture-ethnic matters Decentralization 0.18 0.0081 0.07 0.0098 952
Democracy Culture-ethnic matters -0 . 1 2 0.0077 -0 .1 0.008 1448
Economic policy Urban-rural relations -0.15 0.0072 -0.07* 0.0091 1 2 0 2
EU Decentralization -0 .1 * 0.0071 -0 . 1 2 * 0.0099 491
EU Education -0.09 0.0066 -0 . 1 2 * 0.0077 619
Decentralization Environment 0.07* 0.0056 0 .1 0.005 6 8 8
Democracy Urban-rural relations -0 .1 1 0.0056 -0.09 0.009 1084
Culture-ethnic matters EU -0.17 0.0055 -0.05 0.0046 704
EU Environment -0.06* 0.0043 -0.13 0.006 537
Liberal-authoritarianism Culture-ethnic matters -0 .1 1 0.0043 -0.05 0.0039 1331
Foreign policy Education -0 . 1 2 0.0039 -0.05 0.0042 1 2 1 2
Democracy Education -0 . 1 2 0.0032 -0.05 0.004 1216
Foreign policy Environment .07* 0.0029 .07* 0.0032 925
K>OO
Notes: All coefficients significant at less than p<.05 unless marked by * (p<.l). 
Issue 2—> Issue 1: Issue 2 change regressed onto Issue 1 change (and vice versa).
Appendix 
7.5 
Dynam
ic 
interconnections, CM
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dataset
Chapter 8
The salience of unusual issue preferences
In this chapter, I introduce an alternative approach to conceptualising and measuring static 
issue interconnections: the relative unusualness of a party’s policy position compared to its 
programmatic profile as a whole. ‘Unusualness’ here refers to the extent to which a party’s 
views on a particular topic are more extreme or more centrist than its general average 
stance. The concept of unusualness is related to that of static issue interconnections: the 
difference of one policy stance compared to the party’s mean position is another way of 
capturing the extent to which an issue position can be predicted from a party’s other views. 
One key advantage of the unusualness measure is that it provides an issue- and party- 
specific assessment of the strength of static interconnections. In this chapter, I use 
unusualness to demonstrate the impact of policy interconnections on party competition, in 
particular on the political strategy of modifying issue salience.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the salience theory of party competition is one 
of the oldest and best-established rivals to the Downsian spatial model (Downs, 1957; 
Budge and Farlie, 1983). The latter assumes that parties compete by taking up identifiable 
positions on shared policy dimensions, while in the former political parties ‘talk past each 
other’, mentioning only those topics where they have a clear advantage. For many years, 
salience theory was weakened by its position as an alternative, rather than as a 
complement, to spatial competition, and has as a consequence remained relatively 
underdeveloped and under-examined. Recently, renewed attention has been paid to the role 
of issue salience in party competition, with a particular focus on explicitly combining party 
strategies on position and on salience (Green-Pedersen, 2007; Belanger and Meguid, 2008;
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Green and Hobolt, 2008; Meguid, 2008; Tavits, 2008). It is rightly argued that position and 
salience are two attributes of party views on political topics, and that these two 
characteristics are often related. This chapter builds on this recent renewal in interest in 
issue importance in party competition. In particular, I examine which issue positions within 
their policy profiles parties choose to emphasise.
The relationship of a party’s position to its overall ideological package can be 
summarised by the degree to which the position in question is ‘unusual’. As mentioned at 
the beginning of this chapter, I define the unusualness of an issue position as its distance 
from the overall mean extremeness of the party from the political centre. Issue positions 
can thus be unusually extreme or unusually moderate compared to the party profile as a 
whole. When it comes to which issues parties should emphasise in the pursuit of electoral 
success, parties should, at first glance, stress those topics on which they are relatively 
moderate. After all, these are the policy areas where the party is likely to be closer to the 
median voter. However, I suggest that parties may also choose to emphasise precisely 
those issues within their policy profile where their position is relatively extreme. For one, 
an unusually extreme position may reflect a party’s concerted effort to distinguish itself on 
that issue and may indicate the intensity of a party’s preferences on that issue, particularly 
on the part of its supporters. For niche parties (Meguid, 2005; Adams et al., 2006), this 
incentive may be even stronger as their survival depends in particular on carving out for 
themselves a unique role within the party system. I therefore also suggest that the 
incentives for the emphasis of relatively extreme issue preferences should be greater for 
smaller parties, as well as in crowded party systems.
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I define ‘unusual issue positions’ and 
then give an account of the measurement approach and descriptive results for the 2003 
expert survey. Next, I review the extent to which existing literature on salience as an 
electoral strategy in party competition has also taken issue positions into account. I then
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consider the theoretical expectations concerning the effect of positional unusualness on 
issue salience, including the mediating impact of political and institutional factors. Next, I 
outline the measurement of the key variables and present the results of the empirical 
analysis. I conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of the findings for party 
competition research and for the theory of issue interconnections.
Unusual issue positions: definition and measurement
In Chapter 3, I defined static interconnections as the issue linkages between two policy 
areas and argued that this concept was well-captured by the predictive power of one issue 
position for a party’s position on a second topic. This chapter presents an alternative 
approach to conceptualising and measuring static issue interconnections, though one that is 
based on the same theoretical foundations.
This new concept is that of an issue position’s ‘unusualness’ within a party’s 
programmatic profile. An ‘unusual position’ is here defined as one that is more centrist or 
more extreme than those otherwise defended by the party. I therefore assume that there is a 
tendency for parties to be similarly extreme (that is, equally distant from the political 
centre) on most issues. Such an assumption can be justified by the fact that a left-right 
dimension is a universal phenomenon, which means that party programmes can often be 
reduced to a position on a single underlying continuum (Miller et al., 1999; McDonald and 
Budge, 2005). In other words, the parties’ positions on all issues are often relatively 
similar, at least in terms of placement on a Euclidean scale. This simplification of 
programmes has advantages for parties, who benefit from the existence of a simple 
heuristic (left-right or liberal-conservative) that can transmit a large amount of information 
to potential voters (Downs, 1957; Ferejohn, 1993).
However, while there is a tendency towards low-dimensional spaces and simple 
party programmes, this tendency is not complete. Left-right does not capture all there is to
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party competition, and its usefulness varies depending on the national context (Benoit and 
Laver, 2006). Within a party’s programmatic profile, some issue positions will be more 
unusual than others. Thus, positions differ in their distance from the party’s mean position 
relative to the political centre, and the further away from this mean the position on the 
given issue is, the more unusual it is. It is worth stressing that in this chapter only the 
relative position of a party on an issue compared to the party’s other positions is 
considered. In other words, I am not looking at how unusual -  be it extreme or centrist -  a 
position is within a particular party system, that is, compared to the positions of other 
parties.
It is worth presenting in detail how unusualness is operationalised. The degree of 
unusualness equals the distance from the political centre of one issue position minus the 
party’s mean distance from the political centre. In other words, for each issue i in a party 
p 's  policy profile, UnusualnessiP = extremenessjP - mean extremeness^. Positive values 
mean that the party’s position is unusually extreme, negative values that it is unusually 
centrist.
To measure the level of unusualness, three pieces of information are therefore 
needed: first, the location of the political centre; second, the distance of the party on the 
issue in question from the centre; and third, the party’s mean distance from the centre on 
all others issues. All these were calculated using expert survey data. In determining the 
location of the political centre, the fact that this may differ between countries was taken 
into account: the location of the political centre is therefore the mean position on each 
issue of all parties, weighted by the parties’ vote share in the preceding election. The issue- 
specific extremeness is then the party’s absolute positional distance from that centre. The 
party’s mean extremeness was then calculated as the party’s mean absolute distance from 
the political centre on all issues except for the one in question. Subtracting the mean 
extremeness from the issue-specific extremeness provides the unusualness value.
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mean distance
raw party position (bold) distance from from  centre o f positional
Issue and political centre political centre other issues unusualness
Economic policy -9.5 <-------- 1------- 1----- ------>  9.5 3.58 2.18 1.41
-3 0.6
Liberal-authoritarianism -9.5 <-— 1---------- 1------ ------>  9.5 4.85 2 . 0 0 2.86
-3.8 1.1
Immigration -9.5 <■----------1— 1------------- >  9.5 2.48 2.34 0.15
-1.6 0.9
Environment -9.5 < -------------H— ------ >  9.5 0.42 2.63 -2.22
0.4 0.8
EU: Accountability -9.5 <■------- H ------- ------ >  9.5 1 . 0 0 2.55 -1.55
-1.9 -0.9
EU: Authority -9.5 -------- H ----------- > 9.5 0.69 2.43 -1.74
-1.2 -0.5
Peacekeeping -9.5 <--------- H ------ ---- > 9.5 1.81 1.72 0.09
-2  -0.2
Decentralization -9.5 < -------------b - h - ------>  9.5 4.01 2 . 1 2 1.89
-1.2 2.4
Figure 8.1 Example of positional unusualness: Austrian Social Democrats (SPO)
Note: Data from Benoit and Laver (2006).
It is worth illustrating this with an example. Figure 8.1 presents a party’s policy 
package and the unusualness of different issues within it. This example uses the positional 
information provided by Benoit and Laver (2006) on the Austrian Social Democratic Party 
(SPO), measured on a scale from -9.5 to 9.5. The spatial illustration in the second column 
depicts the raw party position as indicated by experts as well as the political centre. For 
instance, the political centre on economic policy is just to the right of the centre (0 .6) in 
Austria. Since the SPO’s raw score on economic policy is -3, the party is 3.6 points to the 
left of the political centre. The party’s mean level of extremeness, that is, its mean distance 
from the political centre on all other issues, is 2.18. The difference between this and the 
issue-specific extremeness produces the unusualness score. Here, the SPO is unusually 
extreme on economic policy, with an unusualness score of 1.4. The party is most unusually 
extreme on liberal-authoritarianism and most unusually centrist on environmental policy. 
Appendix 8.1 presents the complete results for one country, Germany.
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The overall unusualness is presented in Figures 8.2 and 8.3 for the various issues 
and party families. For each issue and party family, the graphs show the mean absolute 
level of unusualness in the Benoit and Laver survey, thus disregarding differences between 
unusual extremeness and unusual centrism. The 95% confidence intervals and a line at the 
overall mean value are also included. The differences between the issues are not great, with 
levels for unusualness close to the mean for all seven policy areas. Economic policy is 
clearly below the mean, while liberal-authoritarianism and decentralisation are above. This 
indicates that positions on economic policy are generally close to the overall party mean 
extremeness and positions on the latter two issues are further away. Turning to the party 
families, a clear pattern emerges: mainstream party families tend to be relatively 
homogenous in their positional profiles, while smaller, niche competitors -  especially 
Green and Communist parties -  tend to exhibit high levels of positional diversity.
Figure 8.4 presents the level of relative unusualness, making it possible to see 
whether issue positions are unusual in their extremeness or in their centrism. It is clear that 
liberal-authoritarianism is overwhelmingly more extreme than the parties’ general profile. 
The same applies, if to a lesser extent, to immigration and deregulation. Decentralisation, 
on the other hand, is an issue where parties are generally more moderate than their overall 
programmatic package would suggest. Other relatively moderate issues are European 
integration and environmental policy.
It is also possible to compare this overall picture with the levels of relative 
unusualness for the seven issues for each party family (Figures 8.5 to 8.13). There are clear 
differences between the party families, who vary in the level of unusualness of the 
different policy areas. On economic policy, for example, Communists and Conservatives 
are unusually extreme, and Christian Democrats and Agrarian parties centrist. On the 
environment, Green parties are unsurprisingly more extreme, as are Christian Democrats 
on liberal-authoritarianism and Liberals on deregulation. Despite these inter-family
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CO -
Figure 8.2 Absolute unusualness by issue, Benoit and Laver expert survey
Note: F igure show s abso lu te  levels o f  unusualness for each  issue, i.e. the  m ean  abso lu te  
d istance from  the po litica l cen tre  for each issue; line at m ean  overa ll salience; 95%  
confidence in tervals show n; D ereg  =  deregulation ; FP =  fo re ign  po licy ; E con  =  econom ic  
policy ; LA  =  libera l-au thoritarian ism ; Envi = environm ent; D ecen t = d ecen tra liza tion ; E U  
= E U  support; Im m ig  = im m igration ; data from  B enoit and L aver (2006).
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Figure 8.3 Absolute unusualness by party family, Benoit and Laver expert survey
Note: F igu re  show s abso lu te  levels o f  unusualness by  p arty  fam ily , i.e. the  m ean abso lu te  
d istance  from  the po litica l cen tre  b y  party  fam ily; line at m ean  overa ll sa lience; 95%  
co n fid en ce  in tervals show n; C om  =  C om m unists; S ocD em  =  Social D em ocrats; L ib =  
L ibera ls; C D  =  C hristian  D em ocrats; C on  =  C onservatives; A gri =  A grarians; N a t =  
N atio n a lis ts ; E th -R eg  =  E thn ic-R eg ionalists; data from  B eno it and  L av er (2006).
CN -
(/)
Figure 8.4 Relative unusualness by issue, Benoit and Laver expert survey
Note: F igu re  show s re la tive  levels o f  unusualness; negative  v alues are unusu a lly  cen trist; 
p o sitiv e  v alues are unusu a lly  extrem e; line at m ean overa ll sa lience; 95%  con fid en ce  
in te rva ls  show n; D ereg  =  deregu la tion ; FP = foreign po licy ; E con  =  econom ic po licy ; LA  
=  lib e ra l-au tho ritarian ism ; Envi =  environm ent; D ecent =  decen tra liza tion ; E U  =  E U  
support; Im m ig  = im m igra tion ; da ta  from  B eno it and L aver (2006).
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Figures 8.5 to 8.13 Relative unusualness by party family, Benoit and Laver survey
Note: line at m ean overall salience; 95%  confidence  in tervals show n; C om  =  C om m unists; S ocD em  = 
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differences, party families are nevertheless similar in their levels of unusualness on some 
issues. Thus, there is little divergence between party families on decentralisation and 
European integration.
In this section I have presented the conceptual underpinning of positional 
unusualness and described its empirical measurement using expert surveys. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I consider the place of issue unusualness in party strategies. In 
particular, I use this new indicator as an independent variable and examine its effect on 
issue salience.
Unusualness and salience
This chapter builds on recent work into party strategies by considering salience and 
position at the same time (Kriesi et al., 2008b; Meguid, 2008; Tavits, 2008). Thus, instead 
of arguing that salience should replace position in party competition theory or that salience 
variation should be considered an alternative electoral strategy, I suggest that position and 
salience are fundamentally linked.
Issue salience and policy positions
There are three stances in the literature on the relationship between issue positions and 
issue salience. The first of these argues that positional theories are faulty as parties 
compete only by raising and lowering issue importance. The early proponents of salience 
and valence theory in particular (e.g. Stokes, 1963; Budge and Farlie, 1983) concluded that 
issue positions were less important than often claimed. Instead, they suggest that one 
should look to salience rather than positions to describe and explain party strategies. In this 
view, salience is presented as an alternative, not complementary way of understanding 
party competition. The fundamental argument of such authors is that we are wrong to think
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that parties compete by taking up distinct positions on common issues. Instead, they stress 
issues that they are seen as ‘owning’.
A second view accepts that parties do occupy policy positions but argues that such 
positional reputations are very difficult to change (Petrocik, 1996). It is worth 
remembering that even Downs argued that party positions are likely to remain relatively 
stable due to parties’ need to appear responsible and reliable (Downs, 1957, p. 109). In a 
situation where positions are relatively fixed, parties may find it easier and more effective 
to change the salience of their issues rather than attempt to change their policy position 
(Steenbergen and Scott, 2004, p. 167). In this view, parties vary their emphasis on certain 
topics in order to exploit an existing positional advantage. Party politics then turns into a 
‘competition for issue space’ (Carmines and Stimson, 1986, p. 915) where the introduction 
of new dimensions of political conflict can significantly alter the relative support parties 
gamer (see also Riker, 1986). In other words, in this part of the literature salience is seen as 
not the only, but nevertheless the most strategically important policy characteristic, as 
policy positions are overwhelmingly stable.
The third and most recent approach considers salience and position to be distinct 
but complementary characteristics of political issues. Parties should be seen as making 
decisions regarding both the stance they take and how much they emphasise that stance 
(Meguid, 2005). Modifying issue emphasis is then a further weapon in a party’s arsenal 
during an election campaign. A model of party competition that ignores either position or 
salience is probably too simple. Instead, we should examine how these two attributes of a 
party’s policy profile are linked. Considering both position and salience as associated 
strategies in party competition is an approach that differs from the majority of existing 
literature. Recent work has, however, tried to integrate salience into a spatial model of 
party competition (Meguid, 2005; Kriesi et al., 2008b; Tavits, 2008). Here, party strategies 
are seen as encompassing salience and ownership elements as well as just programmatic
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appeals (Meguid, 2005, p. 349). Both issue positions and issue importance can be 
manipulated by political parties in the pursuit of electoral gains.
The salience o f  unusual policy positions
I follow this recent work in considering salience and position at the same time: instead of 
arguing that salience should replace position in party competition theory or that salience 
variation should be considered an alternative electoral strategy, I suggest that position and 
salience are fundamentally linked. More precisely, in this chapter I examine which issue 
positions within a party profile are emphasised by political parties. The assumption in this 
chapter is therefore that positional decisions precede salience choices in party strategies. In 
other words, the decisions taken regarding policy positions have an effect on the salience 
the party publicly gives to the issue.64 Policy positions are therefore treated as exogenous, 
and the level of issue salience as endogenous. A complete model of party competition 
would, as Steenbergen and Scott (2004, p. 167) point out, treat both aspects of policy 
programmes as endogenous because parties need to make ‘strategic choices on both issue 
salience and issue positions’; however, they add that ‘it is difficult to identify such a 
model’.
Parties should emphasise unusual positions more than others within their policy 
profile. I have argued that parties will tend to take similarly extreme or centrist positions 
on all issues. Parties will not diverge from such a homogenous policy profile without 
reason. Taking up an unusual position can reflect an effort to adopt a particular political 
stance, and one that is noticeably different from its overall profile. Instead of giving the 
automatic response to a political question, the party decides to diverge from its general 
position on an issue. The factors that lead parties to take such a decision mean that the
64 This is arguably more realistic than the reverse assumption: that parties decide on the salience they wish to 
give to a topic before choosing a position. This would mean that a party would decide that it cared very 
strongly about, say, economic or foreign policy, before having some idea concerning the position it wishes to 
take.
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position in question is also likely to be stressed by them. It is therefore worth considering 
what might lead parties to single out one issue over others.
In discussing issue ownership, Petrocik, Benoit et al. (2003, p. 602) argue that there 
are three reasons why a party might decide to concentrate on an issue: sincerity, internal 
party imperatives and strategic calculation. Sincerity refers to the beliefs of elite 
politicians, while internal party imperatives refer to the pressure exerted by the party’s 
constituent groups. Strategic calculation refers to party behaviour aimed directly at 
increasing political success, whether through votes or office. These three incentives to 
stress specific issues also explain why parties might decide to take up an unusual position. 
Importantly, the motivation behind taking up an unusual issue position is different for 
unusually extreme and unusually centrist positions.
Explaining increased emphasis on relatively centrist positions is straightforward. 
While sincerity and internal party imperatives may of course play a role, the strategic 
motives are also strong. It is thus well-established that parties should have an incentive to 
stress those positions within its profile on which it is most centrist. For example, a Social 
Democratic party that wants to gain new voters can stress its tough approach to law-and- 
order, a tactic pursued by New Labour in the run-up to the 1997 election (van der Brug, 
2004). If the aim is to capture the median voter, then the party should emphasise those 
issues where it is located close to the median voter. One of the oldest and most well-known 
predictions in political science is that parties, given certain assumptions, will converge 
towards the median voter (Hotelling, 1929; Downs, 1957). The centripetal incentives 
leading to policy moderation should also mean that parties will stress those issues on which 
they are particularly centrist. Put simply, the aim of vote-maximisation should lead parties 
to stress their unusually moderate positions.
Of course, the reality of political competition has proved that this convergence is by 
no means perfect, and various explanations for this, even within the Downsian framework,
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have been offered (Aldrich, 1983; Miller and Schofield, 2003; Schofield, 2003; Grofman, 
2004; Adams et al., 2005; Schofield and Sened, 2006). Generally, the starting assumption 
is that parties should converge but that various reasons exist for parties to fail to do so, be 
it abstention, activists, campaign donors or other competitors. Similarly, it is also possible 
that parties will stress unusually extreme positions as much as unusually centrist ones. 
First, a party’s unusually extreme positions can be the result of internal party imperatives: 
such issues might be those on which its supporters and funders have particularly strong 
preferences, preventing any moves to the centre. This would also mean that such positions 
are more likely to be emphasised. Second, there are also strategic incentives to present 
unusually extreme positions. Controlling for the general political environment, presenting 
such a position to the public is a way for parties to attract notice: they allow for the 
‘product differentiation’ that can be a key to electoral success (Kitschelt, 1994, p. 118). 
Parties can in this way build up a strong reputation and issue ownership for themselves 
(Petrocik, 1996). In sum, it would make sense for parties to stress unusually extreme 
positions due to, first, the power of the party base and party funders and, second, the 
strategic benefits of product differentiation.65
Interactions with unusualness: party size and party system size
The impact on salience of the unusualness of an issue position should depend on two other 
factors. First, smaller parties will be more tempted to stress a unique stance. Such parties 
may try to carve out a particular issue-based ‘niche’ for themselves (Meguid, 2005; Adams 
et al., 2006). For one, small parties may be most successful in generating media coverage 
if they concentrate on one (controversial) issue. For Meguid (2005), this increased
65 While the reasons to avoid stressing unusually extreme positions are relatively well-known, there might 
also be a reason why a party might fail to stress an unusually centrist position. Thus, an unusually centrist 
position could reflect the fact that this issue is not a party’s priority. Taking up a position close to the centre 
may simply mean that the party has given a standard response when faced with a political issue. For example, 
extreme-right parties often have relatively centrist economic policies, but these positions are also generally o f  
less relevance to those parties’ image.
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emphasis on a single issue is also fundamental to the electoral success of niche parties: 
‘Unable to benefit from pre-existing partisan allegiances or the broad allure of 
comprehensive ideological positions, niche parties rely on the salience and attractiveness 
of their one policy stance for voter support.’ This gives them an incentive to put particular 
emphasis on topics that set them apart from their (larger) competitors. For niche parties, 
distinguishing themselves from mainstream parties will usually equate to taking an 
extreme position. Indeed, it has been shown that policy moderation is costly for niche 
parties but not for their mainstream competitors (Adams et al., 2006; Ezrow, 2008b). Thus, 
these parties should be expected to stress their relatively extreme positions as a means of 
carving out a niche and ensuring party growth and survival. In contrast, larger, ‘catch-all’ 
parties, which aim to attract as great a number of voters as possible, tend to have more 
comprehensive policy platforms and the resources to publicise them (Kirchheimer, 1990 
[1966]; Meguid, 2005). Concentrating on one issue will thus be less essential to that 
party’s success.
Second, parties may be more likely to stress unusual issue positions within their 
programmatic profile if they are competing in a large party system. This is due to the 
incentives created by what Kitschelt terms the ‘crowdedness’ of the competitive space. In 
his view, the choice of electoral programmes by a party will depend on the positions of its 
competitors, in particular the extent to which certain political spaces are still unoccupied 
(Kitschelt, 1994, p. 34). According to Dow (2001, p. 111), it is often argued that a system 
with fewer political parties creates ‘convergent spatial incentives’, while larger party 
systems induce ‘divergent spatial incentives’. This is due to the fact that the ideal positions 
for vote-maximisation are nearer to the centre when there are fewer competitors in the 
system. There is thus a stronger incentive for ‘product differentiation’ when a system is 
more fragmented (Cox, 1990; Kitschelt, 1994, p. 118; Ezrow, 2008a). The greater
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incentive to differentiate in a large party system should mean that parties are more likely to 
stress unusual issue positions when they are faced with a larger number of competitors.
Political environment and issue salience
O f course, positional unusualness is not the sole determinant of issue salience for a 
particular party. The political environment will also play an important role. Therefore, two 
strategic aspects should be controlled for. First, parties do not have monopolistic agenda 
control (Steenbergen and Scott, 2004, p. 169; Green-Pedersen, 2007, p. 610). Even if a 
party may want to de-emphasise a certain issue, it might not be able to do so if other 
parties choose to focus on that topic. The inverse is true as well: while a party may wish to 
stress an issue, it might not be able to if the other parties refuse to follow suit. Second, 
parties respond to electoral incentives when choosing to emphasise certain issues. Issues 
will only become salient if there is real political differentiation, that is, if it is possible to 
distinguish between the positions of political actors. Netjes and Binnema (2007, p. 40) give 
the example of European integration: ‘The main reason for [the] absence of the EU issue 
from domestic party competition is said to be the pro-integration consensus among the 
mainstream parties. In other words, there is no incentive to compete, since parties cannot 
distinguish themselves.’ Parties may thus only choose to stress unusual issues if there are 
no other parties that claim a similar position.
Measurement
As in the previous chapters, the main data sources are the two expert surveys carried out 
respectively by Laver and Hunt in 1989 and Benoit and Laver in 2003 as well as the CMP
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dataset (Klingemann et al., 2007). Twenty-three countries, all EU/OECD members, are 
included in this analysis.66
Dependent variable: issue salience
Salience measurements were taken from the expert surveys and manifesto data. In the 
surveys, each expert was asked to provide the ‘relative importance’ of each policy area for 
each party (Benoit and Laver, 2006). The scale ranges from 1 to 20. In the 1989 survey, 
salience information is available for the same eight issues for all 23 countries.67 In the 2003 
survey, the issues for which data is available differ by country.68
Expert surveys provide a simple, straightforward measurement of salience, but one 
that is not altogether free of methodological concerns. Thus, experts may be influenced by 
the position of the party in their evaluation of issue importance: experts who assign an 
extreme position to a party on an issue may also be likely to think that this issue is 
important to that party. There may thus be a certain amount of interdependence between 
position and salience in the expert survey, possibly biasing the results. A second concern is 
that my measurement of the key independent variable, unusualness, is also based on the 
expert surveys, and the findings may as a result only be the consequence of the 
idiosyncrasies of these surveys. In order to provide further confirmation of my hypotheses 
and following the recommendation of Marks (2007), I therefore also use the manifesto data 
as a second measurement of salience.
Here, the manifesto chosen is from the election closest to that of the relevant expert 
survey. Salience levels from the CMP data were assigned to equivalent topics in the expert
66 The 23 countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, the UK and the US.
67 The eight issues are: economic policy (taxes versus spending), social policy, environment, USSR relations, 
decentralisation, public ownership, urban-rural relations and clericalism. Clericalism is not available for 
Iceland in the 1989 survey.
68 Four issues are nevertheless available for almost all countries: economic policy (taxes versus spending), 
social policy, environment and decentralisation. For more information on the issues included and the question 
wording, see Benoit and Laver (2006).
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Dependent variables n mean s.d. min max
Salience (expert survey) 1328 12.61 2.97 2.72 19.81
Salience (manifestos) 893 7.68 7.06 0 . 0 0 45.46
Independent variables
Unusualness: extreme 1328 0.00 2.37 -7.39 10.03
Systemic salience (manifestos) 893 7.68 5.52 0 . 0 0 30.95
Systemic salience (expert surveys) 1328 12.61 1.89 5.60 18.11
Mean party salience 1328 12.57 1.77 -3.71 16.34
Vote share 1321 14.46 0.36 13.75 15.17
Table 8.1 Descriptive statistics of main variables
Note: Data from Laver and Hunt (1992), Budge et al. (2001), Benoit and Laver (2006) and 
Klingemann et al. (2001).
survey, using the categorisation developed in Chapter 4, which was based partly on the 
examples of Budge and Laver (1992a) and Stoll (2005). For a full list of the manifestos 
selected and the CMP categories assigned to each topic, see Appendices 8.2 to 8.4. It is 
worth noting that the expert survey and CMP measures have different theoretical bases. 
The manifesto data restricts itself to a party’s public statements: it does not take into 
account what the party in fact ‘does’. The expert survey summarises the informed opinion 
of academic specialists, so goes beyond the mere measurement of public statements. 
Therefore, the two measures reflect ‘different conceptual underpinnings of salience’ 
(Netjes and Binnema, 2007, p. 45).69 Descriptive statistics for the salience measurements 
used in the regression models can be found in Table 8.1.
Independent variable: unusualness
The measurement of the main independent variable was described above, and summary 
statistics for this variable can also be found in Table 8.1. Negative values indicate that the 
issue position is unusually centrist, and positive values that the position is extreme
69 In order to assess whether one salience dimension underlies both measures, I carried out a correlation 
analysis, following the approach used by Netjes and Binnema (2007, p. 45) to examine different measures o f  
salience o f  the EU issue. The correlation between the two measures is positive, but relatively weak (1989: 
r=0.34, n=756; 2003: r=0.28, n=893). This is very similar to the level o f correlation found by Netjes and 
Binnema, who argue that the weakness of the correlation should not be surprising given the different 
theoretical foundations o f the measures.
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compared to the rest of the party ideology. While this variable has already been considered 
at length, two points are nevertheless worth making. First, as measured here the political 
centre varies by issue and is calculated as the mean position of all parties, weighted by vote 
share. It could have been argued that experts would have already taken the location of the 
political centre into account in their scoring approach, so that 10.5 (the midpoint of the 1- 
20 scale) could also have been chosen as a proxy for the issue-specific political centre. All 
models were also run with this measurement, with no noteworthy differences in the 
direction or magnitude of the results.
Second, the measure for unusualness in terms of extremeness is unsurprisingly 
highly correlated with the distance of the position from the political centre (r=.8). In a 
regression model, it would have been interesting to include both measures, as this would 
indicate the added explanatory value of the unusualness measurement as compared to the 
simple distance from the centre. However, including both measures would increase 
multicollinearity substantially, so it is difficult to distinguish empirically between the two 
characteristics of party positions. In terms of constmcting an interpretable regression 
model, it is therefore necessary to choose one of the two measures, and this decision needs 
to be based on a theoretical justification and the nature of the research question. Here, I ask 
which positions within a party’s profile are emphasised, so it makes sense to use the 
independent variable that captures this approach. Moreover, in practical terms, the 
unusualness measurement also allows the construction of a useful assessment of relative 
centrism if its squared value is included as an additional independent variable. Taking the 
distance from the political centre does not enable the creation of such a variable, at least 
not based on a strong theoretical grounding.
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Independent variables: interaction effects
I suggest that two factors may interact with unusualness in their effect on salience: party 
size and party system size. As a measurement of party size, I use the score achieved by the 
party in the election immediately preceding the expert survey. In the case of the 2003 
Benoit and Laver expert survey, this information was already included in the dataset. For 
the 1989 Laver and Hunt expert survey, the variable was added from the Parline database, 
available on the website of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU, 2007). I measure party 
system size using the most common index, the Effective Number of Electoral Parties 
(ENEP) (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979).70 ENEP is calculated as 1 / Epj2: 1 divided by the 
sum of the squared vote shares for each party (p*) (Dunleavy and Boucek, 2003, p. 292f.). 
The scores were taken from Gallagher (2007) for 1989 and 2003, the years in which the 
expert surveys were carried out.
Independent variables: political environment
Three further measures were calculated in order to control for some of the influence of the 
political environment. First, I calculated the level of systemic salience for each issue in 
order to account for external agenda control (Steenbergen and Scott, 2004, p. 173). This is 
the average salience for each issue for all parties in a given country. The party under 
consideration was excluded in order to avoid endogeneity problems. For example, if there 
are three parties (A, B and C) then the systemic salience for party A is the mean salience 
for parties B and C.71
Second, in order to control for the electoral incentives created by political 
differentiation, I created a dummy variable for the existence of other parties in the political 
vicinity. A party was coded as taking up roughly the same position as another party if it
70 Since this chapter addresses electoral rather than parliamentary politics, the index for electoral parties was 
chosen instead o f that for parliamentary parties.
71 As in Steenbergen and Scott (2004), each party was weighted equally.
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was within one point on either side on the expert survey scale. For example, if party A and 
party B have scores of 4.5 and 5.3 respectively, another party was considered to be present 
at roughly the same policy position. Each side of the issue was seen as fundamentally 
separate, so if party A has a score of -0.5 and party B of 0.3, each party is seen as taking up 
distinguishable positions.72 While this is a simple measurement, it should capture at least 
some of the extent to which two parties were seen as occupying a fundamentally similar 
policy position.
Finally, for each issue in the expert survey, a mean party salience score was 
calculated. This is the mean salience of all issues, excluding the issue under consideration. 
This controls for the possible occurrence that some parties might simply stress all issues
73more than others, for example due to their greater resources (Meguid, 2005, p. 349). 
Descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in the regression models can be 
found in Table 8.1.
Results and analysis
The main test of this chapter’s claims is provided through a cross-sectional regression 
analysis for the 2003 expert survey. The same analysis was also carried out for the 1989 
survey; the results, which do not differ meaningfully, are not discussed in detail but 
presented in the appendix. Changes within parties over time are examined by looking at 
salience differences between 1989 and 2003.
72 In Germany, the CDU and CSU were not coded as competitors even though they were given separate 
scores in the Laver/Hunt survey. In Belgium, each language community was coded separately as the parties 
in each part do not compete with each other directly. Similarly, Northern Ireland was treated as a distinct 
political system.
73 This score was not calculated for the CMP data as issue salience there is measured in percentage terms, i.e. 
in terms o f relative presence.
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Cross-sectional analysis
Tables 8.2 and 8.3 present the results of a multiple linear regression analysis of issue 
salience. In Table 8.2, the dependent variable is the salience measurement provided by the 
expert survey itself; in Table 8.3, the measurement extracted from the manifesto dataset is 
used. Party dummies were included as a control in all models. The results for the Laver and 
Hunt dataset do not differ substantially and are included in Appendix 8.5.
There is clear evidence that unusual issues are stressed more heavily: the more 
unusual an issue position within a party’s political programme, the more that party will 
tend to emphasise it. The relevant coefficient is positive and significant in all models, and 
inclusion of this variable increases the explained variance (adjusted R2). With the expert 
survey measurement, unusualness is almost as important as the systemic level of salience 
in explaining variation in salience levels. For the manifesto measurement, the standardised 
beta score is still over half the size of that for systemic salience. Adding the unusualness 
measure greatly improves the variance in salience explained by the models. This is 
especially true for the expert survey measurement. The model without an unusual 
measurement explains about 36% of the variance; this increases by 27% for the model with 
extreme unusualness. The additional variance explained by adding the squared term is just 
1%. For the manifesto measurement, adding unusualness also improves the amount of 
variance explained by the model, but less impressively. Here, model 4 (without an 
unusualness measurement) explains about 40% of the variance; this increases by 6% for 
model 5 (extreme unusualness). Again, adding the squared term adds little in terms of 
explained variance.
However, in general unusually extreme positions are stressed more. In models 2 
and 5, which only consider the level of positional extremeness, every one-unit increase in 
a position’s unusualness is associated with a 0.32 increase in expert-survey issue salience
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Predictors B stand. B B stand. B B stand. B
U n u s u a ln e s s :  e x t r e m e .321*** (.076) .256 .274*** (.074) .219
U n u s u a ln e s s :  s q u a r e d .047*** (.006) .141
V o te  s h a r e -.041** (.018) -.181 -.031** (.014) -.138 -.022 (.014) -.096
I n te r a c t i o n :  U n u s u a l n e s s * v o t e  s h a r e -.006*** (.002) -.067 -.006*** (.002) -.064
E N E P -.038 (.144) -.021 -.052 (.110) -.028 -.038 (.107) -.021
I n te r a c t i o n :  U n u s u a ln e s s * E N E P .077*** (.013) .326 .080*** (.013) .323
S y s t e m i c  s a l i e n c e .654*** (.042) .415 .495*** (.033) .315 .509*** (.032) .323
M e a n  p a r t y  s a l i e n c e -.611*** (.069) -.365 -.213*** (.054) -.127 -.198*** (.053) -.118
O t h e r  p a r t y -.644*** (.150) -.108 .166 (.118) .028 .177 (.115) .030
P a r t y  d u m m ie s Yes Yes Yes
C o n s ta n t 16.470** (1.644) 12.272*** (1.263) 11.392*** (1.240)
Adj. R2 .36 .63 .64
n 1321 1321 1321
*p<.l, **p<.05, ***p<.01; standard errors in parentheses.
Table 8.2 Regression results with expert survey salience as dependent variable
Predictors
Model 4 
B stand. B
Model 5 
B stand. B
Model 6 
B stand. B
U n u s u a ln e s s :  e x t r e m e 1.08*** (.278) .357 .955*** (.276) .315
U n u s u a ln e s s :  s q u a r e d .110*** (.024) .132
V o te  s h a r e .016 (.048) .029 .019 (.045) .036 .049 (.045) .093
I n te r a c t io n :  U n u s u a l n e s s * v o t e  s h a r e -.017** (.007) -.079 -.015* (.008) -.071
E N E P -.132 (.413) -.028 -.125 (.395) -.026 -.018 (.390) -.004
I n te r a c t io n :  U n u s u a ln e s s * E N E P -.048 (.051) -.080 -.036 (.051) -.060
S y s t e m ic  s a l i e n c e .835*** (.034) .653 .798*** (.033) .624 .807*** (.033) .631
O th e r  p a r t y -1.426*** (.429) -.101 -.596 (.422) -.042 -.480** (.418) -.034
P a r t y  d u m m ie s Yes Yes Yes
C o n s ta n t 3.625 (3.087) 4.281 (2.948) 2.642(2.931)
Adj. R2 .40 .46 .47
n 893 893 893
*p<.l, **p<.05, ***p<.01; standard errors in parentheses.
Table 8.3 Regression results with manifesto salience as dependent variable
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and an additional 1.08% of manifesto sentences devoted to that topic. By adding a 
quadratic term, it is also possible to examine the difference between unusually extreme and 
unusually centrist positions. In models 3 and 6, this added variable is strongly significant. 
To examine the precise effect of the quadratic term, it is necessary to plot the fitted values. 
For the expert survey (Figure 8.14), we can see that unusualness in terms of centrism has 
no effect on salience: below 0, the relationship between the two variables is relatively 
weak. The fitted values for the manifesto measurement (Figure 8.15) show a stronger U- 
shaped relationship, but only very centrist positions are stressed more than positions 
that are not unusual. The dominant impression is that unusually extreme positions are 
stressed far more than unusually centrist positions.
The larger the party is, the weaker the association between unusualness and 
salience. The effect is quite substantial, as is shown in Figures 8.16 and 8.17. Looking at 
the manifesto data, the predicted marginal effect of a position’s relative extremeness within 
a party’s programmatic profile is about half as great for a party with 30% of the vote than 
for a party with 10%. Above approximately 30%, we cannot be sure that there is a 
marginal effect at all. The expert survey data presents a similar picture, as the marginal 
effect of ‘extreme unusualness’ again declines with increasing party size, with no 
significant impact for parties above around 20%.
However, the evidence on party system size is not clear (Figures 8.18 and 8.18). 
For the expert survey data, party system size has the expected effect: the larger the party 
system, the more parties are likely to stress issues that are extreme within their positional 
profile. The effect is significant and quite strong: the predicted impact on salience of a one- 
unit increase in extreme unusualness rises by about 0.5 points if the effective number of 
electoral parties goes up by six points. For the manifesto data, there is no significant effect 
of party system size. Moreover, the sign is in the opposite direction than predicted: an in-
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Unusualness
Figure 8.14 Effect of unusualness on salience, expert survey measure of salience
Note: x -ax is  show s relative level o f  unusualness, w ith  negative  values u n u su a lly  cen tris t 
and p o sitiv e  values u nusua lly  ex trem e; y -ax is show s pred ic ted  level o f  sa lience  u s in g  the 
expert su rvey  m easure ; values g raphed  based  on M odel 3 in T able 8.2; 95%  confidence  
in tervals show n as dashed  line.
Unusualness
Figure 8.15 Effect of unusualness on salience, manifesto measure of salience
Note: x -ax is  show s re la tive  level o f  unusualness, w ith  negative v alues u n u su a lly  cen trist 
and positiv e  values u nusua lly  extrem e; y-ax is show s pred ic ted  level o f  sa lience  u s in g  the 
m an ifesto  m easure ; va lues g raphed  based  on M odel 6 in T ab le  8.3; 95%  confidence  
in tervals show n as dashed  line.
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Figure 8.16 Marginal effect of unusualness on salience conditional on party size,
expert survey measure of salience
Note: x -ax is  show s the size o f  the party  m easured  in per cent; y -ax is show s the p red ic ted  
effec t o f  ex trem e unusualness on salience; values graphed  based  on M odel 3 in T ab le  8.2; 
95%  confidence  in tervals show n as dashed line.
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Figure 8.17 Marginal effect of unusualness on salience conditional on party size,
expert survey measure of salience
Note: x -ax is  show s the size o f  the party  m easured  in per cent; y -ax is show s the p red ic ted  
effec t o f  ex trem e unusualness on salience; values graphed  based  on  M odel 6 in T ab le  8.3; 
95%  confidence  in tervals show n as dashed line.
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Figure 8.18 Marginal effect of unusualness on salience conditional on party system 
size, expert survey measure of salience
Note: x -ax is  show s the size o f  the party  system  m easured  as the  e ffec tive  n u m b er o f  
e lec to ra l parties; y -ax is  show s the pred ic ted  effect o f  ex trem e unu su a ln ess  on salience; 
v a lues g raphed  based  on M odel 3 in T able 8.2; 95%  confidence  in tervals show n as dashed  
line.
Party System Size
-----------  Margnal Effect of Extreme Unusualness
----------- 95% Confidence I nterval
Figure 8.19 Marginal effect of unusualness on salience conditional on party system 
size, expert survey measure of salience
Note: x -ax is  show s the size o f  the p arty  system  m easured  as the  effec tive  n u m b er o f  
e lecto ral parties; y -ax is show s the p red ic ted  effect o f  ex trem e u n u sua lness on  salience; 
v a lues g raphed  b ased  on M odel 6 in T able 8.3; 95%  con fidence  in tervals  show n  as dashed  
line.
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crease in ENEP is here expected to lead to a decreasing impact of extreme unusualness on 
salience. For the 1989 Laver and Hunt survey (see Appendix 8.5), the interaction effect is 
positive but not significant for expert survey salience and negative and significant for the 
manifesto-extracted salience. There is thus contradictory evidence on the effect of party 
system size on the impact of unusual issue positions on salience.
Finally, the controls taking into account the political environment have the 
following expected effects. The systemic level of salience has a positive and large effect on 
the party’s level of salience on the same issue, while the presence of another party in the 
close vicinity tends to reduce issue salience substantially. The political environment thus 
has a clear impact on issue salience.
Issue and party fam ily  differences
The effect of unusualness on salience may differ depending on the issue under 
consideration. It is therefore worth distinguishing between the different policy areas 
included in the surveys. In order to let the effect of unusualness on salience vary by issue, I 
included issue dummies and an additional interaction term, extreme unusualness*issue, in 
Models 3 and 6.74
As seen in Table 8.4, unusualness has an effect on salience for almost all issues, for 
both types of the dependent variable. In the expert surveys, the effect is not statistically 
significant for only one issue, foreign policy; in the manifestos, the effect disappears only 
for European integration and immigration. This is already an interesting result. The overall 
effect of unusualness on salience is not due to one or two of the issues. Instead, it is a 
generalised phenomenon that holds across political topics. The same is also true for the 
1989 expert survey, whose results are presented in Appendix 8.6.
74 As before, mean party salience is not included when the manifesto measurement o f salience is the 
dependent variable.
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Expert survey M anifestos
by issue
Economic policy 0.46 1.44
Liberal-authoritarianism 0.54 1.3
Environmental policy 0.73 1.61
Decentralization 0.39 1.37
Foreign policy -0.09 0.9
European integration 0.19 0.58
Immigration 0.48 0.48
by party family
Communist 0.24 1.06
Green 0.41 1.23
Social Democrat 0.17 0.78
Liberal 0.29 0.45
Christian Democrat 0.32 1.37
Conservative 0.61 1.35
Agrarian 0.37 0.53
Nationalist 0.64 1.20
Ethnic-Regionalist 0.34 0.84
Table 8.4 Effect of extreme unusualness on salience by issue and party family
Note: All coefficients significantly different from 0 at a .05 level, except for those 
underlined; results based on Models 3 (Table 8.2; expert survey salience) and 6 (Table 8.3; 
party manifesto salience), with interactions with issue dummies (e.g. extreme unusualness 
* economic policy dummy) or with party family (e.g., extreme unusualness * Communist 
party family dummy).
Of course, there are nevertheless some differences between the issues. The largest 
impact of unusualness is for environmental policy, where parties appear to stress their 
more extreme positions the most. Economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism also have a 
consistently large impact. The salience of two issues linked to international relations -  
foreign policy and EU support -  tend to be least affected by their relative unusualness. The 
two data sources present remarkably similar results, with only few shifts in the ranking of 
issues.75 It is particularly noteworthy that economics -  often seen as the fundamental 
divide in politics -  is one of the issues with the strongest unusualness effect. This lends 
further weight to the claim that it is not a marginal phenomenon that parties emphasise
75 A model allowing the effect o f the quadratic term to vary by issue was also run. The results are not 
presented here as no marked differences were visible.
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their more extreme positions. Other topics generally seen as central to the political debate 
such as liberal-authoritarianism and the environment also exhibit a relatively strong effect. 
It is on the topics that parties tend to agree on, for example foreign policy and EU 
integration, where there is little influence of unusualness on salience.
Party families may also differ systematically in the effect of unusualness on 
salience. This was again examined using an interaction term, this time extreme 
unusualness *party family, which was added to Models 3 and 6. The summary results for 
the models are also presented in Table 8.4. Again, the dominant impression is that the 
effect of unusualness on salience is present for most party families. This is true for both the 
expert survey and the manifesto measurement of salience. In the former data source, there 
is no effect of extreme unusualness only on Social Democratic parties; in the latter, there is 
no significant effect for Liberal, Agrarian and Ethnic-Regionalist parties. There is 
definitely a general link that is not restricted to marginal parties. That said, there is a clear 
trend for smaller, niche-type party families to exhibit a greater effect. Green and 
Nationalist families show a relatively strong effect for both data sources. For Liberals and 
Social Democrats, the effect of unusualness is weaker or even absent.
Two party families are particularly interesting in the patterns exhibited. The 
Conservative parties tend to behave more like a niche party in this analysis. They are one 
of the party families that stress their relatively extreme positions the most. This result is 
consistent between the two salience measurements. Second, the Christian Democrats 
strongly differ in their placement depending on the salience measurements. According to 
the experts, their emphasis of unusually extreme positions is similar to that of other 
mainstream party families. However, the manifesto measure produces the diametrically 
opposite result: here, the Christian Democrats are one of the families most likely to stress 
unusually extreme positions. A closer analysis showed that this effect was the result of the 
Christian Democrats’ extraordinary emphasis on liberal-authoritarianism in the manifestos;
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this obscured the fact that the Christian Democrats generally do not emphasise their 
unusually extreme positions, a finding in line with the expert survey results. Therefore, 
there is further evidence for the finding that it is in particular niche parties that emphasise 
their unusually extreme positions. However, it is not the case that their mainstream 
competitors consistently fail to exhibit a similar strategy, only that they do so weakly 
compared to their smaller, more marginal competitors.
Unusualness and changes in salience
To add further confirmation to the hypothesis that parties tend to emphasise internally 
unusual issue positions, I also consider changes within parties. I thus examine whether 
increases in unusualness also lead to increases in salience. Using the 1989 and 2003 expert 
surveys, issue positions are compared with the associated changes in salience. Four issues 
were included in both surveys for a large number of countries: economic policy, liberal- 
authoritarianism, environmental policy and decentralisation.
Tables 8.5 and 8.6 present the results of the regression analysis for both expert 
survey and manifesto salience. The dependent variable for both series of regressions is the 
change in salience between 1989 and 2003. The main independent variables are the 1989 
level of extreme unusualness and its change between 1989 and 2003.76 Control variables 
are the 1989 levels of salience for the dependent variable issue, of systemic salience and 
mean party salience.77 The changes in systemic and mean party salience between 1989 and 
2003 were also included. Party dummies were added to all regressions.
For manifesto salience, the results confirm the hypothesis. If the unusualness of a 
party’s position within its overall policy profile increased between 1989 and 2003, it also 
increased its emphasis on that topic. For every one-unit increase in extreme unusualness,
76 The calculation o f  the unusualness measures differs for each o f the surveys since the number and content 
of the other issues became country-specific in 2003. The two unusualness measures should nevertheless be 
roughly comparable.
77 As in the cross-sectional analysis, mean party salience is included for the expert survey measurement o f  
salience only.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Predictors______________________  B stand. B B____________ stand. B B____________ stand. B
Unusualness: extreme (1989) 
Change in unusualness:extreme
.569*** (.048) .448 
-.028 (.046) -.020
.562*** (.049) .442 
-.024 (.047) -.018
Vote share (1989)
Change in vote share
Interaction: Unusualness*vote share change
.043 (.031) .212 
.023 (.026) .056 
.003 (.006) .013
Issue salience (1989)
Systemic salience (1989) 
Change in systemic salience 
Mean party salience (1989) 
Change in mean party salience 
Party dummies
-.478*** (.046) 
.166** (.074) 
.377*** (.084) 
-1.377*** (.276) 
-1.556*** (.192) 
Yes
-.553
.128
.253
-.682
-.980
-.636*** (.040) -.737 
.140** (.060) .108 
.330***(068) .221 
-.575** (.230) -.285 
-.771*** (.165) -.486 
Yes
-.638*** (.041) -.738 
.136** (.061) .104 
.323*** (.068) .216 
-.627*** (.237) -.310 
-.831*** (.169) -.523 
Yes
Constant 20.225*** (4.491) 15.928*** (2.565) 8.11*** (2.836)
Adj. R2 
n
.55
456
.71
456
.71
456
*p<.l, **p<05, ***p<.01; standard errors in parentheses.
Table 8.5 Regression results, dependent variable: change in salience between 1989
and 2003, expert survey measure
Predictors
Model 4 
B stand. B
Model 5 
B stand. B
Model 6 
B stand. B
Unusualness: extreme (1989) 
Change in unusualness:extreme
.803*** (.164) .210 
.438** (.176) .104
.778*** (.163) .203 
.544*** (.179) .130
Vote share (1989)
Change in vote share
Interaction: Unusualness*vote share change
-.054 (.109) -.094 
.091 (.090) .079 
.063*** (.023) .103
Issue salience (1989) 
Systemic salience (1989) 
Change in systemic salience 
Party dummies
-.663*** (.044) 
.626*** (.065) 
.626*** (.065) 
Yes
-.712
.545
.494
-.748*** (.046) -.804 
.627*** (.063) .495 
.795*** (.063) .518 
Yes
-,754***(.045) -.810 
.643*** (.062) .507 
.807*** (.063) .526 
Yes
Constant 3.303 (3.483) 3.272 (3.403) 1.892 (5.835)
Adj. R2 
n
.52
400
.56
400
.56
400
*p<.l, **p<.05, ***p<.01; standard errors in parentheses.
Table 8.6 Regression results, dependent variable: change in salience between 1989
and 2003, party manifesto measure
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Expert survey M anifestos
Economic policy 
Liberal-authoritarianism 
Environmental policy 
Decentralization
0.10
-0.04
- 0.19
0.13
0.3898017
0.8063781
0.4774207
0.2638716
Table 8.7 Effect of change in extreme unusualness on change in salience by issue and
party family
Note: Coefficients significantly different from 0 at a .05 level are in italics and those 
different at a .1 level underlined; results based on Models 3 (Table 8.5; expert survey 
salience) and 6 (Table 8.6; party manifesto salience), with interactions with issue dummies 
(e.g., change extreme unusualness * economic policy dummy)
that issue’s salience is predicted to increase by about half a percent. The impact of this 
variable is significant and strong. For the expert survey, the evidence that an increase in 
extreme unusualness leads to an increase in salience is weak: the effect is far from 
statistical significance. Nevertheless, there is some support for the hypothesis that an 
increase in a position’s relative extremeness also leads to a greater emphasis on that issue.
It is noteworthy that the 1989 level of unusualness also has a strong and positive 
effect for both dependent variables: the more unusually extreme an issue position was in 
1989, the more likely the party was to increase the salience of that issue. For every point 
that an issue position is more unusually extreme in 1989, salience is predicted to have 
increased by more than half an expert-survey unit and by .8% of the manifesto. Thus, it 
appears that the internal unusualness of an issue has a strong effect on how salience levels
The effect of vote share is also tested (Models 3 and 6). Here, I examine whether an 
increase in vote share would also heighten the impact of a change in unusualness on 
changes in salience. However, for the expert survey this interaction effect is not significant, 
while for manifesto coverage it is among larger parties that an increase in unusualness has 
a greater effect. The findings thus do not conform to expectations. It is not possible to 
conclude that an increase in party size will weaken the effect of an increase in unusualness.
change.
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This could partly be due to the fact that only two time points are available, which is a 
strong restriction on the data.
Finally, I also examine whether the effect of unusualness change on salience 
change differs depending on the precise issue under consideration. To do so, I again add an 
interaction term, which this time lets the effect of change in extreme unusualness vary by 
issue.78 The results are presented in Table 8.7 for the expert survey and the manifesto 
measurements. Issues where the change in unusualness has a significant effect on change 
in salience are in italics or underlined. For the manifesto measure, only the coefficients for 
liberal-authoritarianism and environmental policy are significant, with the former having a 
particularly strong effect. It thus appears that changes in the relative position of these two 
issues are clearly related to how salient they are. It is worth noting that the effect is in the 
predicted direction for all four issues. As for the aggregate examination, the results for the 
expert survey are not clear, with only change in the unusualness of decentralisation 
showing a clear positive impact on salience change. In fact, change in the unusualness of 
environmental policy is predicted as having a negative impact, in contradiction to the 
manifesto finding. Overall, there nevertheless is evidence that change in the unusualness 
(in terms of extremeness) of an issue position is reflected in the change of emphasis within 
a party ideology.
Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter’s starting point was the presentation of an alternative approach to 
conceptualising and measuring static issue interconnections: positional unusualness. This is 
defined as deviation from the party’s mean distance from the political centre. In other 
words, the more extreme or more centrist the position is compared to the party’s other 
positions, the more unusual it is. I argued that the level of unusualness has an effect on a
78 This interaction term is added to Model 2, with party dummies removed. Party family differences were not 
investigated due to the limited number o f cases per family.
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second element of party strategies, namely, issue importance. I suggested that parties 
should be likely to stress those issues that are unusual within their programmatic profile. 
The regression results, using two different salience measures, consistently show that this 
hypothesis is correct, but more so concerning internally extreme positions. The issue 
positions that are unusually extreme within a party profile are emphasised more than 
positions that are unusually centrist or not unusual. This position-salience association is 
also present for policy changes within parties: evidence was also found that issues that 
increase in terms of their relative extremeness grow in salience for that party.
This goes against the Downsian expectations of median convergence, under which 
parties should work hard at portraying themselves in the most moderate light possible. 
Parties’ increased emphasis on their more extreme issues has several possible explanations. 
First, this could be due to internal party imperatives: activists and donors may be 
particularly attracted by those more extreme positions and lead the party as a whole to 
emphasise them as well. Second, this could reflect strategic calculation: relatively extreme 
positions will attract attention to a party and build its reputation. Conversely, relatively 
moderate positions may reflect the fact the issue is relatively unimportant for the party. It is 
worth reiterating that the argument is not that parties will become more extreme in their 
pursuit of electoral success, but rather that they are likely to stress those issue positions on 
which they have decided to be more extreme.
These incentives to stress relatively extreme issues are particularly strong for 
smaller, non-mainstream parties. In particular, some parties will try to carve out an issue- 
based ‘niche’ for themselves. Such niche parties operate on a narrower range of issues and 
need to develop a reputation for ownership over those topics. In fact, there is strong 
evidence that it is smaller parties that emphasise their unusually extreme positions. This 
provides further support for the finding that the incentives and strategies of niche parties 
are fundamentally different from mainstream parties (Adams et al., 2006; Ezrow, 2008b).
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Interestingly, the strategic environment as summarised by the size of the party system was 
not found to have a consistent effect. The effect on salience as a party strategy depends 
more on the size and type of the party than on the environment in which the parties 
operate.
This chapter’s findings have three main implications for further political science 
research. First, party strategies do not always conform to Downsian expectations. There is 
a general tendency for parties to emphasise their relatively extreme positions. Second, this 
is particularly true for smaller, niche-type parties. In studying party competition, it is 
therefore necessary to take into account the different types of parties present in a political 
system. Third, it is important to view salience and position as associated party strategies. It 
is misleading to consider the two attributes of policy programmes in isolation. Two key 
ways that parties can appeal to and catch the attention of voters are taking up relatively 
extreme positions and stressing those positions. In recent work, the manipulation of 
position and salience have both been seen as useful weapons within a party’s arsenal 
(Meguid, 2005). In this chapter, we have seen that these tactics are also generally 
combined: salience and position are associated issue attributes, so it may be misleading to 
see the two issue characteristics as providing distinct campaign tools available to parties.
The relevance of this chapter for this thesis as a whole is twofold. First, I described 
the concept of intra-party positional unusualness, an alternative approach to examining 
static interconnections within party programmatic profiles. Using the expert surveys, I then 
outlined the measurement of this indicator and presented the empirical differences between 
issues and party families in terms of this concept. Second, I showed that this concept has 
an important impact on the decisions parties take concerning the salience they give to 
political issues. The place of an issue position within the overall package of policy views 
defended by a political party has significant effects on how parties campaign on that issue.
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When accounting for an issue’s role within party strategies, it is also important to know the 
position of that issue relative to the overall character of that party’s programmatic profile.
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Appendix 8.1 Calculation of unusualness measure: Germany
Party name
CDU/CSU
FDP
Green
PDS
SPD
Issue Issue position
political centre 
(weighted country 
mean)
distance from 
political centre mean extremeness unusualness
EU: Accountability 0.13 -2.03 2.16 2.60 -0.44
EU: Authority 0.27 -1.21 1.48 2.70 -1.21
Decentralization -1.99 -0.98 1.02 2.76 -1.74
Economic policy 3.90 1.42 2.48 2.55 -0.07
Environment 4.01 1.53 2.48 2.55 -0.07
Immigration 4.12 -0.62 4.75 2.23 2.52
Peacekeeping -3.92 -3.98 0.07 2.90 -2.83
Social policy 5.41 -0.50 5.92 2.06 3.85
EU: Accountability -2.59 -2.03 0.56 3.24 -2.68
EU: Authority -0.55 -1.21 0.66 3.22 -2.56
Decentralization -4.58 -0.98 3.61 2.80 0.80
Economic policy 8.21 1.42 6.80 2.35 4.45
Environment 6.26 1.53 4.73 2.64 2.08
Immigration -2.63 -0.62 2.01 3.03 -1.02
Peacekeeping -3.82 -3.98 0.16 3.30 -3.13
Social policy -5.21 -0.50 4.71 2.65 2.06
EU: Accountability -6.50 -2.03 4.47 4.45 0.02
EU: Authority -3.56 -1.21 2.35 4.75 -2.41
Decentralization -5.14 -0.98 4.16 4.49 -0.33
Economic policy 0.52 1.42 0.89 4.96 -4.07
Environment -7.31 1.53 8.84 3.83 5.01
Immigration -7.83 -0.62 7.20 4.06 3.14
Peacekeeping -3.90 -3.98 0.08 5.08 -5.00
Social policy -8.13 -0.50 7.63 4.00 3.63
EU: Accountability -5.47 -2.03 3.45 4.98 -1.53
EU: Authority 0.18 =1.21 1.39 5.27 -3.88
Decentralization 3.12 -0.98 4.09 4.89 -0.80
Economic policy -7.51 1.42 8.93 4.20 4.73
Environment -1.36 1.53 2.89 5.06 -2.17
Immigration -5.35 -0.62 4.73 4.80 -0.07
Peacekeeping 3.72 -3.98 7.70 4.37 3.33
Social policy -5.63 -0.50 5.13 4.74 0.39
EU: Accountability -2.69 -2.03 0.67 1.86 -1.20
EU: Authority -2.46 -1.21 1.24 1.78 -0.54
Decentralization 1.21 -0.98 2.18 1.65 0.54
Economic policy -1.18 1.42 2.59 1.59 1.00
Environment 0.44 1.53 1.09 1.80 -0.71
Immigration -2.85 -0.62 2.22 1.64 0.58
Peacekeeping -4.96 -3.98 0.97 1.82 -0.85
Social policy -3.24 -0.50 2.73 1.57 1.17
Note: Data from Benoit and Laver (2006).
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Appendix 8.2: CMP elections used in regression analysis
Election used
Country 2003 survey 1989 survey
Australia 10/11/2001 24/03/1990
Austria 24/11/2002 07/10/1990
Belgium 18/05/2003 13/12/1987
Canada 27/11/2000 21/11/1988
Denmark 20/11/2001 10/05/1988
Finland 16/03/2003 17/03/1991
France 09/06/2002 05/06/1988
Germany 22/09/2002 02/12/1990
18/06/1989,
Greece a 09/04/2000 05/11/1989
Iceland 10/05/2003 20/04/1991
Ireland 17/05/2002 15/06/1989
Israel 29/05/1996 01/11/1988
Italy 13/05/2001 14/06/1987
Japan 09/11/2003 18/02/1990
Luxembourg 13/06/1999 18/06/1989
Netherlands 22/01/2003 06/09/1989
New Zealand 27/07/2002 27/10/1990
Norway 10/09/2001 11/09/1989
Portugal 17/03/2002 19/07/1987
Spain 12/03/2000 29/10/1989
Sweden 15/09/2002 18/09/1988
UK 07/06/2001 11/06/1987
US 07/11/2000 08/11/1988
a: For Greece, average o f the two elections taken
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Appendix 8.3: Composition of CMP issues
Economic policy: per401 (Free Enterprise: Positive), per402(Incentives: Positive), per403 
(Market Regulation: Positive), per404 (Economic Planning: Positive), per406
(Protectionism: Positive), per407 (Protectionism: Negative), per409 (Keynesian Demand 
Management: Positive), per412 (Controlled Economy: Positive), per413 (Nationalisation: 
Positive), per414 (Economic Orthodoxy: Positive), per415 (Marxist Analysis: Positive), 
per503 (Social Justice: Positive), per504 (Welfare State Expansion: Positive), per701 
(Labour Groups: Positive), per702 (Labour Groups: Negative)
Foreign policy: peri03 (Anti-Imperialism: Positive), per 104 (Military: Positive), peri05 
(Military: Negative), peri06 (Peace: Positive), peri07 (Internationalism: Positive), peri09 
(Internationalism: Negative)
Culture/ethnic matters: per601 (National Way of Life: Positive), per602 (National Way of 
Life: Negative), per607 (Multiculturalism: Positive), per608 (Multiculturalism: Negative), 
per705 (Underprivileged Minorities: Positive), per706 (Non-economic Demographic 
Groups: Positive)
Liberal-authoritarianism: per305 (Political Authority: Positive), per603 (Traditional 
Morality: Positive), per604 (Traditional Morality: Negative), per605 (Law and Order: 
Positive)
Decentralisation: per301 (Decentralisation: Positive), per302 (Centralisation: Positive)
EU: perl08 (European Integration: Positive), peri 10 (European Integration: Negative) 
Urban-rural: per703 (Farmers: Positive)
Environment: per416 (Anti-Growth Economy: Positive), per501 (Environmental 
Protection: Positive)
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Appendix 8.4: Expert survey and CMP issues
Expert survey issue_________ CMP issue
Decentralization Decentralization
Economic Policy Economic Policy
Environment Environment
EU: Authority EU
EU: Joining EU
EU: Larger/Stronger EU
EU: Peacekeeping Foreign Policy
EU: Strengthening EU
Immigration Culture/Ethnic Matters
NATO Foreign Policy
Social Policy Liberal-Authoritarianism
Urban-Rural Urban-Rural
US Foreign Policy
USSR Foreign Policy
Note: This table shows which expert survey issues were assigned to which CMP issues for 
the regression analysis.
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Appendix 8.5: Explaining salience, Laver and Hunt expert survey
A) Expert survey salience as dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Predictors B stand. B B stand. B B stand. B
Unusualness: extreme .297*** (.127) .184 .397*** (.127) .246
Unusualness: squared .067*** (.012) .144
Vote share .034* (.017) .129 .035* (.015) .135 .039** (.015) .149
Interaction: Unusualness *vote share -.005 (.003) -.047 -.006* (.003) -.051
ENEP .463*** (.169) .185 .407*** (.154) .163 .416*** (.152) .166
Interaction: Unusualness*ENEP .059** (.023) .183 .033 (.023) .102
Systemic salience .662*** (.040) .424 .629*** (.036) .403 .628*** (.036) .403
Mean party salience -.911 ***(.089) -.404 -.677*** (.083) -.301 -.628*** (.082) -.279
Other party -.780*** (.203) -.105 -.131 (.191) -.018 -.117 (.188) -.016
Party dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4.228** (1.596) 2.713* (1.460) 1.508(1.454)
Adj. R2 .34 .45 .47
n 1178 1178 1178
*p<.l, **p<.05, ***p<.01
B) Party manifesto salience as dependent variable
Manifesto Project
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Predictors B stand. B B stand. B B stand. B
Unusualness: extreme 1.671*** (.412) .441 2.000*** (.413) .528
Unusualness: squared .163*** (.037) .157
Vote share -.019 (.048) -.032 -.008 (.047) -.032 .003 (.046) .005
Interaction: Unusualness*vote share -.023** (.011) -.094 -.024** (.011) -.098
ENEP .607 (.478) .108 .545 (.464) .098 .560 (.458) .100
Interaction: Unusualness*ENEP -.141** (.070) -.194 -.226*** (.072) -.311
Systemic salience .822*** (.041) .608 .782*** (.041) .579 .794*** (.040) .588
Other party -.794 (.594) -.046 .166 (.601) .009 .174 (.593) .010
Party dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 7.555* (3.848) 7.554** (3.737) 5.565 (3.711)
Adj. R2 .32 .36 .38
n 756 756 756
*p<.l, **p<.05, ***p<01
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Appendix 8.6 Effects of extreme unusualness on salience by issue and party family, 
expert survey salience, Laver and Hunt
Expert survey Manifestos
by issue
Economic policy 0.60 2.09
Liberal-authoritarianism -0.01 2.28
Environmental policy 0.72 2.34
Decentralization 0.44 1.42
USSR relations 0.15 1.38
Public Ownership 0.95
Urban-rural relations 0.44 1.56
Clericalism 0.79
by party  fa m ily
Communist 0.37 1.57
Green 0.63 2.09
Social Democrat 0.54 1.30
Liberal 0.52 1.71
Christian Democrat 0.56 1.53
Conservative 0.81 1.88
Agrarian 0.53 1.14
Nationalist 0.47 2.62
Ethnic-Regionalist 0.33 1.01
Note: All coefficients significantly different from 0 at a .05 level, except for those 
underlined; results based on Models 3 (Table 8.2; expert survey salience) and 6 (Table 8.3; 
party manifesto salience), with interactions with issue dummies (e.g. extreme unusualness 
* economic policy dummy) or with party family (e.g. extreme unusualness * Communist 
party family dummy).
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
Party ideologies can be characterised by their policy interconnections. The programmes 
and policies that parties propound and defend can thus be summarised as sets of 
components that vary in the level they are linked to each other. When thinking about 
specific party policies, we should see them as part of a larger package of positions and 
consider how they are connected to the other elements that constitute that system. In the 
following, the key findings of each chapter are briefly summarised, followed by a 
consideration of broader theoretical and empirical conclusions. I finish by presenting 
six ways in which the research presented here could be improved upon and extended.
Summary of key empirical findings
The four empirical chapters of this thesis presented a series of conclusions regarding the 
nature of issue systems and their effect on party competition. Chapter 5 presented the 
findings for static interconnections using expert surveys and party manifestos. There are 
clear patterns to the existence of static linkages, though these differ on the economic 
left and right, between party families and between countries. In examining these 
patterns, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between logic- and 
circumstance-based linkages. Looking at specific issue pairs, the most tightly 
interconnected issues have logical links to both economic policy and liberal- 
authoritarianism, which are often seen as the anchor issues of political competition.
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Examples of such strongly linked issues are immigration and the environment. Issues 
that are in principle free from links to both of these anchor topics are also relatively 
weakly statically interconnected.
Chapter 6 examined the occurrence of dynamic interconnections and reached 
three conclusions. First, dynamic interconnections are generally weaker than their static 
counterparts. This reflects the more demanding nature of this type of linkage as well as 
the relative absence of external forces creating interconnections. Second, there are clear 
patterns to the existence of dynamic interconnections. Differences between issue pairs 
exist and are systematic. Third, static interconnections can be used to predict dynamic 
interconnections, but with one restriction: only logic-based static linkages are likely to 
be reproduced dynamically. Overall, dynamic interconnections represent a limit to 
Downsian vote-maximising strategies in the sense that parties cannot move freely on 
logically interconnected issues.
Chapter 7 applied the framework used in the previous two chapters to the 
examination of salience interconnections. The first key difference between position and 
salience is the inherent upper limit of salience: in essence, issue emphasis is a scarce 
good that parties have to distribute between policy areas. This, together with the 
absence of external forces creating interconnections, means that salience 
interconnections tend to be weaker than positional interconnections. They are also 
generally more likely if two issues are logically linked. Thus, salience interconnections 
are similar to dynamic position interconnections in their overall weakness and in their 
basis in logic.
Chapter 8 explored the subject of issue systems and their effect on party 
competition from a different angle by examining the impact of ‘unusual’ issue positions 
on salience levels. Policy positions that are relatively extreme, compared to a party’s
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mean position, are more likely to be emphasised. This applies in particular to smaller, 
niche-type parties. This stress on extreme views is due to the need of such parties to 
develop a memorable and unique reputation for themselves and satisfy the demands of 
activists and campaign donors. This again weakens the impression that the vote- 
maximising strategies suggested by Downs might be generally applicable.
The characteristics and effects of issue systems
There are three important features of the components of party ideologies and of the 
policy interconnections that link them. First, the components -  the distinct issue areas -  
have two main attributes: a position on a spatial continuum and a given level of 
salience. In taking this approach, this thesis combines the positional work of Downs 
(1957) and his successors with the salience model of Budge and Farlie (1983), in line 
with other recent work on party competition (e.g. Meguid, 2008). The positional 
attributes were considered in Chapters 5 and 6 and the salience attributes in Chapter 7, 
with Chapter 8 analysing the two features jointly.
Second, the connections between issues can be static and dynamic. Static 
interconnections refer to the extent it is possible to predict one issue position from 
another, while dynamic linkages concern the extent to which parties tend to ‘move 
together’ on a given issue pair. The distinction between these two features is at the core 
of policy interconnections. It was also examined whether static interconnections (both 
for positions and for salience) can predict the existence of their dynamic counterparts. 
Chapters 5 and 7 considered static, and Chapters 6 and 7 dynamic interconnections. 
Chapter 8, looked at positional unusualness, a characteristic which is similar to static 
linkage, both at one time point and over time.
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Third, policy interconnections can be built on two foundations: logic and 
circumstance. A logic-based linkage exists due to some inherent connection between 
the two issues, for example due to a budget constraint or due to an underlying value that 
binds the two policy areas together. A circumstance-based linkage is created through 
historical and societal conditions that are coincidental and time-specific and is, 
therefore, not due to an inherent logical connection. The differences between logic- and 
circumstance-based interconnections were considered in Chapters 5 to 7 of this thesis.
These three categorisations form the basis of the analysis of how issues are 
interconnected within party ideologies, the first part of the research question of this 
thesis. Two core findings emerge from the empirical application of the theoretical 
approach. First, static position interconnections are the strongest and most frequent 
form of interconnection, which is due to the fact that both logic and circumstance act as 
strong forces on the creation of these linkages. Dynamic position interconnections and 
both types of salience interconnections are clearly weaker, relying as they do mainly on 
logic as their linkage foundation.
Second, there are clear patterns to the connections that exist between issues. 
Circumstance-based interconnections vary more between different subgroups of parties 
-  such as the economic left and right and party families -  than logic-based 
interconnections. For example, positions on economic policy and liberal- 
authoritarianism vary more in the level of static interconnection than economic policy 
and the environment. Overall, some issues such as immigration and environmental 
policy are characterised by their strong ties to other topics, while others such as 
decentralisation and EU support are relatively flexible. Thus, it is important to 
distinguish between logic and circumstance in predicting dynamic interconnections 
from static linkages. This was found for both position and salience linkages.
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The second part of the research question focused on the consequences of issue 
interconnections for party competition. Here, there are three central findings. First, 
policy interconnections are a limitation on Downsian vote-maximising strategies. These 
dynamic ties between issues mean that parties do not move on each policy area at will. 
Instead, change on one topic will often require a repositioning in other areas as well. 
Parties may not be able to optimise their policy programme in order to place themselves 
at the median on each issue, due to the constraints imposed by interconnections.
Second, the trend to median convergence identified by Downs (1957) is in any 
case not universally applicable. The Downsian expectation would be that parties stress 
those positions where they are closer to the political centre. However, this research 
shows that some parties have an incentive to stress issue positions that are unusually 
extreme within their overall profile. Indeed, parties tend to emphasise such positions. 
There is even evidence that they increase the salience of an issue if they become more 
extreme on that topic.
Third, and in line with salience theory, parties will find it easier to modify the 
importance of issues than the positions they take. Positions are difficult to change: 
parties are rationally immobile due to need to create a reputation for stability and 
consistency (Downs, 1957), while voters may take a while to register positional changes 
(Ordeshook, 1976). Therefore, parties have an incentive to compete using salience, 
which may be easier to change than positions (Petrocik, 1996; Steenbergen and Scott, 
2004). Another reason why salience modification is a more attractive tool for electoral 
campaigns than policy change is that salience interconnections tend to be weaker than 
position interconnections. This means that modifying salience is relatively easy because 
it is a modification of the issue system that is relatively free of consequences for the 
system as a whole.
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Implications for research into political competition
The findings of this thesis have several implications for political science, in particular 
the study of party competition. Thus, this research adds to our knowledge in four areas: 
party ideologies, party system dimensionality, party strategies and political 
representation.
First, this thesis addresses the fundamental debate concerning the nature of party 
ideologies. In the Introduction, we saw that there are two approaches to understanding 
the competitive behaviour of political parties. The first view, generally if somewhat 
falsely ascribed to Downs (1957), sees parties as solely vote-seeking actors. All policy 
preferences derive from the party’s aim to win as many votes as possible. The second 
view, as stated by Wittman (1973, 1983), argues instead that parties are ideological and 
policy-seeking. Any attempt to secure electoral success will be pursued only to further 
the aim of implementing the preferred policy preferences. Only under the second view 
would policy interconnections be expected to be frequent and strong. However, this 
thesis suggests that this dichotomy is false. There are both vote-seeking and policy- 
seeking reasons why parties should develop interconnected packages of policy 
positions. It is therefore appropriate to apply Converse’s approach to individual-level 
ideologies to political parties; indeed, party ideologies are more strongly interconnected 
than voter ideologies. The strength and frequency of policy interconnections was 
demonstrated statically and dynamically, as well as for position and salience. Parties 
should therefore be seen as ideological actors whose programmes can be characterised 
as packages of interconnected policy views.
Second, the findings of this thesis have theoretical and empirical implications 
for the study of party system dimensionality. Dimensionality is a concept of 
considerable importance for the study of political competition. The number of
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underlying lines of conflict that summarise party competition influences the nature of 
voter choice, party strategies and coalition formation (McKelvey, 1976; Laver and 
Shepsle, 1995; Warwick, 2002; McLean, 2006; Kriesi et al., 2008b). Dimensionality is 
not the immediate topic of this research. However, the concept of policy 
interconnections is closely related, even though it refers to a level below that of party 
systems. Instead of looking at the systemic level -  a country, a region or even the 
European Union - 1 consider how issues are interconnected within each party ideology. 
Both concepts therefore refer to the extent to which a complicated universe of distinct 
issues is reduced to a simpler world where policy areas are linked and one position can 
predict another (Poole, 2005). Issue systems and policy interconnections refer to a 
lower level of aggregation than party system dimensionality. This research has 
suggested that policy interconnections underline the process of simplification that 
occurs within party ideologies and creates low-dimensional spaces. Dimensions are the 
end result of the translation of the potentially chaotic issue space into a more simplified 
and more easily navigable world. Each dimension is built on the interconnections 
between single issues, so this research contributes to the study of dimensionality by 
looking at the step between the highly complex action space and the simple basic space 
(Poole, 2005). This theoretical argument is backed up through extensive empirical 
analysis of existing policy interconnections within party ideologies. In sum, I therefore 
suggest that policy systems and issue connections are concepts that further our 
understanding of party system dimensionality and complement that existing strand of 
research.
Third, this research has important implications for the explanation of party 
behaviour and party strategies. Thus, my findings question the general assumption that 
parties are driven by vote-maximising motivations. The fundamental text on party
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strategies is Downs’ 1957 work, in which he argues that parties’ overriding ambition is 
to win as many votes as possible. While the vote-maximisation assumption can indeed 
largely explain how parties behave, much research from Downs onwards has suggested 
modifications to his original framework (e.g. Strom, 1990). Particular effort has been 
concentrated on explaining the fact that convergence on the median voter is not perfect, 
even in two-party systems. This thesis shows that the existence of policy 
interconnections restricts the strategies open to political parties. First, some 
combinations of issue positions may not be attractive to parties even though they may 
appear to be the most electorally promising. Consequently, parties cannot combine 
issue positions at will, but must instead respect the requirements of logic and coherence. 
Second, parties cannot move on each issue freely, as such policy changes can affect 
other components of the issue system. The existence of dynamic interconnections 
restricts the ability of parties to change their programme for short-term electoral gains. 
Finally, parties have an incentive to stress those positions within their issue system that 
are more extreme than others as this can increase their unique profile and satisfy 
activists and donors. In sum, this thesis therefore provides further reasons, based on the 
policy interconnections approach, why parties may fail to engage in those electoral 
strategies that may at first sight promise the greatest immediate success at the polls.
This thesis also adds to our understanding of party behaviour by re-evaluating 
the manipulation of issue salience as a tool used by political actors. There has been a 
recent revival of interest in issue salience as a feature of party ideology and party 
strategies (Steenbergen and Scott, 2004; Meguid, 2005; Stoll, 2005; Netjes and 
Binnema, 2007; Belanger and Meguid, 2008; Meguid, 2008; Tavits, 2008; Libbrecht et 
al., 2009; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009). In Budge and Farlie’s (1983) original 
formulation, salience was seen as an alternative to the position-based spatial model of
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party competition and was more akin to Stokes’ (1963) valence approach. However, 
salience as a feature of party strategies is actually closely linked to positional 
approaches since both models assume that parties compete on substantive policy issues 
on which voters disagree. The most realistic approach would therefore be one that 
integrates salience and position, and this has indeed been suggested by Meguid (2005, 
2008). In this thesis, salience and position are both explicitly considered as properties of 
the components of issue systems. Given the weaker inherent interconnections for 
salience, it makes sense that this element of party ideologies should generally be seen as 
more easily manipulated than positions (Petrocik, 1996). Moreover, this thesis also 
significantly extends this debate by considering the links between positions and 
salience; more precisely, I ask what kinds of positions are emphasised by political 
parties and come to the counter-intuitive conclusion that it is the unusually extreme 
views that should be stressed. This thesis therefore provides further insight into the use 
of salience as a political strategy and how it is linked to policy positions.
Finally, the findings of this thesis may also provide further insights into the 
limits of democratic representation through political parties. The extent to which 
governments are responsive to voter preferences and concerns has been a subject of 
political science research for several decades (Pitkin, 1972; Huber and Powell, 1994; 
Stimson et al., 1995; Wlezien, 1995). Issue systems and policy interconnections may 
limit the extent to which voter preferences can be represented by political parties and 
thus realised by governments. If issue interconnections are stronger among parties than 
among voters, then there may be systematic underrepresentation of frequent 
combinations of voter preferences. This means that voter choices will be inherently 
limited and constrained -  and thus cannot be fully represented. Policy interconnections 
may also have consequences for the process of coalition formation if parties’ choice of
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government partners is limited. This could be due to existence of issue interconnections 
that may make compromises more difficult to achieve. In addition, coalition formation 
can be rendered more complicated if issue systems allow for multidimensional policy 
spaces (McKelvey, 1976; Schofield, 1978). Issue interconnections may thus also limit 
the realisation of representation of voter preferences at the government formation stage. 
While the impact of political representation is the least direct implication of policy 
interconnections, it is nevertheless a likely impact of the existence and nature of policy 
interconnections.
These are the main overall claims, findings and implications of this research, 
answering the questions of how issues are interconnected and what effect this has on 
party competition. To conclude this thesis, I now turn to a discussion of possibilities for 
future research based on this dissertation.
Opportunities for future research
A thesis, like all research, is necessarily limited by the time, space and resources 
available, so there are ways in which greater depth and accuracy could be added to the 
findings I have presented. My findings throw up important further questions that could 
be investigated in future research. Here, and to conclude this dissertation, I therefore 
consider six ways in which it would be possible to improve on and extend the findings 
of this thesis. The first three, regarding measurement and empirical focus, are largely 
practical and closely related to this dissertation; the last three, which consider models of 
party competition, the role of institutions and the effect on political representation, are 
more theoretical and broader in outlook.
The first extension concerns the measurement of position and salience of issue 
areas. In this thesis, I have used two separate data sources that provide information on
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both issue features for a series of issues. However, as pointed out in Chapter 4, both 
data sources also have definite limitations. These may apply in particular to the party 
manifesto data, which have been criticised for both the theory and practice of its coding. 
A possible extension of this thesis would therefore be to explore other ways of 
measuring issue positions and salience. One such source of data has been provided by 
Kriesi et al. (2008b), who use newspaper articles to code the position and salience of a 
series of issues for political parties following a method suggested by Kleinnijenhuis and 
Pennings (2001). Six countries in Western Europe are included, and the election 
coverage includes one in the 1970s and three since 1990 for each country. This dataset 
thus lacks the country coverage of expert surveys and CMP data, with a time 
component that is greater than that of the expert surveys but smaller than that provided 
by the manifestos. A second data source that includes a new way of examining party 
positions and issue salience on a series of areas is available through the new expert 
survey carried out by Hooghe et al. (2008). However, this dataset includes information 
for only one time point, so is clearly more rather than less limited than the two expert 
surveys I examined in this thesis. Despite these limitations, it would be worthwhile to 
check whether the conclusions in this thesis also hold for the sources of data used by 
Kriesi et al. and by Hooghe et al.
More innovatively, it would be worthwhile to pursue the possibility of applying 
newer approaches to determining party positions to this research question. One such 
method that is currently being used is computer-aided content analysis, mainly through 
the software programmes Wordscores (Laver et al., 2003) and Wordfish (Slapin and 
Proksch, 2008). The advantage of these programmes is that they provide reliable and 
flexible methods of coding large amounts of textual data. However, for the research 
question of this thesis it was necessary to consider policy interconnections in a large
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number of countries, and such a data collection simply does not exist yet and would be 
very work-intensive to create. Nevertheless, a fresh analysis of this thesis’ research 
using these more novel approaches could yield interesting insights as well as greater 
reliability.
Further, it would be worthwhile to disaggregate the broad findings made in this 
dissertation: this is the second possible extension to this thesis. I have suggested that 
issue systems differ between countries, party families and time periods, and other types 
of systematic differences are of course also possible. While issue systems were 
analysed separately for these groups of parties or party systems in Chapter 5 and (to a 
lesser extent) in Chapter 8, the main focus of this thesis has been on the broader cross- 
national patterns of issue interconnections. In future work, it would be worth examining 
in greater detail patterns in party positions and issue salience at the level of countries, 
party families and time periods, whether using the two datasets used here or other 
sources of such information. For this dissertation, the restrictions imposed by data 
availability made it difficult to analyse dynamic interconnections at a disaggregated 
level. An alternative way of examining issue interconnections from a lower level of 
analysis would be through a series of case studies. At best, the analysis in this thesis 
examined party policy change between two elections, making it difficult to understand 
the exact mechanism of dynamic issue interconnections. A series of in-depth case 
studies of the evolution of party positions could provide a better understanding of when, 
how and why parties ‘move together’ on distinct issue areas. Two ways in which this 
could be done is by analysing the debates surrounding revisions of the party manifesto 
or by examining the processes of repositioning, for example following the election of a 
new party leader.
336
Third and conversely, it would also be worthwhile to extend the analysis to a 
broader range of countries. In this research, 23 countries were examined, and these were 
mainly democracies in Western Europe or the English-speaking world. The sole 
exceptions were Japan and Israel, both with longer democratic histories than some 
European countries, and both economically developed. These countries were chosen in 
order to maximise the comparability of the countries across time. For example, limiting 
the study to these 23 countries allowed a direct comparison of the findings for the two 
expert surveys. Looking to the future, two immediate possibilities for extending the 
scope of this research exist. First, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe could be 
included very easily. For these, there is now substantial expert survey data (Benoit and 
Laver, 2006; Hooghe et al., 2008; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009). Manifestos 
have also been coded for these countries (Klingemann et al., 2007). Second, moving 
outside of Europe, expert survey data on Latin America will also soon become available 
(Wiesehomeier and Benoit, 2009). This straightforward availability of data means that 
this research could be easily extended to other areas, and it would be interesting to see 
how policy interconnections differ in these areas. Recent work already indicates that the 
structure of interconnections may be quite different in Central and Eastern Europe 
compared to Western Europe (Marks et al., 2006; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009).
A fourth extension of this thesis would be a closer examination of the links 
between position and salience. In Chapter 7, I argued that salience is more easily 
modifiable than positions; this is due in part to the fact that an issue’s level of 
importance is less strongly interconnected with other topics. Chapter 8 added to the 
examination of issue salience and issue interconnections by showing that unusually 
extreme issue positions are also stressed more than others. Two paths for future 
research are possible. First, it is necessary to untangle the measurement of salience and
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position. The two concepts are of course related, with directional theory, for example, 
essentially combining them into one concept (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989). 
However, there is a fundamental difference between the salience of a position -  that is, 
the level of coverage it receives by a political party -  and the position itself. Experts 
assessing salience are likely to amalgamate the two, even if only unconsciously. 
Similarly, manifesto coding, which in the CMP approach is based in salience theory, 
has also been used successfully to examine party positions. It would therefore be useful 
to develop a measurement approach that clearly distinguishes between these two related 
but distinct features of the components of issue systems.
In addition, further exploration of the links between salience and position is 
necessary. Indeed, this will help provide a better understanding of the advantages and 
drawbacks of various measurement methods. In this thesis, I have shown within the 
context of issue systems that the two features are distinct (Chapter 7) but also affect one 
another (Chapter 8). For too long, salience and position have been considered as 
alternative approaches to understanding party competition. In future research, these two 
aspects of party strategies should be considered together, as has already been done in 
other relevant work (Meguid, 2005, 2008). Indeed, more research is necessary on how 
the two features of issue system components influence one another. For example, it 
would be interesting to know more about the kind of positions that are stressed by 
political parties, and under what conditions. In this thesis, I have provided a first answer 
to this question, but there is room for more research on the links between these two 
concepts.
Fifth, further research could consider in more detail the influence of institutions 
on the patterns of policy interconnections. This thesis has not considered in detail the 
possible impact of country-specific features on the kind of policy interconnections that
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develop, though cross-national differences were examined in Chapter 5 and the impact 
of party system size in Chapter 8. There is a long list of potential institutional factors 
that might impact on policy interconnections. This applies in particular to circumstance- 
based interconnections, which are more flexible than logic-based linkages and could 
thus more easily be affected by national conditions. Possible institutional factors range 
from the organisation of society (e.g. the size of the manual labour force and the level 
of religiosity) via the electoral system (e.g. party system size and electoral rules) to the 
state structure (e.g. corporatism and federalism). Future research could use such 
institutional variables in order to predict patterns of interconnections, perhaps aided by 
a larger sample that includes Central and Eastern European and Latin American 
countries.
Finally, this thesis has concentrated on policy interconnections within party 
ideologies, and the findings have provided answers to the question of how issues are 
linked and how this affects party competition. However, I have argued that this research 
has consequences that go beyond our understanding of how political parties compete. 
Policy interconnections in party competition thus could also limit voter choice and 
influence coalition formation. Due to the focus of this thesis, these claims have 
remained theoretical. Future research could address these issues directly. For example, 
it would be possible to compare in detail the extent of issue interconnections within 
voters’ views with those found among political parties. Two questions in particular 
could be answered. First, are voter ideologies less tightly interconnected than party 
ideologies? While this has been one of my theoretical arguments in this thesis, it has as 
of yet not been empirically examined. Second, are there frequent combinations of issue 
positions that are systematically underrepresented by political parties, and if so, which 
ones? This would partly be a consequence of looser interconnections among voters.
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Importantly, this would strengthen the case that policy interconnections restrict the 
freedom of voter choice through the nature of the ‘package deals’ on offer. A second 
strand of research could examine coalition formation in multiparty systems in the light 
of issue interconnections. Here, it would be worth analysing the impact of the policy 
profiles of parties on their likelihood of joining a coalition.
In this thesis, I have developed a new approach for summarising party 
ideologies: they are systems made up of variously connected issue components. This 
approach is not only of descriptive value, but also adds to our knowledge of the nature 
of party competition. However, not all aspects and impacts of policy interconnections 
have been investigated here; this is the task for future research.
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